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ABSTRACT

This is the first publication in a series developed by the Programa de Educacion Interamericana designed to enrich and strengthen the knowledge and understanding of Texas teachers and students in the field of intercultural education, with particular reference to Mexico and the republics of Central and South America. The project hopes to produce a new strategy for education which will foster and enhance cultural empathy wherever areas of study in elementary and secondary education relate to any aspect of Latin America. The articles in this volume were prepared to provide the teacher with an overall cultural base with specific examples: 1) Culture and Education: A Rationale for Programa de Educacion Interamericana; 2) Society and Education in Brazil; 3) Language and Cultural Empathy; 4) Philosophy of Latin America: Yesterday and Today; 5) Political Economy of Latin America; 6) The History of Latin America; 7) Contrasts of Peru and Brazil; 8) Social Forces in Latin America. Statistical data, biographical information on key persons in Latin America, and quite extensive bibliographies accompany almost every chapter. Curriculum materials, teaching guides, and other resources in the Monograph Series are: SO 001 425 through SO 001 428. (Author/VLW)

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Intercultural Education Series

An Introduction To Selected
Latin American Cultures

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PROGRAMA DE EDUCACION INTERAMERICANA

BRYAN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY

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An Introduction to Selected Latin American Cultures

edited by

Frank W. R. Hubert

and

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1967

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PROGRAMA DE EDUCACION INTERAMERICANA
INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION SERIES

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AN INTRODUCTION TO SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN CULTURES

by

FRANK W. R. HUBERT, ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST, JAMES A. CASTAÑEDA, JOHN H. HADDOX, IRVING O. LINGER, LOUIS DE ARMOND, CARLOS ARECCO, EARL JONES

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Preface

The express purpose of this program is to enrich and strengthen the knowledge and understanding of Texas teachers and students in the field of intercultural education, with particular reference to Mexico and the republics of Central and South America. The premise of *Programa* is an honest acknowledgment that an understanding of Latin American cultures is essential to the educated citizen of the United States of America.

Innovative in concept, the project should produce a new strategy for education which will foster and enhance cultural empathy wherever areas of study in elementary and secondary education relate to any aspect of Latin America. We define "cultural empathy" as the ability to understand and appreciate the culture of another people as one's own. We expect to produce, in many substantive areas of the curriculum, units of study, curricular materials, teaching guides, and other useful resources. The ultimate goal: to help Texas teachers and students achieve a warm and genuine understanding and appreciation of our neighbors to the south.

The Bryan Independent School District, under the direction of Superintendent Alton Bowen, has provided the leadership for this project as its sponsoring agency. Mr. Bowen and his staff have worked continuously to make the effort a fruitful one. A high spirit of interagency and interscholastic cooperation provide the needed momentum and energy for a project with the dimensions and aspirations of *Programa de Educación Interamericana*. At the national level, noteworthy assistance has come from the United States Office of Education and the Department of State. On a regional basis, the laboratory staff and Executive Director Edwin Hindsman of the Southwest Education Development Corporation have performed outstanding services. Within the state and local spheres of activity, State Commissioner J. W. Edgar and the Texas Education Agency, President Earl Rudder of Texas A&M University, the professors of several other universities, and the more than 25 participating public and private schools have all joined effectively in the larger ensemble of effort which made *Programa de Educación Interamericana* possible.

FRANK W. R. HUBERT
EARL JONES

CULTURE AND EDUCATION: A RATIONALE FOR *PROGRAMA DE EDUCACION INTERAMERICANA*



FRANK W. R. HUBERT

Texas A&M University

Dr. Frank W. R. Hubert, dean of Texas A&M University's College of Liberal Arts, received the B.A., M.A. and Ph. D. degrees from the University of Texas. He is senior adviser of *Programa de Educación Interamericana.*

Some of his current responsibilities include: president, Board of Directors, Southwest Educational Development Laboratory; chief adviser, principal investigator or coordinator of four additional research projects in progress—"Creative Application of Technology to Education", "Application of Scientific Management Practices to Academic Administration", "Design of a Model Set of Criteria for Evaluation of Proposed Courses in Junior and Senior Colleges and Universities", "Design and Production of Supplementary Materials for Teachers of High School Physics".

Dr. Hubert holds memberships in many professional societies and related organizations, some of which are: American Academy of Political Science; State Board of Examiners for Teacher Education; Executive Committee, Texas A&M University; Research Council, Texas A&M University; Councilor, Texas A&M Research Foundation; National Society for the Study of Education; State Executive Board for the Department of Religion in Public Education of the Texas Council of Churches; Governor's Committee on Public School Education, 1966; president, Association of Texas Colleges and Universities, 1965-66; Advisory Committee on Academic Freedom, Tenure, and Responsibility, 1966; Coordinating Board of Texas Colleges and Universities, 1966.

Among his numerous publications are: "System-Wide School Evaluation", "Criteria and Formulae in Faculty Evaluation", "An Educational Profile for Every Student", "Let's Talk About Certification", "School Accreditation", "Symposium on Interprofessional Cooperation", "The Search for Excellence in Industrial Arts", "The Year 'Round School: Pros, Cons, and a Proposal", and "New Perspectives in Schools and College Relations".

Culture and Education: A Rationale for *Programa de Educación Interamericana*

Frank W. R. Hubert
Texas A&M University

Culture and education share a common dilemma; they each defy the attainment of precise definition—the kind of definition which is acceptable to and mutually understood by large audiences. An excellent illustration of the application of this dilemma to culture is made by Professor James Deetz in his charming mini-book entitled *Invitation to Archaeology* (1, p. 5). He puts it this way:

> Culture can mean many things: a growth of bacteria in a petri dish, the correct way to behave in various situations, or what we get when we read "good" books, listen to "good" music, or learn to appreciate "good" works of art. To the anthropologist, culture means none of these things. On the other hand, to say just what it does mean to an anthropologist is by no means simple. In fact one entire book has been devoted to the definitions of culture used in anthropology. Assuming that you could find them, ten anthropologists selected at random on the street would probably give ten somewhat different definitions.

This uncertainty of precise meaning applies equally, if not with greater force, to education. To the individual with the orientation of a political scientist, education is a function of government by which the state perpetuates itself. The student generally thinks of education as being some variation of an adult-directed, formal process, by which a program of studies is completed. A point of view held by some would equate education with pedagogy, while others would put forth a broader, universalizing definition of education as the care and cultivation of the human system. A rapidly emerging concept on the contemporary scene is that education is an extremely complex technological process wherein a skilled professional is responsible for influencing the learning of one or more other persons in such a way that they choose to follow selected patterns of behavior for their own good and for the good of society.

The purpose of opening this monograph with an examination of the uncertainties of culture and education is aimed at the objective of emphasizing the complex nature of each of these great human systems of society. An understanding of culture at the level of expertness is not often attained by the scholar, especially when the culture under consideration is different from that of the scholar's own heritage. The task of influencing the behavior of other persons toward selected goals is in itself one of the most complex human enterprises, even when the subjects to be influenced are from the same cultural background.

The definition of culture adopted for the purpose of this monograph, comes again from Professor Deetz and is expressed by him in this fashion:

> Culture (is a) uniquely human system of habits and customs acquired by man through an extrasomatic process, carried by his society, and used as his primary means of adapting to his environment. (1, p. 7)

The selection of a definition of education was made with the role of the teacher in mind, and has already been cited; namely, it is a complex technological process wherein a skilled professional is responsible for influencing the learning of others in such a way that they will choose to follow selected patterns of behavior for their own good and for the good of society.

Consider now the exceedingly complex task which society assigns the first grade teacher of reading. Here is a person whose responsibility is to influence the behavior of twenty or more six-year-old children in such a way that within less than a year each of them is able to observe and behaviorally react to a series of printed symbols. On the basis of educational technology alone, this task is difficult even when the children assigned to the teacher's care have been selected on the basis of criteria calculated to enhance and expedite the attainment of the objective. Ideally they are children who share a common heritage in the language of instruction and who have similar social habits and customs. In other words, the children are kindred in their cultural backgrounds.

Turn now to the heart of the problem of intercultural education. The technical problems confronted by the teacher are increased exponentially at that moment when one or more children with cultural backgrounds different from their peers are placed in the classroom group. The newcomers bring a set of social customs and habits to the classroom which are substantially different from those of the group, and the teacher's concern for the individualization of instruction takes on a new meaning. The magnitude of the problem assumes massive proportions when the only language which the new student brings with him is different from that of the other class members and the teacher. Without a common understanding of language between teacher and pupil and between the individual student and his classmate peers, the social and technical obstacles to education are paramount.

In today's society, three great forces are propelling the educational system toward an emergency need to recognize the importance of intercultural education and to make relevant social and technical adjustments to those problems which arise at the interface of two or more cultures in the same environment. Because of the importance of these great forces on *prima facie* evidence alone, they are listed here without elaboration. The first of these is the broadly encompassing civil rights movement which is at work in all components of society in the United States of America and in many other nations of the world. Second, the urbanization pattern of the nation is responsible for bringing together vast collections of diverse ethnic and cultural groups into small, highly concentrated locations. Finally, the scope and rate of population mobility on an international as well as a national scale have reached new proportions not matched in history, and most economic and political indicators point toward a further acceleration of this movement of people. The intense activity of these three social forces will continue to bring to the same educational setting, at increasing rates, persons with differing backgrounds, customs, habits, and language. This is the milieu for intercultural education generally, and it is the specific point of origin for *Programa de Educación Interamericana.*

Programa de Educación Interamericana was designed as an innovative experiment in intercultural education within the context of Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (3). The express purpose of *Programa* is to enrich and strengthen the knowledge and understanding which Texas' elementary and secondary school students and teachers have of other cultures, with specific reference to the American republics of Mexico and those of Central and South America. In effect, the rationale for this experiment acknowledges the accumulation, over a period of years, of a cultural deficit on the part of the principal components of the state's educational program. It recognizes that today's schools are confronted with the task of educating students to live effectively in an environment whose boundaries cannot easily be located.

The selection of Latin American cultures as the focal point for this study was based upon logical grounds, Texas' fortunate proximity to Latin America and the presence of unique resources available in the Southwest.

The nurture of cultural empathy is the project's intangible, yet ultimate goal—a goal that is definitely in harmony with the affirmation of one's own local, state, and national heritage. The ability to understand and to appreciate the habits and customs of another people, almost as if one himself were a participant in that culture, is the essential educational experience sought through *Programa.*

The concrete objective of the project is to produce a planned system wherein participating educational agencies design and implement programs of curriculum development, instruction, and teacher education which give forceful attention to intercultural education in the Americas. The actual work of *Programa* is carried out by a hand-picked headquarters staff of competent professionals who are knowledgeable and experienced with intercultural education programs. This staff works with a group of teachers selected from the more than 25 participating local education agencies on the basis of their social and intellectual maturity, their expertness in one of the teaching areas involved in the study, and their proven experience in curriculum development programs. These intercultural innovators pursue a vigorous orientation program, followed by a carefully guided study-travel seminar in their assigned countries. An evaluation and assessment period immediately follows the foreign travel-study seminar, during which the teachers and the staff actually design the production of innovative and supplementary teaching materials.

One of the first staff exercises of *Programa* was to make an analytical inventory of the complete range of studies in grades 1-12 of Texas' schools for the purpose of identifying those "places", i.e., subjects and grade levels, where there exists in a substantial way the opportunity to gain a better understanding of the diverse cultures of the Americas. The richest subject matter areas for further development proved to be in art, music, language, the social studies, and literature.

For example, in grade five of state accredited elementary schools the subject matter for social studies is devoted to a year's study of "American Lands and Peoples". Major emphasis is devoted to United States geography and history, and survey studies are extended to the other nations and republics of the Americas. The official description of this program of studies includes this comment (2, p. 252):

> Since a comprehensive study of the various countries of Latin America is not feasible, it is suggested that emphasis be placed on the natural environment and way of life in the major regions of Central and South America. Emphasis is also placed on such topics as inter-American relationships, including the Pan American Union and the Organization of American States.
>
> It is suggested that this regional survey of Latin America be followed by a study in detail of at least one culture or nationality group in each: Central America, South America, and the island countries. Criteria for selecting a particular culture to study may include such considerations as
>
> - importance of the country in the current international scene
> - importance of influence on other cultures
> - particular ties or relationships to the United States.
>
> Time alloted for and emphasis given to study of a particular culture are matters for the local schools to decide. Also, the local school selects specific areas of content for emphasis and omission.

Local school districts which make a serious effort to "study in detail at least one culture or nationality group" in Central and South America and in the island countries, actually take on an instructional task which requires unusual teacher qualifications and the availability of extensive reference and illustrative materials. One of the objectives of *Programa de Educación Interamericana* is to add significantly to the materials available for teacher use in culture-studies, and also to expand the culture-knowledge of the teachers associated with the project.

Throughout the course of the entire project, the insight and experience of authoritative academic specialists is brought to bear upon problems of Latin American studies in Texas schools. This publication is the direct outgrowth of the rich contributions of representatives from psychology, linguistics, philosophy, education, sociology, political economics, and history.

The educational agencies and institutions included in this project represent a wide range of social and economic characteristics, and no simple formula is sufficient to describe their educational and cultural backgrounds. The participating school districts' students are primarily Anglo-American, although several districts have a large number of Latin American, Spanish-speaking students. The project includes both urban and rural areas. And it includes school systems whose programs of Latin American study are at dramatically different levels of development.

All participating school systems, however, share the same dilemma, fostered by America's expanding world leadership and the consequent international emphasis in education. Teachers are necessarily assuming responsibility for international studies, but often they do not feel prepared. Likewise, teachers often find that available international studies materials have not been developed to the high quality that our present need requires. There is a genuine demand for a consistent review of teacher preparation and for a comprehensive evaluation of materials.

There is another, more specific need represented in the participating school systems. The children and teachers in many of these districts live in communities that are bilingual and where the influence of Latin America is omnipresent. A more intensive program of Latin American studies is designed to meet this local need of self-understanding and communication. The richness of Latin American culture is not always fully grasped, and the Latin American element in our own life not fully appreciated. There is need then to explore Latin America, whose past and present at many points has coincided or conflicted with that of Texas.

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SOCIETY AND EDUCATION IN BRAZIL



ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST

University of Chicago

Dr. Robert Havighurst received his A.B. degree from Ohio Wesleyan University and his Ph.D. (in chemistry) at Ohio State University. He did research work in chemistry and physics for several years, and taught these subjects at Miami University in Ohio and at the University of Wisconsin.

After he became interested in problems of education, Professor Havighurst changed his field of work to that of education and taught at Ohio State University and the University of Chicago, where he has been professor of education since 1941.

Since 1965, Dr. Havighurst arranged to divide his time between Chicago and Kansas City where he is professor of education and director of the Center for the Study of Metropolitan Problems in Education.

Dr. Havighurst has conducted research in the field of human development at all age levels. He has traveled extensively in Latin American countries, especially Brazil and Argentina. He works frequently with the University of Puerto Rico in research projects on education and psychology. Professor Havighurst is in great demand as a speaker, lecturer, and consultant on his fields of specialization and on Latin America.

He is author or co-author of the following books: *Human Development and Education; Older People; Society and Education; Educating Gifted Children; The Psychology of Moral Character; Growing Up in River City; Society and Education in Brazil; The Public Schools of Chicago—A Survey Report; The Educational Mission of the Church; La Sociedad y la Educación en América Latina; A Cross-National Study of Buenos Aires and Chicago Adolescents.*

Society and Education in Brazil

Robert J. Havighurst
University of Chicago

The Land and the People

Brazil is the largest and most variegated Latin American country. Occupying half of the land area of South America, it stretches from the equator into the south temperate zone. While only 9 percent of its territory lies below the Tropic of Capricorn, this is a rolling, fruitful and well-watered area that contains 30 percent of the 85 million Brazilians, and that produces most of the industrial goods and much more than its proportional share of the national income.

Regional differences are so great in Brazil that it is necessary to discuss education in terms of regions. A single description of the average for the country would not fit the facts for any part. The North, a large region consisting of two states and the territories in the Amazon basin, is sparsely populated, and has a predominantly mestizo population. The principal economic activity is trade in tropical products. One quarter of its population lived in places of 10,000 or more inhabitants in 1960, making it more urbanized than the more rural Northeast. The average income and socioeconomic status is slightly above that of the Northeast.

The Northeast, with 31 percent of the population in 1965, consists of nine states which make up the "hump" that extends into the Atlantic below the Amazon region. This area was the most prosperous during the colonial centuries, when a large slave population did the work of the great subtropical plantations. With the decline of tropical agriculture, the pressure of population growth, and the periodic droughts in one sector, called the "Polygon of Drought", the Northeast has become the problem area of Brazil. Its socioeconomic indices are all low, compared with the rest of the country. It has been sending surplus population in search of a livelihood to the more prosperous East and South for several decades. This area has about 45 percent mestizo or brown-skinned people according to the census, and 10 percent "Negro" or black-skinned.

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*This essay is drawn largely from the following two sources: HAVIGHURST, ROBERT J. & MOREIRA, J. ROBERTO. Society and education in Brazil. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965 and HAVIGHURST, ROBERT J. & GOUVEIA, APARECIDA. Socioeconomic development and secondary education in Brazil. International Education Review 12:397-415. 1966.

The East, including the great mineral-producing and agricultural state of Minas Gerais and the industrial area of Rio de Janeiro, contains 25 percent of the population and is relatively prosperous, as can be seen from Table 1. This area has about 16 percent "Negroes" and 33 percent brown-skinned.

The South, including the four states from São Paulo to the south, has 36 percent of the population and is the most modern and progressive area, both in matters of industry and of agriculture. For example, in 1950 only 34 percent of Brazilian farms had plows, but 84 percent of these plows were in the four southern states. Only 37 percent of employed males were occupied in agriculture in the South in 1960, while 57 percent of the men of the North and Northeast were in agriculture. Only 10 percent of the population is Negro or mestizo, and there is a substantial group of over a half million orientals of Japanese ancestry.

The Two Brazils. Historians and contemporary writers alike have spoken of "two Brazils". One is the traditional, agricultural, aristocratic social structure of the colonial and imperial periods. The other is the modern, industrial, democratic social structure which has emerged by the middle of the 20th century as the Brazil of the future, but not without resistance due to the inertia of the traditional Brazil and the vested interests of the agricultural aristocracy. The "two Brazils" are present in every part of the country but the tendency is for the new Brazil to predominate in the South while the old Brazil predominates in the North and Northeast.

Contemporary Social Structure

Economic development is the key to understanding the present social structure of Brazil. The development of a truly modern economy started about 1940 when Brazil prospered from war-time prices for her exports of raw materials. Since there was little that she could import in return from the belligerent countries during the war, domestic industry was stimulated to produce goods that formerly were imported. The increase of industrial production during World War II was approximately 50 percent. A modern steel industry was created at this time; it was expanded after the war and produced 3 million tons annually in 1962. This was still far from meeting Brazil's domestic needs for steel, but it made Brazil one of the leading steel-producing countries of the world. By 1962, Brazil's automobile industry was meeting the demand for new cars. Vast resources of water power put Brazil among the four leading nations in potential hydroelectric energy.

Table 2 shows how the economy developed between 1949 and 1960: The gross national product increased more rapidly than it did in the USA during that period, and the industrial product tripled in a ten-year period.

Meanwhile the country was becoming more urban. The proportion of the population living in places of 2,500 and over grew from 31 percent in 1940 to 45 percent in 1960.

Brazil is one of the "developing countries". It is in Category II of the four categories defined by Harbison and Myers* on the basis of a dozen indices of human resources development. Category II is called "Partially Developed Countries", while Category III is called "Semi-Advanced Countries". Brazil lies between the two categories. The regional differences are such that the South and East regions are in Category III, while the North and Northeast are in II.

Since Brazil is mainly a Catholic country, the Roman Catholic Church bulks large in the social structure. Not only does it maintain a large secondary school and university establishment, but its leaders are also directly involved in programs for better living conditions in the city slums and for the improvement of working conditions of agricultural laborers in the Northeast.

The family as an institution is changing in the ways that families in other societies change as the society becomes more urbanized and industrialized. Women are employed outside the home much more than was formerly true. Whereas before 1930 almost the only employment available to a middle class woman was school-teaching, now women are working in all professions and in many business offices. The number of children per family is smaller in cities than in rural areas, and smaller in the middle class than in the working class.

In spite of the intervention of military forces in the national government since 1964, the governments of Brazil have been relatively stable compared with other Latin American countries. There has been no civil war. Since the dictatorial regime of Getulio Vargas, which ended in 1946, there has been a responsible national government with a Congress elected by the people, even though some of the civil rights have been denied outspoken opponents of the government since 1964.

On the whole, the Brazilian educational system has grown and developed without much political interference and with substantial government support. The three levels of government—national, state, and local—support public and private education. The percentage distribution of government support was 45, 49, and 6 percent from federal, state, and local governments respectively in 1964. When the cost of university education is included, the government expenditure on education in 1964 was 2.8 percent of the gross national product.**

The national Congress, after a number of years of work by committees and commissions, passed the present Basic Law for Education in 1963. This law is aimed at making the states more responsible in the government of education, and reducing the activity of the federal government. However, the federal government maintains control of and is the major support of the universities of the country.

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*HARBISON, FREDERICK & MYERS, CHARLES A. Education, manpower, and economic growth. Tables 6-7. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964.

**MINISTERIO DO PLANEJAMENTO E COORDENACÃO ECONÔMICA. Plano decenal de desenvolvimento econômico e social, educação (1), Table 37. Escritorio de Pesquisas Econômicas Aplicadas, 1966.

Socioeconomic Structure and Education

Brazil has the same type of social class structure that is found in most of Europe and North America. There is a small upper class based on wealth and family lineage. There is a growing middle class consisting of people in non-manual or white-collar occupations. This is generally divided between an upper-middle and a lower-middle class. And there is a large manual working class which can be divided into an upper-working class and a lower-working class. The upper-working class has a stable position, stable family life, a fairly good income, and some occupational skills. The lower-working class does unskilled work, has a relatively low income, and is subject to unemployment; some of this group live an unstable family life.

The distribution of employed persons in Brazil according to socioeconomic status is given for 1950 in Table 3. Since 1950 there has been an increase in the upper-middle and lower-middle groups due to economic development, and a decrease in the size of the lower-working class. In other words, all of Brazil has tended to follow the pattern shown in Table 3 for the South.

Race and Socioeconomic Status. Brazil's large Negro ex-slave population is unequally distributed among the regions, as was noted above. Race in Brazil is regarded as a *social* fact rather than a biological one, and Brazil has quite a different "race problem" from the problem in the USA, and different again from the problem in the Union of South Africa. There is no legal discrimination in Brazil based on race or color. Furthermore, in all regions except the South a majority of the people is neither white nor Negro but a variety of shades of brown which comes from a mixture of Caucasian, Indian, and Negro ancestors.

There is a strong statistical tendency for the darker people to be lower in socioeconomic status and for the lighter people to be high. Thus skin color and social class are related. One sees many dark-skinned children in school in a slum area of a city and few in the upper-middle class area. But there are always some light-skinned children in a slum school, and generally some dark-skinned children in private schools and in public schools in high-status neighborhoods.

However, in the northeastern State of Bahia and in the city of Salvador, once the capital of colonial Brazil, there are some upper-class persons with dark skins, and skin color has relatively little relation to social status.

The fact that social status and skin color are closely related in an ambiguous way is illustrated by the following incident which occurred when a group of Brazilian educators and social scientists visited a town of 5,000 in the interior of the state of Pernambuco. They had a letter of introduction to a lady of high status, some wealth, and an established family which had a branch in Rio de Janeiro. When they called on the lady, she was cordial and asked how she could help them. They asked her for the names of outstanding citizens with whom they might talk. She said, "By all means talk to Dr. .... He is our leading citizen." They asked her about the social groups in the community and eventually about the Negro group. "Oh," she said, "the Negroes are lazy, ignorant, immoral. They are no good. We do not need them in our community."

Later, they visited the doctor to whom she had referred and they found him to be a useful informant about the community. He was well-informed and friendly. They noticed that he was a very dark-skinned mulatto.

When they called again on the lady to thank her for her courtesy, they said, "We enjoyed talking with Dr. .... But one thing puzzles us. He is a Negro and you said that Negroes were lazy, ignorant, and immoral. We don't understand this." "Oh," she said, "Dr. .... is not a Negro. He is a doctor."

The Educational System

The educational system of Brazil is illustrated by the chart of Figure 1. It is similar to that of France in the early 20th century and is modelled after it. The normal age for entering school is 7, though many middle class children enter at 6 and frequently they have attended a private kindergarten. The primary school normally lasts four years, though the cities now generally have added a fifth year. In some rural areas, however, the primary school has only three grades.

In November, 1964, a national school census was taken, covering nearly all children from 7 through 14 years of age. The results are as follows:

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF PUPILS ATTENDING SCHOOL, 1964.
(last month of school year)

Age	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Enrollment (thousands)	956	1,304	1,300	1,426	1,245	1,254	989	765
Percent of Age Group Enrolled in School	47	66	72	73	75	71	67	61

This table should not be interpreted to mean that no more than 75 percent of Brazilian children attend primary school. Rather, since the primary school is generally a 4- or 5-year school, this table shows that about half of all children start school at age 7, while others do not start until they are 9 or 10. Those who start late may continue in the primary school until they are 14 or older. Other data show that between 90 and 95 percent of Brazilian children attend primary school at some time in their lives. Most of them stay in school for at least 4 years. Many of them have to repeat the first grade and some may repeat this grade two or three times, eventually dropping out without becoming really literate.

The average number of years of schooling for a Brazilian pupil by the time he is 14 years of age is 5.3 years, as can be computed from the table given above. But this table includes children who attend the first cycle of the middle school, which some enter at age 12.

There are substantial regional differences in primary school attendance. In the more urban and industrial states of the South of Brazil, twice as high a proportion of children complete the 4-year primary school with passing grades as is the case in the predominantly rural North and Northeast.

The middle school system in Brazil has been highly selective. Middle schools generally charge tuition fees, even if they are state supported. They have an entrance examination that a child who has finished the 4-year primary school can seldom pass. Consequently, parents generally send their children to a tutor or a special tutoring school for a fifth year, during which they get ready for the entrance examination. Now that the fifth grade is added to the primary school in most cities, automatic entrance to the middle school is granted upon completion of the fifth grade unless the school is so crowded that it must apply an examination as a criterion of admission.

The system of middle schools is very complex. There are several different types of schools and they may be operated by the state or federal government, churches, or private individuals and groups. The middle school is divided into two cycles, the first of four years and the second of three years. The first cycle, called the *ginasio,* takes pupils normally from the age of 12 through 15, and gives a basic general education. There are also commercial schools, industrial schools and a few normal schools which have first-cycle "basic courses" of two to four years.

The second cycle consists of the academic *colegio,* commercial, industrial, and agricultural schools, and normal schools which train teachers for primary schools.

The middle schools of the second cycle appear at first glance to be quite different from each other. However, graduates of any second cycle course are eligible to take the usual entrance examinations for a university course. Some technical schools give very good preparation for university work in the natural sciences. They are attended by youth from upper-middle class families who expect to enter engineering or physical science courses in the university. Other technical schools are highly-specialized vocational training schools. Some commercial schools at the second cycle give good preparation for the economics courses of the university, though most students in commercial schools expect to go directly from the school to a job. The normal schools give good preparation for the liberal arts courses in the university and many girls attend a normal school with the expectation of entering the university rather than of teaching in a primary school.

To further complicate the picture, many middle level schools operate day and night programs, and the night schools are sometimes more crowded than the day schools. Students attending night schools are likely to be employed and above the "normal" age. The median age of a sample of students in the fourth year of the first cycle was found to be 17 in the study described later in this chapter.

The universities are relatively recent in Brazil. The first true university was founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1920. This was a combination of professional schools such as law, medical, and engineering schools which had grown up in Brazil during the preceding century. At present there are 32 universities, 22 of them financed by the federal government, three by state governments, six by the Roman Catholic Church, and one by private non-church funds.

An admission examination is required for entrance to a university; each unit or "faculty" of a university is responsible for its own. University enrollments have grown rapidly since 1940, as shown in Table 4. In the five years after 1960 there was a 66 percent growth. Enrollments have shifted toward the schools of engineering, exact sciences, and business administration, and away from the traditional facilities of law and medicine. The proportion of women in the university student body has increased steadily.

The general increase of school enrollment is also documented in Table 4. There it can be seen that middle school and university enrollments have grown equally, with a five-fold increase in the 18 years from 1947 to 1965. Primary school enrollment has also increased but at a slower rate. In the more highly developed regions almost all children go to school and stay for at least 4 years; consequently the enrollments increase only as the population of school age increases in these areas.

Administrative Control. In terms of public and private administrative control, middle schools and universities are about evenly divided. In 1965, government administered universities enrolled 57 percent of the university students; the remaining 43 percent were in private universities, nearly all Roman Catholic. In the same year, governments administered middle schools with 48 percent of the enrollment, while a variety of private organizations administered schools with the remaining 52 percent. Many of the schools were Roman Catholic; some were administered by Lutheran and other Protestant bodies; many were operated by individuals and groups for profit.

Primary schooling is overwhelmingly public supported and administered. Only 12 percent of these pupils were in private schools in 1962. States administered schools with 64 percent of the enrollment and *municipios* (counties) administered schools with 24 percent of the enrollment. These latter schools were generally below the state schools in quality of educational programs, and training and experience of teachers.

The cost of instruction per pupil per year differs greatly with the level of schooling. For 1960 and 1961, two separate studies indicated that the average cost per pupil per year in primary schools was equivalent to $15 in United States money; for middle school pupils, $105; and for university pupils was $950. The relatively high cost for university students is due to the fact that many university classes are small; most university professors teach very few classes, and they are not well-paid. Critics of the Brazilian university system argue that classes could be increased by admitting more students without raising the cost of the university appreciably but most Brazilian professors believe that this would force them to lower their academic standards. In 1964, of the approximately 110,000 candidates who took admission examinations, only 55,000 were accepted.

Selectivity of the Brazilian Educational System. The educational system is highly selective in Brazil, principally on the basis of socioeconomic status. This, combined with urban-rural differences, produces a considerable group of illiterates among the rural poor. Table 5 shows the percentage of children born in a given year who reached various educational levels in 1964. A little more than one-third completed the 4th grade of the primary school. Actually more than two-thirds of Brazilian children were in school for 4 years or more, but at least half of them did not succeed in meeting the standards for completion of the 4th grade.

Approximately 25 percent of youth entered the middle schools in 1964, and a total of 18 percent of the numbers in the seven-year age group from 12 through 18 were in middle schools. Seventeen percent of the age group completed the first cycle, which is approximately the equivalent of junior high school in the USA. Six percent completed the second cycle of the middle school. About half of these graduates entered a university.

The Teaching Profession

In 1964 there were 500,000 teachers in Brazil, 340,000 in primary schools, about 125,000 in middle schools, and about 30,000 in universities. Among the primary school teachers, 56 percent had completed a normal school course or its equivalent, 44 percent had not. The normal school is a secondary school in Brazil. Relatively few of those who had completed a normal school course had continued with one or more years of university-level work.

The teachers in middle schools were almost equally divided between university graduates and others who had some university work or none at all. A good many middle school teachers originally were primary school teachers with a normal school training.

The simple pupil-teacher ratio, obtained by dividing the number of pupils by the number of teachers, showed a figure of 31 in Brazil in 1962. The comparable figure for middle schools in 1964 was 16.3, and for universities in 1964 was 4.7. These low ratios in middle and higher schools are due to the fact that a good many teachers have other jobs and do not teach full time. This is particularly true of university teachers; most teach only one class.

The great majority of primary school teachers is female; the majority of university teachers is male; and about 60 percent of middle school teachers is male.

Middle Schools And Socioeconomic Development In Brazil

Under twentieth century conditions, secondary education has two major societal functions:

1. To contribute to the economic development of the society.
2. To increase the degree of social integration of the society; the meaning of social integration is the tying together of various social, economic and racial groups into an interacting social system in which every person has the opportunity to achieve the social and economic status which he desires if he is willing to work for it and has the requisite abilities.

In the more industrialized and the more affluent societies the two functions go together with little or no conflict. The same educational program serves both functions quite well.

In the less industrialized and the less wealthy societies there is sometimes an apparent conflict; one function may be given priority over the other. For example, secondary education may be given to a high-status group only, and thereby may not contribute to social integration, even though it does contribute to economic development. Or, secondary education may be provided for everybody at a certain age at such a great cost that it takes the place of effective investment in higher education or in factories, and thereby slows down the economic development of the society.

In a big country, such as Brazil, one sees both functions being served with different degrees of efficiency in different regions of the country, and even in different sections of the same state, as in the differences between the major city and the remainder of the state. Even in a more industrialized big country, such as the United States, the two functions are served with different degrees of effectiveness in different regions.

Description of the Study

The study was made with a questionnaire filled out by samples of students in the last year of the first and second cycles, respectively. The questionnaire contained items concerned with family background, student attitudes toward education, student attitudes toward occupations, student values and attitudes with respect to various aspects of changing social and economic life, and student work experience.

In order to get the range of the country, students in five states were studied. The most modern and industrial state of São Paulo was one. Also, the southernmost state, Rio Grande do Sul, was studied because it has a substantial central European immigrant influence with a significant though small proportion of Lutherans. It is more rural than São Paulo but more urbanized than the other three states. From the North we chose the state of Pará, which is situated at the mouth of the Amazon. Though the state is heavily rural, 88 percent of middle school pupils in Pará are in Belém, the capital city. Two of the Northeast Atlantic-fronting states are included, Pernambuco and Ceará. Both of these states are rural, though Pernambuco has for its capital, Recife, the major industrial city of the northern half of Brazil.

An attempt was made to study a representative sample of pupils in each state. This was done separately for the capital city and for the remainder of the state. For the capital city a list was made of all the middle schools, grouped according to the categories mentioned above. For example, one group consisted of all the academic schools of the second cycle, public, day shift, and including both sexes. For each of these categories we first ascertained the enrollment of pupils in the final grade of both cycles in the year 1962. This number varied, for the metropolitan area of São Paulo, from 6,112 in the category academic-first-cycle-private-lay (non-church)-mixed sexes, day shift, to 21 in the category industrial-second-cycle-SENAI-male-day shift. It was then decided to study a certain percentage of the students which might vary from one category to another, so as to avoid too large numbers in the more numerous categories. The quotas ranged from 5 percent in the most numerous categories to 100 percent in the least numerous. Finally, in order to get the requisite number of students thus agreed upon, schools in a category were chosen by a method of random numbers until the quota was reached. All students in the final year of a school so chosen were asked to fill out the questionnaire. If this produced too many questionnaires, some were eliminated by a method of chance. The data from the different categories of schools could then be combined later through using a system of "multipliers" when it was necessary to get totals for a particular state or a particular cycle or for the capital to be compared with the interior of a state.

For the sample of a state outside the capital city, a simplified method was necessary, at the expense of the representative quality of the sample. The cities within the state were grouped into three categories as follows:

Large—cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants.
Medium—cities with 15,000 to 50,000 inhabitants.
Small—cities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants.

Among the cities of a given size category, a certain number were chosen by chance, the ratios ranging from one state to another. In the State of São Paulo, for example, the sample consisted of 2 out of 17 "large" cities; 5 out of 40 "medium" cities; and 8 out of 245 "small" cities. In each of these cities, all the schools were included that had classes in the final year of either cycle, and all of the pupils in these classes were studied. Approximately 16,000 students filled out questionnaires, ranging from 6,000 in the state of São Paulo to 1,100 in the state of Pará.

Differences In Middle School Attendance

The regional differences in attendance at middle schools are documented in Table 6, which shows the proportions of pupils in the middle schools in relation to the total populations of the five states that were studied in this research. These proportions vary from 1.66 for the state of Ceará (Northeast) to 3.66 in the state of São Paulo. These are all substantially below the proportions to be found in the USA.

Similar to regional differences are those between the major city of a state and what the Brazilians call "the interior" of the same state. This is mainly an urban-rural differentiation since most of the Brazilian states are predominantly rural and tend to have one major concentration of population in or around the state capital. Middle school attendance is higher in the state capital than in the remainder of the state in all five states in this study. Here, too, there is a regional difference. In the more progressive South the extent of middle schooling does not fall far short of the proportion of the population outside of the capital city. But in the North and Northeast only a minority of the middle school enrollment is outside of the central city, compared with a large majority of the total population.

Sex Differences

There are some sex differences in attendance at middle schools which also vary by regions. In general, boys outnumber girls in the middle schools of the Southern states, while girls outnumber boys in the North and Northeast.

The major factor in determining middle school attendance is socioeconomic status. The occupation of the father was taken as the index of socioeconomic status. The student was asked to state the occupation of his father in enough detail to indicate what kind of work he did, how much responsibility he had, how much land he owned, and like factors.

The occupations were grouped into three levels, called high, middle and low. The A or high level is equivalent to upper and upper-middle class in the usual North American social science terminology. The middle level is equivalent to lower-middle class. The C or low level consists of the manual worker class which includes a large majority of Brazilians but did not produce many middle school students in this study.

As can be seen in Tables 7 and 8, the second cycle tends to have higher proportions of high-status students than the first cycle. This is true for the states of São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Pernambuco. Also, in all five states the second cycle has fewer low-status students than the first cycle. Still, the differences between the two cycles are not great ones. Perhaps the differences would be much greater if the first year of the first cycle were compared with the last year of the second cycle. Possibly, by the close of the first cycle, the effects of family social status on middle school attendance have largely become established. However, it may be true that even at the beginning of the first cycle these effects are fairly visible.

Although the differences between capital and interior are seldom statistically significant, there is a strong and apparently reliable tendency for the capital to have more high-status students than the interior cities. This is only weakly balanced by the tendency of the cities of the interior to have more lower-status pupils. The most likely explanation is that there are proportionately more high-status families in the capital than in the interior, and proportionately more lower-status families in the cities of the interior.

Indices of Opportunity Through Middle Schooling

In order to compare the five states on the extent to which youth of the various socioeconomic groups attend middle schools, an "index of opportunity through middle schooling" has been worked out.* This index is the percent of youth who attend middle schools for some period of time, as little as a few months or as much as the full seven years. Table 9 gives the data, together with comparable data for the USA. For each state there is given the percentage of the 12-18 age group enrolled in middle schools. These numbers are broken down into percentages of the 12-18 age group in the various socioeconomic levels. Then from the data given on the student questionnaires it is possible to compute the percentage of youth from each socioeconomic level who attend middle school.

The estimates in Table 9 are crude mainly because the percent of youth in the various socioeconomic groups is not known accurately. Since the percentage in the "high" socioeconomic group is only 3 to 6, an error of one or two percentage points can throw the opportunity index off by 25 to 50 percent. However, the results for the lower-status group are quite stable and reliable, and indicate clearly the level of opportunity through middle schooling and the variation in this level among the states.

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*For a full explanation of the index of opportunity, see the paper by Havighurst and Gouveia referred to previously.

In general, it seems likely that children of middle-status families have about as much opportunity through middle schooling as do children of upper-status families. This conclusion would be modified if we took completion of a second cycle course as the criterion of opportunity. As Tables 7 and 9 show, the upper-status students have higher relative indices of second cycle attendance than of first cycle attendance in São Paulo, Rio Grand do Sul, and Pernambuco.

For comparison purposes, the figures for the United States of America are given in Table 9. The number, 74, in the second column is the percentage of the age group 16-18 who reached the highest three grades (10-12) of the American secondary school in 1964. Similarly, the numbers in the first column are the percentage distribution of students in the highest three grades of the secondary school according to socioeconomic status.

Distribution of Socioeconomic Groups

Youth of the various socioeconomic groups are not distributed evenly among the various types of schools. Table 10 shows how the students from lower-status families are distributed. As would be expected, youth from working-class families are more likely to attend commercial, industrial, and agricultural schools than they are to attend academic and normal schools. Especially at the second cycle, the academic and the normal schools are heavily high and middle status in composition.

The only exception to this rule is seen in the composition of the second cycle industrial schools of the city of São Paulo. Although the first cycle industrial schools of São Paulo are 69 percent working-class in composition, the second cycle industrial schools are only 20 percent working-class. The explanation for this is that there are several private schools of industrial chemistry in São Paulo which attract large numbers of boys from middle- and high-status families. Interviews with students in these schools indicate that such schools offer an attractive pathway to employment in the prosperous chemical industry of Brazil, leading to managerial positions. At the same time, these courses are so strong in the instruction in physical science and mathematics that they offer a good preparation for the entrance examinations to the engineering schools and the exact science faculties of the universities. Thus some high-status youth choose these schools in preference to the scientific course in the academic *colegio*.

Attitudes Toward Socioeconomic Development

There is a relation between the values and attitudes of people and the level and rate of economic development of their society. This is not a simple cause-effect relationship. That is, when people have attitudes favorable to economic development, this does not necessarily produce economic development. Rather, attitudes influence development and development influences attitudes. There are other factors also: such as natural resources, size of population, climate, and political organization, which affect the socioeconomic structure and the rate of socioeconomic development of a country.

Thus the social attitudes of young people are one element in the complex of factors that make for development of the society. Consequently we have attempted to study some of the attitudes of Brazilian youth that are presumably relevant to socioeconomic development. We have data on various sub-groups of youth who attend middle schools in Brazil, but we do not have comparable data on other groups in Brazil, or on youth in other countries.

The two attitude scales which seem to be most useful for the purpose are called the modernism-traditionalism scale and the initiative-ambition scale. These are both designed to measure attitudes toward participation in a modern industrial democratic society as one who is autonomous and welcomes social change and social complexity.

The modernism-traditionalism scale contains 16 items, such as the following with the instruction to the student to indicate much or little agreement or much or little disagreement.

"As things are today, an intelligent person should concern himself with the present and not worry about what might happen in the future."

The initiative-ambition scale is adapted from a "risk-taking scale" developed for use with employees of business concerns in the United States. This was designed to measure propensity to take risks as against the seeking of security. It consists of eight pairs of job descriptions, the respondent being asked to choose one of each pair as his preference. Examples are:

(1) A job in which I succeed very well or fail completely.

(2) A job in which I will never be a great success, but in which I will never fail completely.

(1) A job which is nearly always the same.

(2) A job which is constantly changing.

The Brazilian respondents answered the items on this scale as though they consisted of two clusters or factors: Risk-taking and ambition; autonomy and liking for change.

These two attitude scales were given to second cycle students. The results are shown in Tables 11 and 12.

Modernism-Traditionalism. There is no reliable difference among socioeconomic groups on the modernism-traditionalism scale. Such differences as do exist are between states, between the capital and the interior, and between the sexes. The states rank in the following order, from modern to traditional: Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Pará, Pernambuco, Ceará. The students in the capital are more modern than the students in the cities and towns of the interior. Boys are slightly more modern than girls on this scale but the differences are small, and in Rio Grande do Sul girls are slightly more modern than boys.

Initiative-Ambition Scale. On the scale of intiative-ambition, or risk-taking, there is little or no difference among socioeconomic groups but there are substantial differences between states and between sexes. The states follow the same order as they do on the modernism-traditional scale. The capital-dwelling students are higher on this scale than the interior-dwellers. And boys are substantially higher than girls on this scale.

Inferences from the Attitude Scales. The two attitude scales support each other, except for sex difference. It appears that young people attending middle schools in the more industrialized and urbanized areas have attitudes more conducive to support of, and participation in, social change which is directed toward greater individual autonomy and greater social complexity.

Among middle school students it is also clear that there are almost no reliable differences in these attitudes that are related to their socioeconomic origin. Tables 11 and 12 indicate that the high-status youths may be slightly above the others on the scale of initiative-ambition, but not of modernism-traditionalism. There is also a suggestion that the small, low-status group in Table 12 are slightly above the middle groups on the scale of initiative-ambition. But none of these socioeconomic differences compares in magnitude to the differences between states and between capital and interior within a state.

Since the middle school students who come from low-status families are only a small fraction of low-status youth in Brazil, it is quite possible that a respresentative sample of youth would show large socioeconomic differences on these attitude scales. The study made by Kahl* of Brazilian adults indicated that there was a considerable relationship between scores on Kahl's modernism-traditionalism scale and socioeconomic status among Brazilian adults.

The inference we draw is that youth from lower-status families who enter middle schools and stay four years or more are a selected group, selected for attitudes which are conducive to individual autonomy and social complexity. We do not know whether they had these attitudes when they entered middle school or whether they learned these attitudes from the middle- and upper-status students and from the teachers with whom they associated in school.

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*KAHL, JOSEPH A. Urbanização e mudanças ocupacionais no Brasil. América Latina 4:21-30. Oct.-Dic. 1962.

Students in the Labor Force

One of the striking facts about middle school students is their tendency to be employed while they attend school. About 60 percent of São Paulo boys at the end of the first cycle is employed, and about 75 percent of males at the end of the second cycle. In Pará, which has the lowest employment rate of students, 25 percent of boys in the first cycle and 40 percent of males in the second cycle are employed. About half as many girls are employed. Table 13 shows the employment rates for males of the two cycles in the capital cities. Students of commercial schools have the highest rates of employment. This is probably due in part to the fact that most commercial schools are privately operated and charge a substantial tuition fee, which may be beyond the means of students' families to pay. However, it is also due to the fact that business is expanding rapidly in Brazil and needs employees, and must get them wherever they can be found. In this situation, the existing body of students may be drawn into the labor force in large numbers.

Furthermore, students tend to work nearly full time. The proportion among employed students who work 30 hours a week or more is well above 80 percent in the more industrialized states and it is almost as high among first cycle students as among those in the second cycle. If a system of middle schools serves an important societal function by providing workers who are still students, the structure of the school system should reflect this fact, as does the Brazilian system in several ways.

For one thing, there are many night courses, at both first and second cycles, and the students in night courses have a high employment rate. Also, the school day is relatively short, not requiring more than four or five hours of attendance per day at school in the day courses, and somewhat less in the evening courses.

Another characteristic of middle school students in Brazil is their relatively advanced age in comparison with the age they would have reached if they entered secondary school at 11 or 12 and finished seven years later. A considerable group of students is three or more years older than the "experimental" age and these students have a high employment rate, no matter what kind of school they attend. It may be that the availability of employment makes it a competitor with serious pursuit of school studies, so that a student who sees that he is doing poorly in school may reduce his effort and decide to repeat the year. He still will have earned his living during the year, and the repetition of the course next year should be easier for him. (The Brazilian middle school passes or fails a student on his entire year's work; he cannot pass some work and fail in other work, thus getting partial credit for the year.)

The students from homes of lower-status are much more likely to be employed than students from higher-status families. This is seen in Table 14. Thus the opportunity to earn a living makes it possible for children of families with modest incomes to continue their studies.

Jobs Students Fill. The actual jobs held by middle school students are overwhelmingly office jobs. They work in business offices, banks, and stores. Very few students do manual work unless they are students of industrial courses. Such students are likely to be employed at jobs related to the trades they will follow later. Those in the second cycle often work at the level of a technician and will continue with such work. Students in commercial courses are more likely to continue with similar work after they graduate than students in academic courses. The working students in the academic *ginasio* and *colegio* have a wide variety of jobs.

Conclusions

From this analysis of middle schooling in Brazil, it appears that the system is contributing to the economic productivity of the society by training young people for a wide range of "middle level" jobs that do not require a high degree of specialized training but can be learned by young people with the knowledge and skills that they acquire in middle schools. The commercial schools have an important part in preparing young people for clerical jobs. The industrial and agricultural middle schools serve relatively small numbers of students, though they have grown rapidly in the most recent years. Thus, the middle schools are not an important source of trained manpower for the skilled trades and the jobs as technicians.

While training young people, the middle schools also provide a degree of social integration by bringing youth of various social class backgrounds together in school and by giving opportunity for upward mobility to a number of working-class youth. Nearly all middle schools have at least some students of working-class origin, though the academic schools which are not public-supported generally have a rather small minority of these students. The proportion of the total number of youth of working-class background who get into middle schools is quite small, though in absolute numbers it is substantial. This proportion varies from 8.5 percent in the progressive state of São Paulo to 2.2 percent in the rural and conservative state of Ceará. When this is compared with 59 percent of working-class youth who get into senior high school in the USA, it can be seen that the Brazilian middle schools are far from contributing as much toward social integration as they do in an affluent and highly urban industrial country.

APPENDIX

FIGURE 1.

THE BRAZILIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Level or Branch	Subdivisions	Years of Study	Age of Pupils	Source of Support
PRIMARY	Pre-Primary	2 - 3	4 - 6	Mainly private
	Primary	4	7 - 11	Mainly state and *municipal*
	Supplementary	2	11 - 13	Mainly state and *municipal*, with federal aid
MIDDLE				
Secondary	*Ginasio*	4	11 - 14	Mainly private, some state
	Colegio	3	15 - 18	Mainly private, some state
Normal	Rural	6 - 7	11 - 18	State and private
	Urban	4	14 - 18	State and private
Commercial	Basic	2 - 4	11 - 14	Mainly private
	Technical	3	15 - 18	Mainly private
Industrial	Basic	4	11 - 14	Mainly federal and state
	Technical	3	15 - 18	Mainly federal and state
Agricultural	Basic	2 or 3	12 - 14	Federal and state
	Technical	2 or 3	15 - 18	Federal and state
HIGHER				
Universities and advanced schools	Nearly 25 schools or faculties and departments, with nearly 60 major or specialized fields of study	3 - 4	18 - 25 & over	Mainly federal and private

Source: HAVIGHURST & MOREIRA. Society and education in Brazil. Table 16, p. 136.

TABLE 1.

BRAZIL — REGIONAL COMPARISONS ON INDICES OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

	North	Northeast	East	South	Brazil
Per Capita Income, 1958 U.S. $ of 1957	136	95	274	321	265
Primary School Enrollment. % of 11-year-olds in school, 1964	76	59	74	84	75
University students, 1965 % of age-group 20-24	1.4	1.1	2.7	2.9	2.2
Professionals of university level per million inhabitants, 1950	—	936	—	3,701	
Percent literate, 1960 Age 13-19	—	44	64	84	
Population, 1965, percent distribution	3.5	31	25	36	100

Note: The West Central region, with 4.5 percent of the population, is omitted from this table.

TABLE 2.

ECONOMIC GROWTH OF BRAZIL, 1949-60

Year	Gross National Product Per Capita	Gross National Product	Agricultural Product	Value of Services	Industrial Product
1947	95				
1948	98				
1949	100	100	100	100	100
1950	104	107	103	106	112
1951	108	114	105	114	124
1952	111	119	113	116	132
1953	112	124	113	122	138
1954	118	132	122	130	150
1955	119	137	129	133	158
1956	122	144	127	138	178
1957	130	157	140	148	199
1958	137	169	142	157	241
1959	140	178	155		279
1960	143	186	160		337

Source: FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS. Contas nacionais do Brasil. Revista Brasileira de Economia XIV. Mar. 1960.

TABLE 3.

SOCIOECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN BRAZIL, 1950

Percent of Employed Persons

Socioeconomic Class	North	Northeast	East	South	Central West	Brazil
Upper	1.5	1.5	2.0	2.5	1.5	2
Upper-Middle	5.0	2.0	3.0	5.0	2.5	3
Lower-Middle	11.0	11.0	12.0	13.5	11.5	12
Upper Working	16.5	15.5	33.0	37.0	15.5	33
Lower Working	66.0	70.0	50.0	42.0	69.0	50

Source: HAVIGHURST & MOREIRA. Society and education in Brazil. Table 9, p. 101.

TABLE 4.

GROWTH OF ENROLLMENT IN THE BRAZILIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Numbers Relative to 1960 as 100

	Primary	Middle	Higher
1947	48	36	32
1950	58	44	46
1952	63	51	55
1954	70	61	73
1956	82	71	82
1958	91	84	88
1960	7,476,000	1,224,000	96,000
(Absolute No.)	100	100	100
1961	101	110	106
1962	110	124	115
1963		140	132
1964		155	151
1965		176	166

Source: MINISTERIO DO PLANEJAMENTO E COORDENAÇÃO ECONÔMICA. Plano decenal de desenvolvimento econômico e social, educação (1), Table 1.
Note: This is enrollment at the close of the first semester.

TABLE 5.

SELECTIVITY OF THE BRAZILIAN SYSTEM

Percentages of those born in a given year who complete various levels of education, as of 1964.

	Population		Completed Course	
	Age	Number	Number	Percent
Primary School				
4th grade	12	1,650,000	598,000*	36.0
Middle School				
1st cycle	15	1,650,000	288,000	17.0
2d cycle	18	1,550,000	95,000	6.1
University				
4 or 5 year course	22	1,400,000	20,400	1.5

*1961

Source: MINISTERIO DO PLANEJAMENTO E COORDENAÇÃO ECONÔMICA. Plano decenal de desenvolvimento econômico e social, educação (1). Tables 15, 19, 20. Escritorio de Pesquisas Econômicas Aplicadas, Rio de Janeiro, 1966.

TABLE 6.

STATE AND REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN MIDDLE SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

Brazil, 1964	Total Enrollment (thousands)	Percent of Total State or Regional Population
SOUTH		
São Paulo	541	3.66
Rio Grande do Sul	173	2.87
NORTH		
Pará	31	1.77
NORTHEAST		
Pernambuco	81	1.82
Ceará	60	1.66
ALL BRAZIL	1,893	2.42
USA, 1960		
SOUTH	5,675	10.3
NORTH CENTRAL	5,085	9.8

Source: INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTADISTICA. Anuario estadístico do Brasil — 1965.
UNITED STATES CENSUS — 1960. Series PC(2)-5A.

Note: The figures for the USA are based on the numbers in the age group 12-18 inclusive who are enrolled in school.

TABLE 7.

SOCIOECONOMIC ORIGIN OF FIRST CYCLE STUDENTS. ALL TYPES OF MIDDLE SCHOOLS.

Social Origin	São Paulo	Rio Grande do Sul	Pernambuco	Ceará	Pará
	Percentage In A Given Category				
		CAPITAL			
High	21.3	21.4	11.5	17.4	15.3
Middle	49.9	50.6	55.0	61.7	52.3
Low	28.0	28.0	33.5	20.9	32.4
TOTAL	100.0 (1729)	100.0 (741)	100.0 (668)	100.0 (658)	100.0 (450)
		INTERIOR			
High	15.4	14.1	15.2	10.7	10.5
Middle	49.6	55.1	54.6	69.7	51.4
Low	35.0	30.8	30.2	19.6	38.2
TOTAL	100.0 (1807)	100.0 (2121)	100.0 (467)	100.0 (482)	100.0 (241)

Absolute numbers in parentheses.

TABLE 8.

SOCIOECONOMIC ORIGIN OF SECOND CYCLE STUDENTS. ALL TYPES OF MIDDLE SCHOOLS

Social Origin	São Paulo	Rio Grande do Sul	Pernambuco	Ceará	Pará
	Percentage In A Given Category				
		CAPITAL			
High	24.8	27.6	23.3	15.2	18.2
Middle	48.3	54.0	56.9	66.4	58.6
Low	26.9	18.4	19.8	18.4	23.1
TOTAL	100.0 (1129)	100.0 (697)	100.0 (841)	100.0 (591)	100.0 (358)
		INTERIOR			
High	16.2	20.1	23.9	9.3	8.7
Middle	57.1	58.2	54.6	75.8	60.9
Low	26.7	21.7	21.5	15.0	30.4
TOTAL	100.0 (897)	100.0 (1241)	100.0 (132)	100.0 (151)	100.0 (16)

Absolute numbers in parentheses.

TABLE 9.

INDICES OF OPPORTUNITY THROUGH MIDDLE SCHOOLING

Socioeconomic Status	Percent of Total Number of Middle School Pupils In The Various SE Groups	Middle School Enrollment As Percent of Age-Group 12-18	Percent of Total Age-Group 12-18 In The Various SE Groups	Percent of Youth Who Attend Middle School For Same Period
São Paulo		21		
A High	18		6	63
B Middle	51		17	63
C Low	31		77	8.5
Rio Grande do Sul		17		
A	18		6	51
B	55		17	55
C	27		77	6.0
Pará		10.2		
A	15		4	38
B	54		12	46
C	31		84	3.8
Pernambuco		10.5		
A	15		3	53
B	56		12	49
C	29		85	3.6
Ceará		9.5		
A	14		3	44
B	66		12	52
C	20		85	2.2
USA		74*		
A	13*		10	100*
B	39		30	97
C	48		60	59

*These figures refer to grades 10-12 of the American secondary school and to the age group 16-18. HAVIGHURST, ROBERT J. & NEUGARTEN, BERNICE L. Society and education. Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1967.

TABLE 10.

PERCENTAGES OF STUDENTS OF LOWER CLASS ORIGIN IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF SCHOOLS IN CAPITAL CITIES

Type of School	São Paulo	RGS	Pernambuco	Ceará	Pará
FIRST CYCLE					
Academic	21	24	31	20	26
	(1105)	(421)	(402)	(514)	(294)
Commercial	49	36	53	32	51
	(337)	(95)	(124)	(57)	(78)
Industrial	69	66	64	55	76
	(287)	(165)	(142)	(87)	(41)
Agricultural	0	45	0	0	46
		(60)			(37)
SECOND CYCLE					
Academic	15	14	17	17	14
	(263)	(346)	(419)	(355)	(197)
Commercial	47	25	26	34	34
	(226)	(245)	(217)	(47)	(112)
Industrial	20	46	50	0	0
	(449)	(26)	(12)		
Normal	20	16	22	16	18
	(226)	(80)	(186)	(189)	(49)

Numbers in parentheses are the base numbers from which the percentages are calculated.

TABLE 11.

SCORES ON MODERNISM-TRADITIONALISM SCALE BY STATE, SEX, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, AND CAPITAL-INTERIOR RESIDENCE

Second Cycle. Percent in each category on scale.

State		No.	1 (mod.)	2	3	4 (trad.)
Rio Grande do Sul	Total	684	35.7	33.8	22.8	8.1
Capital only	Male	488	33.0	30.2	23.9	12.8
	Female	196	38.5	37.5	20.8	3.3
Status:	A	183	36.0	41.6	17.5	5.0
	B	368	33.8	32.3	25.1	8.8
	C	133	37.2	28.0	24.3	10.5
Interior	Large City	592	29.7	32.1	24.8	13.3
	M & S City	643	30.9	31.7	23.2	14.2
São Paulo	Total	2106	18.4	33.3	28.0	20.3
Entire State	Male	1045	19.5	32.8	29.2	18.5
	Female	1012	17.2	33.8	27.0	22.0
Status:	A	437	19.5	36.3	24.5	19.7
	B	1136	18.0	32.3	29.0	20.7
	C	533	18.6	32.4	28.9	20.1
Interior	Capital	1166	20.0	36.4	28.2	15.4
	Large City	398	19.1	31.7	28.1	21.1
	M & S City	493	14.0	27.4	27.8	30.8
Pará	Total	377	13.4	25.0	31.2	30.3
Capital only	Male	149	14.9	25.7	30.7	28.7
	Female	197	12.3	26.2	28.5	33.0
Status:	A	70	25.0	33.4	28.6	14.0
	B	207	12.1	25.1	31.7	31.1
	C	69	7.0	22.1	23.6	47.3

Note: Scores have been grouped into 4 categories from 1 (Modern) to 4 (Traditional).

(Continued on next page)

TABLE 11. (Continued)

SCORES ON MODERNISM-TRADITIONALISM SCALE BY STATE, SEX, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, AND CAPITAL-INTERIOR RESIDENCE

Second Cycle. Percent in each category on scale.

State		No.	1 (mod.)	2	3	4 (trad.)
Pernambuco	Total	806	9.3	27.9	32.3	30.5
Capital	Male	394	10.4	27.4	33.3	28.9
	Female	412	8.3	28.4	31.3	32.0
Status:	A	160	9.4	25.0	34.3	31.3
	B	463	9.1	30.2	30.0	30.7
	C	183	9.9	24.6	36.0	29.5
Interior	Large City	66	3.0	15.2	36.4	45.5
	M & S City	40	5.0	27.5	25.0	42.5
Ceará	Total	584	6.5	20.4	24.8	48.1
Capital only	Male	262	8.5	18.9	25.4	47.2
	Female	322	4.9	21.7	24.4	49.0
Status:	A	91	6.8	24.5	26.1	41.3
	B	388	6.0	20.4	25.4	48.0
	C	105	7.7	16.5	21.8	54.0
Interior	Large City	71	5.6	11.3	22.5	60.6
	M & S City	77	5.2	13.0	26.0	55.8

TABLE 12.

SCORES ON INITIATIVE-AMBITION SCALE BY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, STATE, CAPITAL-INTERIOR RESIDENCE, AND SEX

	Mean Score								
	Socioeconomic Status								
State	A High	B	C	D Low	Mean for State	Capi-tal	Inter-ior	Male	Fe-male
Rio Grande do Sul	4.94	4.58	4.52	4.72	4.62	5.06	4.39	5.03	4.16
São Paulo	4.91	4.47	4.45	4.53	4.52	4.94	4.01	5.02	3.99
Pará	4.48	3.95	3.91	3.41	3.92	3.99	3.42	4.61	3.30
Pernambuco	4.28	3.72	3.57	4.00	3.78	3.95	2.78	4.23	3.42
Ceará	3.41	3.13	3.10	3.73	3.19	3.35	2.60	3.92	2.71

Note: The four socioeconomic levels, A, B, C and D, are based upon the occupation and the educational level of the respondent's father. Levels A and B are similar to levels A and B of the other socioeconomic scale. Levels C and D, if combined, would be approximately equivalent to level C of the other scale.

TABLE 13.
STUDENTS WHO ARE EMPLOYED

Male Students in Capital Cities. Percent Employed.

Branch	São Paulo	RGS	Pernambuco	Ceará	Pará
	FIRST CYCLE				
Academic *Ginasio*	45	22	34	37	18
Commercial	81	92	75	75	50
Industrial	65	32	16	6	9
	SECOND CYCLE				
Academic-Scientific	30	34	34	38	28
Commercial	95	92	83	80	91
Industrial	61	65	17	—	—

TABLE 14.
SOCIAL ORIGIN AND EMPLOYMENT

Male Students of the First Cycle—Capital Only. Percentage Employed.

Socioeconomic Status	São Paulo	RGS	Pernambuco	Ceará	Pará
			Academic *Ginasio*		
A	17	9	7	20	19
	(144)	(43)	(28)	(49)	(26)
B	35	20	29	34	17
	(238)	(102)	(75)	(152)	(71)
C	69	35	58	62	23
	(65)	(49)	(40)	(45)	(31)
			Commercial		
A	69	73	—	—	—
	(13)	(15)			
B	78	94	48	74	40
	(104)	(34)	(29)	(31)	(15)
C	84	100	91	91	71
	(104)	(27)	(34)	(11)	(14)
			Industrial		
A*	—	—	—	—	—
B	38	25	17	3	—
	(48)	(36)	(47)	(32)	
C	66	32	11	9	10
	(127)	(99)	(72)	(44)	(31)

*Numbers of students are fewer than 10 in cells marked by a dash.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL EMPATHY

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Dr. James Castañeda is professor of Spanish and chairman of the Department of Classics, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish at Rice University. He is considered an expert in intercultural education.

Professor Castañeda received the A.B. degree summa cum laude from Drew University; the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Yale University. In 1957 he received the *Certificat d'Aptitude à l'Enseignement du Français à l'Etranger* from the *Université de Paris* and is in the process of completing a doctorate at the *Universidad de Madrid.*

He has held professorships at Hanover College, University of Southern California, the University of North Carolina, and Rice University. Dr. Castañeda has been director and/or lecturer of NDEA Language Institutes at Purdue, Notre Dame, North Carolina and Rice Universities.

His memberships in professional organizations are many, some of which are: Modern Language Association of Teachers of French; American Association of University Professors; The Renaissance Society; The Society for Religion in Higher Education; and the "Comediantes". He is a former president of the Indiana chapter of the American Association of Teachers of Spanish and Portuguese and is currently chairman of the Houston Council of Teachers of Foreign Languages. Dr. Castañeda has addressed professional organizations and institutions throughout the Southwest as well as in Massachusetts, Florida, North Carolina and Kentucky.

He was editor-in-chief of *The Hanover Forum,* Hanover College, Indiana, 1960-1961. His publications include: *A Critical Edition of Lope de Vega's "Las Paces de los Reyes, y Judía de Toledo";* "El Impacto de Góngora en la Vida y Obra de Lope de Vega", *Romance Notes,* Vol. V, Number 2 (Spring 1964); and a review of *Español a lo Vivo* in *The Modern Language Journal* (in press) by Hanse, Terrence L. & Wilkins, Ernest J.

Language and Cultural Empathy

James A. Castañeda
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Language can be thought of in many ways: as an item in a school curriculum, as a game which requires the mastery of rules to be played well, as a component of culture, as a medium of communication, etc. In short, language itself presently has meanings and implications as varied as the purposes for which it is used by people who find it interesting, necessary, or profitable.

Like many other things, language can also be viewed in context or out of context . . . or, the context in which it is viewed can vary, according to the type or degree of importance which language holds for each and every individual.

The ensuing reflections are those of a language teacher who is quite concerned about the place conceded to language study in our society. We are the monolingual colossus of the modern world—ready, able, and willing to share our advances in science and technology, but unable—collectively as a nation and individually as its citizens—to indulge in the truly empathetic experiences which would assure optimum results in our quest for world peace and cooperation.

Several dimensions of "language" will be considered, as well as the limitations of the merely articulatory phases of culture. If there is a key note to be sounded, however, it concerns the need to realize that a particular language is, in addition to being in itself an important aspect of its culture, the most authentic and direct medium for the articulation of that culture. This does not mean that much cannot be learned *about* foreign cultures without fluency in the corresponding tongues . . . but it does imply the hypothesis that a knowledge of the language of the host country is of extreme importance in the attainment of opimum results in our *Programa de Educación Interamericana.*

In discussing dealings with other cultures, particularly cultures with systems of linguistic expression different from our own, we can talk of attitudes which evaluate "the other culture," on the basis of objective knowledge and/or subjective opinions—and we can talk of efforts made simply to understand "the other culture"—without the subsequent application of value judgments, without the obsessive compulsion to compare and to evaluate, to view with constant reference to a yardstick, to a standard of one's own cultural heritage.

Sympathy and *empathy* are two postures which may also be taken, both admirable, but distinguishable in terms of certain criteria. One can sympathize (i.e., express friendship, interest, concern) with or without an intellectual understanding and knowledge of the object of sympathy. Empathy, however, a far loftier posture, implies *identification* which, in its turn, requires understanding and knowledge.

Henri Bergson has identified a distinction between tragedy and comedy which offers a parallel to our consideration of sympathy and empathy. Bergson points out that the spectator laughs *at* the comic figure because he views the incidents which befall the protagonist from the outside, from the privileged, isolated, and protected point of view of the spectator. Tragedy, on the other hand, draws the spectator into an identification with the protagonist and his situation. The sufferings of the tragic hero evoke compassion (note the contrast between the preposition *at* in the expression "laugh at" and the preposition "with", the prefix *"com"* in the word "compassion"), the distinguishing factor being, as in the contrast between sympathy and empathy, the presence or absence of identification.

Identification may be accomplished on a number of levels and to a number of different degrees . . . and *any* progress towards this goal is admirable. I have perhaps used the term "language" in too exclusive a sense up to this point. I have, of course, been referring to the systematic verbalization which each linguistic group uses to communicate among its own citizenry and also with the initiates who have consciously sought affiliation or association through their own efforts, whether through study, linguistic immersion while in foreign residence, or through some other means. Language in the widest sense is, of course, much more than this. It is, in a metaphorical sense, expression which does not have to be correlated with geographic boundaries. Music is a language of this sort, as is pictorial art, architecture, athletic skill, esthetic quality, and any other common basis for communion of spirit and/or intellect which binds men together. Language, in this wide sense, simply is used to specify a medium of communication understood by all of the concerned interlocutors. Some of us are practitioners in areas which require explicit verbalization; others are in less linguistically oriented fields. The important fact to keep in mind is that we are in search of empathy . . . of which communication and identification are requisites . . . and that some channel for the transmission and interchange of attitudes, techniques, and ideas is essential.

It is necessary also to realize the limitations of language. Complete fluency will not ensure the comprehension and acceptance of ideals and principles which are basically in conflict, especially if these conflict areas represent long-standing, traditional idiosyncracies of the cultures striving for an understanding of each other. Differences between the educational philosophy of the United States and that of several European and Latin American countries will perhaps illustrate this point. To interpret the radically contrasting situations which prevail with regard to the proportion of students who pass and fail in educational institutions of these countries, I have conjured up the oversimplified image which I term the two faces of the *habeas corpus* clause. In the United States, at least in the pre-college years, students are rarely forced to cease and desist in their educational venture because of failure. This situation suggests a frame of reference in which the great mass of society is considered *intelligent* . . . until utter mental incapacity is presented as evidence. In the other countries, at virtually all levels, frequently only a small percentage of a student group is distinguished by success in passing a course of study. This contrasting situation suggests, as a parallel frame of reference, a view according to which the mass of society is considered *unintelligent* . . . until substantial intelligence is presented as evidence. If we take into account the additional degree of selectivity based on socio-economic criteria in the countries other than the United States, we see even more clearly the drastic contrast. We in the United States represent a society in which academic failure is the departure from the norm, while conversely, in the other countries mentioned, the successful student is the exception rather than the rule. A logical corollary would be a greater stigma attached to academic failure in the United States and a greater prestige attached to academic success in the countries discussed in this comparison.

All the linguistic fluency in the world will not guarantee any comprehension of the issues which are responsible for this manifestation, in the academic world, of the complex historical and cultural factors which cause the contrast described. Through the ability to communicate, however, awareness of cultural differences is made greatly more accessible, as is the potential for cultural development through an open-minded eclectic approach of retaining the best of one's own culture and adopting the best features of another culture. Even if no tangible changes or improvements are to be wrought, there remain so many gains to be made in comprehension and in tolerance . . . in every direction. Language, in the service of dogmatism, prejudice, or any other of the less esteemed characteristics of man, can perform negative, reprehensible functions . . . just as it can carry out all of the duties advocated for the attainment of cultural empathy. Dangerous in the hands of a skilled but unscrupulous user, a blessing when used for constructive, ethical purposes, language is but an instrument . . . an instrument of virtually unlimited variation and potential . . . whose performance and purpose depend entirely upon the people whom it serves. The full and accurate comprehension of anything we want to express requires a refined articulation in at least one of the languages we have discussed. Let us not leave unexpressed vital aspects of our message because of language deficiencies.

Each person representing *Programa de Educación Interamericana* has talents of his own and is, or should be, equipped with his own personalized key to empathy, whether it be the tongue of his host country or one of the many universal languages which we cultivate as our fields of professional endeavor.

As a language teacher who is anxious to see foreign language study recalled from exile, where frequently it resembles an uprooted plant, lying dry, straining ineffectually for restitution to its truly vital context, I have a long-range, personal goal for *Programa* which I hope to see attained. Language study must be integrated into the total anthropological context in which each language normally lives in its own natural habitat. To give language study a purpose is to make it more interesting for our students. I hope the day will come when our schools will teach courses in Latin American history in the Spanish language, when similar courses on Brazil can possibly be taught in Portuguese, and when seminar groups in any relevant area [illegible] conducted in the language of the people who are the object of th[illegible]y.

Since the purpose of these reflexions has not been to suggest that *Programa* exclude from trips to Latin America teachers who do not speak Spanish or Portuguese, it is not implied that all teachers who participate in such visitations should personally implement this type of combined language-subject matter instruction. The team members who visit Latin America in person are relatively few in number. Their effect on education in Texas will largely be that of a catalytic agent. As speakers of . . . or spokesmen for . . . the language of their hosts of this summer, their impact on the linguistic dimensions of our school curricula will be significant measure of the success of *Programa*. May their acquisition of cultural empathy be great, both in terms of the quantity and quality of relationships they establish in Latin America and in terms of their contagious enthusiasm for the diffusion of all of the benefits of their experience among their colleagues, students, and fellow citizens.

PHILOSOPHY OF LATIN AMERICA: YESTERDAY AND TODAY

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Dr. John Haddox, professor of philosophy and chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso, received the B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Notre Dame.

Some of his professional positions include: outgoing president, Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies; past-president, New Mexico Philosophical Society; member, Editorial Board, University of Texas at El Paso; guest lecturer, *Universidad de Chihuahua,* Mexico; member: American Philosophical Association, American Catholic Philosophical Association, Southwestern Philosophical Society, New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society, and Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies.

Some of Professor Haddox' publications are: articles on Latin American philosophy in *The Personalist,* University of Southern California; *The International Philosophical Quarterly,* Fordham and Louvain; *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* University of Pennsylvania; *The Inter-American Review of Bibliography,* Pan American Union; *The New Scholasticism,* Catholic University; *The Journal of Inter-American Studies,* Miami; *Proceedings: XIII International Congress of Philosophy,* Mexico City; and *Vasconcelos of Mexico: Philosopher and Prophet,* University of Texas Press, Austin (in press).

Dr. Haddox has traveled extensively in Mexico and personally knows most of that country's major philosophers. The direct dialogue with them lends an authoritativeness to his writings that is seldom achieved.

Philosophy of Latin America: Yesterday and Today

John H. Haddox
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A GENERAL VIEW

The political, social and economic importance of Latin America is now widely recognized in the United States, but the philosophical developments in that part of the world have been seriously neglected. In large measure our histories, dictionaries, and encyclopedias of philosophy are barren when it comes to philosophers from the nations below our southern border. Such books as Patrick Romanell's *Making of the Mexican Mind* and W. Rex Crawford's *A Century of Latin American Thought* are excellent . . . but they are merely exceptions that prove the rule.

It might appear that this is more or less as it should be since philosophy seems to be a purely speculative study far removed from the practical affairs of inter-American relations. Yet, a look at the history of philosophy in Latin America and at its situation at the present time serves to indicate the value of an examination of the achievements of philosophers there.

These men have tended to be very much concerned with the practical affairs of their respective nations. In their philosophical teachings, many of these men have expressed . . . made explicit . . . ideas and ideals that have profoundly influenced the social, political, and cultural developments in their native lands.

José Gaos, in his *Filosofía Mexicana de nuestros Días,* notes that such philosophers as Alejandro Korn (of Argentina), José Vasconcelos and Antonio Caso (of Mexico) were ". . . teachers, not only of the thought of Spanish-speaking lands, but of their entire culture"; and the Argentine, Francisco Romero, in his *Filosofía de Ayer y de Hoy,* insists that in this critical period of history we need men who can throw light on the problems of man, his culture, and his destiny, so the philosopher must be a writer whose thought is readily accessible to all, not a narrow specialist who can be understood only by other professional philosophers.

The endeavors of Latin American philosophers are complimentary to those of philosophers in the United States both in content and in form . . . in what is considered and in how it is approached. Concerning his role and his mode of presentation, with some every few exceptions, philosophers in this country tend to be more or less removed from an immediate involvement in the practical affairs of the nation; the philosopher is usually a professor who writes . . . when he writes . . . textbooks or technical studies for journals that are read only by other philosophers.

In contrast, the Latin American philosopher is usually much more active "in the market place". For example, such philosophers as José Vasconcelos, Antonio Caso, Eusebio Castro, Francisco Larrozo, and Leopoldo Zea have written, and in some cases are presently writing, columns for the daily newspapers in Mexico City. Further, an examination of the professional occupations of some of the most distinguished philosophers in Latin America reveals that they have served as lawyers, educational administrators, political office-holders, diplomats, poets, novelists, sociologists, psychologists, and physicians—as well as professors of philosophy.

From the standpoint of content, and with some exceptions on both sides, philosophers in the United States and those in Latin American nations generally are concerned with different kinds of problems. Philosophers in this country have devoted a large portion of their time and effort to problems in the philosophy of science, theories of knowledge, linguistic analysis, and symbolic logic, perhaps reflecting our reverential almost worshipful, attitude toward science.

Again in contrast, Latin American philosophers have displayed a continuing concern with human conduct . . . with questions of ethical and political philosophy relating to human rights, human dignity, honor, and freedom (and the grounds for all of these). Such philosophers as Francisco Romero and José Ingenieros of Argentina, Antonio Caso and Samuel Ramos of Mexico, Carlos Vaz Ferreira of Uruguay, and Enrique José Varona of Cuba have seen as their task the development of a general view of life and human possibilities as one means of improving the human condition.

Among Latin American philosophers there are many like Alejandro Deustua of Peru, José Pereira da Graça Aranha of Brazil, and José Vasconcelos of Mexico in whose thought, aesthetics have played a central role. These men have been concerned with questions of artistic creation and the character and significance of beauty.

Some, at least, of these men are quite conscious of the rich artistic heritage of their respective lands and are concerned with making explicit, certain cultural tendencies that are implicit in the national character. Vasconcelos once remarked that the philosopher must be a "poet with a system", and any number of Latin American philosophers have written works of a literary excellence which qualify them for this title.

Now, concerning the value of a knowledge of Latin American philosophy, as we have seen, such knowledge aids in an understanding of this area. This is because philosophers in these lands have often sought an understanding of the environs in which they lived.

The Spaniard, José Ortega y Gassett, has emphasized that the philosopher must take into account his own "circumstances", and among the most influential of all our circumstances are the *time* and *place* in which we live. Thus philosophers like Samuel Ramos and Leopoldo Zea are very much concerned about the character of the Latin America in general, and the Mexico in particular, in which they live. As the Cuban patriot José Martí put it: "Our wine is bitter, but it is ours!"

Thus in order to achieve fruitful points of contact with Latin Americans, one must have some understanding of their cultures. And, since they generally bring philosophy to bear upon their problems . . . cultural, political, and social . . . it helps a great deal to know something of their philosophies.

The Mexican philosopher, José Romano Muñoz, has well expressed a common attitude with his ringing declaration: "As the whole world is in crisis, it is my conviction that the philosopher cannot cross his arms and remain locked up in his ivory tower viewing with indifference all that occurs around him. He must take a position. He must decide to take part in the struggle; not necessarily in a political or military sense, but in the open field of ideas, orienting and seeking solutions to our problems, according to his knowledge and understanding."

In the teachings of philosophers in Latin America, one may discover the sources of a humanism which is combined with and tempered by a sense of national pride, of an individualism which is combined with and tempered by a sense of national need, of an idealism which is combined with and tempered by a sense of the problems of national reality . . . characteristics that seem to be developing throughout Latin America.

Antonio Caso: The Mexican Socrates

Few men have influenced the educational and cultural life of Mexico in this century more than Antonio Caso. Born in Mexico City on December 19, 1883, the period of his childhood was uneventful. At the proper age he attended the *Escuela Nacional Preparatoria* where he studied psychology under Ezequiel A. Chávez and history under Justo Sierra.

The preparatory school was strongly under the influence of the Comtean and Spencerian brand of Positivistic philosophy of the Mexican *científicos,* the party of the scientists, who were ideologists for the "honest tyrant", President Porfirio Díaz. The ideals of this group were political order and economic progress with the so-called scientific philosophy, Positivism, as the intellectual tool and Díaz as the political force to operate it.

In the perspective of history it is now rather amusing to note the attempted justification of the president's repeated re-elections on "scientific grounds"; the *científicos* argued that Charles Darwin had established that in the struggle for existence, the fittest survive and, since Díaz survived the challenge of several elections, he was obviously the one most fit to rule Mexico.

Such reasoning satisfied the young Caso for a time, but in 1909 he joined with José Vasconcelos, Pedro Henríquez Ureña, and Alfonso Reyes to found the *Ateneo de la Juventud*. This organization, consisting of about fifty members (mostly young Mexican intellectuals), had as its goals the destruction of Porfirioism, the removal of foreign economic controls in Mexico, and the lessening of the influences of Positivism on the cultural life and the educational system of Mexico.

The members of this organization sought, in the classics of literature and philosophy, new ideals for Mexico, to replace the Utilitarian Reform spirit of 1833 and the Positivist Reconstruction spirit of 1867. The struggle against the tyranny of Porfirio Díaz and against the *científicos'* "biological-evolutionary" view of life as a battle in which the most powerful and ruthless are victors, had profound and enduring effects on Caso's philosophy.

When the National University of Mexico was re-opened after the Revolution, he was named Professor of Philosophy, which position he held, along with a professorship in the law school, for most of his life. Although at intervals he served in diplomatic posts in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Ecuador, he was above all else a devoted teacher who inspired a whole generation of Mexican youth.

Antonio Gómez Robledo, in the preface to *Homenaje a Antonio Caso,* writes: "If there is something missing in this collection, perhaps it is that only an artist could evoke with complete success the aesthetic quality, the insuperable beauty, of the oral teaching of Antonio Caso, each of whose lessons, day by day for so many years, was a finished work of art. Some courses were more constructive than others, but none were ever lacking in verbal eloquence, delicate treatment of material, honest emotion, or gentlemanly demeanor."

On March 6, 1946, Antonio Caso died suddenly from a heart attack. As Patrick Romanell commented: "The Mexican Socrates passed away quietly and Mexico wept."

I want to examine two aspects of Caso's philosophy here: first, his achievement of a system of "ethical dualism", and second, his application of the principles of this system to social and political questions. Caso insists that philosophy must achieve "a synthetic conception of the world" but it is a conception centered upon the person. The Mexican philosopher seeks an inclusive picture of the human situation in all its dimensions, and this knowledge is sought not for its own sake, but for the purpose of improving human life.

Thus Caso notes that the philosopher, *as* a philosopher, must not seek all of the details of human life from any *one* point of view; he must seek to understand the human situation from *all* points of view. Thus philosophy must be based on *all* experience; as he puts it: that of the laboratory *and* that of the oratory.

In a prologue to the third edition of *La Existencia,* published in 1943 during World War II, Caso decried the modern world's exaltation of brute force, "power without scruples", over love and even over law which, he complains, "makes our time one of the most bitter in the history of the world".

To counter this destructive vision he presents an analysis of six different points of view from which existence can be considered and then concentrates on three of these.

First is the metaphysical which is the point of view of abstract, unchanging concepts of essences, "eternal truths". Opposed to this is the historical point of view of reality in terms of its changing, contingent character.

Next, Caso notes that existence can be considered in terms of utility. This is the economic point of view. To the criterion of utility is opposed that of charity, unselfish love, which is the ethical point of view.

The final pair of opposites are the aesthetic and logical points of view. The first of these is that of an immediate, concrete intuition of beauty which is free of all interest in personal gain; the second is concerned with purely formal relations among ideas.

Thus there are three antinomies: the metaphysical versus the historical, the ethical versus the economic, and the aesthetic versus the logical. His task, Caso feels, is to attempt to synthesize these diverse points of view, establishing a hierarchy in which all are included, but the ethical, the aesthetic, and the metaphysical predominate. Of these six points of view only three, the economic, the aesthetic, and the ethical, are examined in any detail in this work.

La Existencia como Economía, como Desinterés y como Caridad was published in 1919 when memories of the "biological-evolutionary" defense of the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz and the violence of the Mexican revolution were still strong in Caso, and when the first World War (in which such weapons of human destruction as poison gas, the airplane, and the submarine were employed and over eight and one-half million persons died) had just ended. Further, the definitive edition of this work was published in 1943, during the horrors of World War II, a conflict in which ultimately more than fifteen million persons would perish.

Caso was also aware of the brutality of the Nazi "solution" to the Jewish problem with the nightmare of mass murder in concentration camps. Is it any wonder, then, that he was compelled to oppose an interpretation of life which made of man an animal, irrevocably self-impelled to strife, and to present and defend an alternative view?

Life as economic is biological; it is essentially self-centered, egoistic. A person so acting seeks to grasp and possess all that is within his power while giving to others as little as possible. When persons are directed solely by the economic factor, or are dominated by it, this leads to conflict, to struggle, possibly ultimately even to war. Thus the economic has a necessary place in human society but it must always be moderated and controlled by moral principles.

Briefly, the value of life as aesthetic derives from its non-utilitarian character. Thus Caso writes: "Such is the victory of the soul over (biological) life, the aesthetic victory, a superior human life . . . existence as disinterested." The aesthetic consists in a break with life as economic and sets the stage for moral existence, for life as love.

The formula for life as love is: the maximum effort for others, with the least profit for oneself. Existence as charity is the plenitude of human existence because only the human person can be unselfish, loving and giving. One becomes truly human in so acting.

Caso says: "sacrifice yourself temporally, because thus you will conserve yourself eternally"; and later: "The vital current is that of combat; but just as animal life seeks a violent victory over the world, charity is another victory, a mystical victory, in which healing triumphs, giving peace not war, love not booty, beauty not sateity."

Now, turning briefly to his socio-political thought, two of Caso's last books, *La Persona Humana y el Estado Totalitario* (1941) and *El Peligro del Hombre* (1942), reveal the fidelity of the philosopher to the principles which had been elaborated many years before in *La Existencia,* but now they are projected into this new sphere.

In the first of these books he distinguishes three grades of being: the thing, the individual and the person. A thing is an object with no organic unity; things are not living so they can be broken or divided into parts with no intrinsic change in their nature taking place.

The individual is a higher grade of being; individuals are living organic beings so they cannot be divided without perishing. In their operations there is direction and purpose . . . a "struggle to exist". In this realm there are three levels: plants, brute animals, and man.

Man is an animal organism and, as such, an individual, but he is also something much superior. Only man is a creator of values, is a social being, conceives ideas; only man has a spiritual dimension. Man is, then, not merely a living being with an organic unity and a substantial identity, he is a person.

Eduardo García Maynez expresses Caso's vision in this way: "In man, the most perfect and highly evolved of individuals from the ideological point of view, we discover a superior grade of existence, a second nature, superimposed on the biological, a new and magnificent order—life of the spirit."

For Caso, human beings are both economic individuals (biologically) and moral persons (spiritually) and a problem arises from the fact that while the spiritual-personal side of human nature should control and direct the biological-individual, in practice the reverse is often true. The pre-eminence of the latter in the socio-political order leads to two systems which Caso abhors: individualistic *laissez-faire* capitalism and communism. Both of these systems view man as an egoistic, economic animal; they differ in species but are generically identical.

Caso insists that egoistic individualism makes the salvation of the person an individual task. This is erroneous, he says, for the isolated individual is impotent. The error of communism is much like that of individualism. It also is an egoistic, purely economic view of man, but of man absorbed in the social and economic whole, the community.

In his *Nuevos Discursos a la Nación Mexicana,* Caso sees Soviet communism as a type of religion, not just a political movement, pointing to the Marxist-Leninist dogma with a messianic view of the proletariat, its cult with ceremonies, festivals, and commemorations, and its moral system with the slogan, "working men of the world unite." Communism is, Caso remarks, "a religion that forgets God".

Next, he warns that communistic egoism has led, in practice, to an extreme nationalism. Patriotism, this Mexican patriot proclaims, is a good to be sought for the person, the nation, the world; nationalism that erects the state into an absolute, the contingent into the necessary, the transitory into the eternal, and imperishable is an evil to be avoided.

In summary, the individualistic egoist wants to *have* more through his *own* economic activities; the communistic egoist wants to *have* more through the economic activities of the community.

In contrast, Caso points out that the person wants to *be* more through his ethical and social activities and that society exists for man, for the realization of his nature and the perfection of his personality. Man was not born for society, but society for man. Society is a means, never an end.

When this philosopher asks which is worth more, the individual or the community, the reply he gives is: "Neither the individual nor the community; but a society based on justice. This is a *moral union of men,* respecting their value. The community that tyrannizes man forgets that persons are 'persons', *spiritual centers of cultural action,* not mere 'biological unities'. The individual who is opposed to the community . . . forgets that above the egoistic individual is human culture which is always a synthesis of values." Caso, then, asserts that the very spirituality of the human person is only realized in a society based on the moral union of men.

Egoism fosters the extremes of *laissez-faire* individualism or totalitarian communism; personalism leads to a just society in which the rights and duties of both the individual and the community are not opposed but justly coordinated. *Laissez-faire* individualism and communism are both economically deterministic systems. The first and foremost consequence of personalistic humanism is freedom for the human person and its correlaries—political and civil freedom, freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought and expression.

It must be evident, finally, that, for Caso, philosophy is not just a speculative enquiry into the basic principles of knowledge and being. As he says: "Philosophy is a theory of right, of felicitude, of beatitude . . . Philosophy shows everyone how to be heroic as heroes, saintly as saints, artistic as artists, and wise as wise men, industrious as workers; pure and clean of heart."

This is why Antonio Caso taught philosophy with such dedication for so many years. In expressing his concept of the spiritual potential of man he sought to make his students not merely good philosophers but good men and good citizens of his *patria,* Mexico.

José Vasconcelos: Philosopher of Synthesis

The approach of philosophers in Latin America to problems of conduct has generally been profoundly humanistic. Of these philosophers, perhaps none has been more widely respected and influential than the Mexican, José Vasconcelos (1882-1959), whose endeavors ranged from politics and education to philosophy and letters.

He had a long and active career in the educational and political life of Mexico, being (among other things) one of that nation's greatest Secretaries of Public Education and running for both the governorship of the state of Oaxaca and the presidency of Mexico. He lost these elections—the latter in 1929. That year marked the end of Vasconcelos' active political career and the beginning of his life as a philosopher (though he had been interested in philosophy for many years and he never really lost his interest in the politics of Mexico).

Thus while he created a complex philosophical system (including a theory of knowledge, a metaphysics, an ethics, and an aesthetics, called "aesthetic monism"), he was always vitally interested in the proximate realities and the more or less remote possibilities of Mexico. He was ever torn between two careers, that of a philosopher and that of a politician.

Man is not a "pure spirit" or a "separated intellect", Vasconcelos insists. He is, in the traditional Spanish phrase, *un hombre de carne y hueso* (a man of flesh and bone), so truth must be sought as the fruit of a total experience—sensory, intellectual, volitional, emotional. One must seek the "whole" truth as a "whole" man.

It is said that Parmenides was being-intoxicated and Spinoza was God-intoxicated; it can equally well be said of Vasconcelos that he was unity-intoxicated. He was possessed by the desire to achieve a vital comprehension of the totality of existence.

Most contemporary philosophers achieve at most a partial view of reality, he felt, because they fail even to consider the fullness of human experience. They ignore the emotions, utilizing only the senses and the intellect in their search of knowledge. In contrast, the Mexican philosopher employed what he calls a "concurrent method" in which the senses, the intellect, and the emotions collaborate to achieve knowledge.

In the collaboration of these organs, each has its own role, its own function. The senses give knowledge its content, its material, its data. The intellect distinguishes and classifies these data by means of distinct concepts (like "green," "tall," "three," "square"), but it is, of itself, cold and empty, lacking in vitality, purpose, and direction.

The tendency of the intellect is, Vasconcelos insisted, to break things down, to study parts, but what exist are whole things, not isolated parts. When a person attempts, by means of his intellect, to "explain" the qualitatively varied world that we experience through our senses, he does so by means of concepts. The knowledge so achieved is all on one abstract level with much of the qualitative and substantial variety of our experience eliminated or ignored.

Vasconcelos thus once commented that every philosophy based on generalities and abstractions, every philosophy of mere concepts, is like a crystal globe, beautiful but empty. He emphasized that the philosopher must respect the qualitative and substantial distinctions among things while, at the same time, organizing his experiences into a systematic picture of reality.

This synthesis of the varied can be achieved, he felt, by means of an emotive knowledge (an intellect informed of emotion), because the emotions grasp the color and the distinctions and the values of things and yet can unify these. The emotions, which tend to attract, to move, to unify diverse elements in so far as they are diverse, engender an enriched knowledge of the varied world we experience.

Former students of Vasconcelos relate an anecdote that vividly illustrates his thesis. One day, upon entering the room in which classes had been held for several months, he asked the students if anyone present could describe the back wall of the classroom. After a few fumbling, unsatisfactory attempts, he allowed them to turn around, whereupon they discover two long, jagged cracks, a large, irregular discolored spot, a small window, and a smaller shelf. Then Vasconcelos remarked that there would have been no question of such ignorance if a beautiful painting had been hanging on this wall. They would have been attracted by—drawn to—the beautiful object and the pleasure resulting from the viewing of it. It would, for that reason, have been a distraction from the lecture, which, he supposed, is the reason for the usually drab, unattractive appearance of classrooms.

Aesthetic knowledge, then, includes both facts and our feelings about these facts; and these feelings are all important in our lives—stirring us, attracting us, moving us to act. Yet they are too often neglected by philosophers, Vasconcelos felt.

The knowledge this philosopher sought was a knowledge that "makes a difference" in our lives, a knowledge that enriches and gives value to what we think and what we do. Thus he was never content to be a philosopher concerned with philosophical problems divorced from the world in which he lived; and this world was, for much of his life, the world of Mexican internal politics and external relations.

In his examination of social and political questions, this philosopher was perhaps more concerned with what Mexico and the rest of Latin America *might* be than with what they are. (Although some knowledge of the actual present reality of this area is necessary for a projection of its potential future condition.) In any event, Vasconcelos wrote as a prophet.

Further, he approached these questions in a manner that was essentially constructive. In his *¿Qué es la Revolución?,* Vasconcelos insisted that in every true revolution there is destruction only on the battlefield; every revolution must be short and thorough, and when it is over the government must turn to peaceful, just, constructive action. He also remarked: "a revolution is the movement for a better way of life" and "a revolutionist is . . . anyone who adds a new treasure to the progress of mankind".

Vasconcelos believed he had two treasures to give to mankind, the mankind of Mexico in particular, and Latin America in general. These treasures were the notion of a "cosmic race" and of "Bolivarism".

Concerning the first of these, his thesis, presented in a book entitled *La Raza Cósmica,* was that the various races of the world tend to mix more and more as time goes on, to the benefit of mankind. In historical terms, Vasconcelos noted, in Europe a mixture of races (including Greeks, Romans, Gauls, Celts, and Tuscans) produced "the fount of modern culture" and expressed his conviction that the vigor and strength of the American is due to the fact that the United States has been a "melting pot" in which diverse nationalities and races have blended.

He ended this brief historical survey with these words: "In every case the highly optimistic conclusion which can be derived from these observations is that even the most contradictory mixtures can always be beneficially resolved because the spiritual factor in each serves to elevate the whole." He was, thus, very much opposed to any theory that proposes the supremacy of a "pure race" and in several places he spoke most contemptuously of the Nazi party in Germany and the Ku Klux Klan in the United States. (This book was published in the 1930's but much of what he said is still relevant.)

Contrary to the racist theories according to which a mixture of bloods is considered to be degenerative, Vasconcelos seeks a vital renovation of mankind by means of racial synthesis. As a theoretical basis for this ideal, he noted that according to the Mendelian laws of heredity, the mating of contrary types will produce diverse and complex variations, and proclaimed that the variations will be superior to those that have existed previously if the mixture of races is in accordance with the laws of social harmony, sympathy, and beauty.

It will take time for the appearance of such results of a mixture brought about, not by violence or force but through free choice founded on an aesthetic sense and love, but when (and if) they appear, it will result in a period of true, universal brotherhood among men.

A basic assumption of the cosmic race theory is the essential equality of all men. This does not mean that all men are presently (or ever will be) equal in the sense of "identical" or "the same". Individual diversity of such things as nationality, race, color, intelligence, and artistic or commercial ability is compatible with an essential unity.

This assumption of the essential unity along with the individual diversity of mankind is traditional in Mexico. It extends back to the sixteenth century when Bishop Bartolomé de las Casas presented his arguments concerning the rights of the Indians; it has been incorporated into Mexico's various constitutions; it determines policies of the present Mexican government. This nation has been (and is) a shining example of racial understanding for a world in which there are many, often opposed, races and nationalities.

Never was this so important as in the present day when persons in newly developing lands, often persons of color, are realizing the injustice of political and social practices and institutions founded on assumptions of racial inferiority. For Vasconcelos no race is inferior or superior to another in any general sense. Different races and nations develop strengths in different areas. Yet no race exists that is inherently lacking in the essential human characteristics nor in special abilities that they can contribute to mankind. This theory which emphasizes the compatibility of racial diversity and human unity contains a significant message for a world torn with racial strife.

Concerning "Bolivarism", Vasconcelos was hopeful about the future of Mexico and the rest of Latin America, despite present conditions. In *Temas Contemporáneas,* he explained that these nations are behind the United States in progress partly because the former were born prematurely of decadent parents (Spain and Portugal at the beginning of the nineteenth century), while the latter, in a relatively mature state, won her independence from a powerful motherland (England at that time).

Thus Vasconcelos recognized it would take Latin American nations more time to develop. Also he mentioned that as economic conditions improve, so will the political institutions and the cultural achievements of the Latin American nations.

However, even more than for economic development he pleaded for political unity among Latin American nations (which he felt is actually required for this development). His point seems to be that the *United* States is powerful, while the *dis-united* states of Latin America are weak. In unity there is strength, so in *¿Qué es la Revolución?* he expressed his hope that the Spanish-speaking nations of this hemisphere will be good neighbors among themselves as well as with the United States.

In a book entitled *Bolivarismo y Monroísmo,* Vasconcelos praised and elaborated on the thesis presented back in 1826 by Simón Bolívar, liberator of large areas of South America, at a conference of Latin American nations in Panama; this was a plan for the new Latin American republics to join in a political and economic union.

Vasconcelos felt that the lands of Latin America have a spiritual identity, as well as national and political diversities. He believed that the latter heterogeneity had been emphasized for too long and that the time had arrived for a recognition of the relative cultural, linguistic, and religious homogeneity of these nations!

He diagnosed, earlier than most, the ailments brought about by hemispheric disunity but he was fundamentally optimistic about the future of a Latin America composed of nations that desire more to cooperate intelligently than to compete ruthlessly. Actually, it was not until many years after Vasconcelos wrote his *Bolivarismo y Monroísmo* that an organization of nations which are both independent (as separate nations) and inter-dependent (as *members* of such an organization), a system which combines hemispheric unity with national diversity, was formed. Such an organization, in aspiration and design if not yet in achievement, is the Organization of American States. This organization, since it includes the United States, extends beyond the boundaries of Vasconcelos' ideal expressed in *Bolivarismo y Monroísmo.*

However, he also enthusiastically supported relations between the United States and Mexico based on the Good Neighbor concept. In the OAS, then, are combined these two approaches to inter-American unity, both strongly favored by the Mexican philosopher. The problems—social, political, and, especially, economic—facing the nations of this hemisphere are enormous, but at least these nations are now aware that they can be solved only by their united efforts.

As prophecy, the dreams of José Vasconcelos have at times failed to materialize. Yet who, in the face of the real and potential accomplishments of the Organization of American States, can deny that he was a true prophet of Latin America?

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LATIN AMERICA



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The Political Economy of Latin America

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> *The imperatives of change will become the winds of revolution unless we and they devise a workable set of policies and politics for our changing times.* Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead (editors' introduction to *Politics of Change in Latin America)*

In the review offered here, Latin America is referred to as an entity with various common characteristics and problems. It should be noted that within the Latin American republics there are a number of divergencies, some of which will be observed as references are made to countries involved in the itinerary set up for *Programa de Educación Interamericana.**

Thus, the phrase "Latin America" has been criticized for being misleading. In fact, Latin American countries follow different paths toward modern nationhood and some students say that the differences between the nations involved are increasing rather than decreasing, and that the area's inhabitants question the existence of "Latin America." Nevertheless, the main thoughts discussed here will center about common problems, and the need for coordination and cooperation. It might be especially appropriate to do so because of the current increasing interest in the possibilities for common market integration and its importance in hastening development.

There is revolution in Latin America today. Not *a* revolution, not revolutions, but revolution, and our own participation in the revolution to promote economic development and political stability has been less

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***For example, although Spanish is common throughout Latin America, Brazilians speak Portuguese, and there are large segments of Indians that have their own dialects. Again, some of the countries have large masses of Indian population (Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, e.g.), but Argentina is predominantly of European stock. There are 85 million people in Brazil, and only 4.5 million in Guatemala.**

than satisfactory (especially in the rural areas). George Lodge, of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, has said:

> If the United States is to secure its vital interests in Latin America, it must better understand the nature of revolution; it must determine more precisely its relationship and commitment to that revolution; and it must revise accordingly its Latin American policies and programs, both private and public. (17)

Revolution here does not mean anarchy or *golpes,* but rather, extensive and intensive modifications in the social-political-economic structure of nations. Many of the countries south of us are in the process of choosing the direction in which the revolution proceeds and it may be possible to undergo transition with a minimum of bloodshed or violence; certainly this is not assured. United States comprehension may enable us to help maximize peaceful change, but change is inevitable, for Latin Americans are among those whose "rising expectations" demand solutions. As we devote more and more attention to the south, perhaps we will recognize the value of a more democratically based revolution than either communists or fascists can offer—one which, hopefully, would extend to the people higher standards of living without going through years of floundering because of violent action and reaction. The order is "tall," and there is no assurance of success. It would seem, nevertheless, that the effort must be made.

The United States has a considerable stake in the outcome of all this fomentation. From the viewpoint of "cold hard economics", for example, our economy has often been plagued in the decades of this century with the problem of how to distribute all the things that we are able to produce. Large and growing markets are necessary to make possible continued output of low per unit cost as we accumulate technology upon technology. The underdeveloped countries offer a tremendous future market potential as their income levels rise. Economic history shows that as countries develop, trade expands, and that the bulk of trade is carried on among and between the richer nations.

Furthermore, our economy is quite dependent upon Latin American countries for strategic materials to feed our modern industrial machine. Our need for all materials, but minerals in particular, will expand tremendously in coming decades as the technological process continues. We now import roughly nine-tenths or more of our supplies of mica, beryllium, manganese, and antimony. Two-thirds of the mica, over one-third of the beryllium, almost one-fourth of the manganese, and over two-fifths of the antimony are imported from Latin America. Three-fourths of our bauxite is imported, and practically all of it comes from Latin America. Around half of our imports of tungsten, zinc, and copper are from Latin America. Today we are net importers of iron ore, most of which comes from Latin America.

In addition, the developing countries are a potential outlet for profitable capital investment, which in turn moves both capital goods and, eventually, consumer goods in trade.

There is also the matter of security. Politically, if we have reasonably good relations with our neighbors, there is less danger of encroachment upon American interests. We cannot afford to let Russia or China teach our neighbors their ways to solve economic-social-political problems.*

It seems reasonably realistic, too, to say that Americans are imbued with a fair share of humanitarianism. Several years ago, in a Gallop Poll questioning why Americans supported foreign aid, humanitarianism was the reason most often given. President Kennedy expressed this aspect of Americans in his Inaugural Address when he said,

> To those people in the huts and villages across the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required — not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.**

A Taste of Basic Economics

The basic economic reality is that most of the things that men want are relatively scarce, and thus choices are necessary. There is less concern over this matter in a rich country where, as stated, the problem is often how to distribute what can be made. In the poor country, however, the issue is urgent. Efforts to alleviate scarcity are critical when one is close to a subsistence level of living and there is fear of risking change. And economic decision-making is the more difficult when very limited resources emphasize the problem of what the economists refer to as "opportunity cost." Projects which appear sound at first consideration may be too costly in terms of what will not be done if they are pursued. The setting of priorities is crucial, and involves difficult, painstaking analysis. There is much difference of opinion because of different values, philosophies, knowledgeability.***

Roughly, the economist might point out that a country's economic development will depend upon its equipment with fundamental factors of production. The classical productive factors are, broadly, land (natural resources), labor, and capital (such things as tools, machinery, factories, "plant and equipment"). Coupled with the problem of adequacies, however, are questions involving the state of the arts, technology, economic climate, availability of leaders (entrepreneurs, innovators, administrators) and problems concerning the *quality* of the various factors. Thus, whoever writes about the problems of the underdeveloped countries is likely to find himself differing to some degree with fellow economists about the primacy of explanations for lack of growth and the appropriate priorities for solutions. Some of the more troublesome underdevelopment problems of Latin America are discussed later. It might be appropriate at this point to review relevant economic history of the area.

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*The author finds it difficult to treat economics, politics, and sociology in separate categories.

**KENNEDY, JOHN F. *Inaugural Address.* January 20, 1961. The next paragraph said, "To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge — to convert our good words into good deeds, in a new alliance for progress, to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house."

***Merely in summarizing some of the problems for discussion later, the author found it most difficult to order them in any foolproof manner.

A Resume of Recent Latin American Economic History

Between World War II and 1957, many of the Latin American nations progressed rapidly and by 1950 enjoyed an annual rate of growth of gross national product* between 4 and 5 percent a year, which exceeded the average rate of growth in the United States and most of Western Europe. In some countries (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) the rate of growth was above 5 percent. Argentina, however, under Perón, grew but little. Advance in the fifties was due mainly to increased industrialism. Agriculture lagged and in some cases regressed. The road to industrial growth was probably paved by protective tariffs and exchange control in the 1930's, and accelerated by shortages associated with World War II. After the War, two factors were especially important: (1) the accumulation of foreign credits resulting from high prices of food products and raw materials during the war, and (2) the growth of American direct investment (36).

By 1958 the Latin American boom was over and average rates of growth declined from 5 to 2 percent. In Argentina and Chile the rate of growth had dwindled to nothing. Terms of trade** deteriorated and there were large trade deficits. By 1960 such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay were in a critical economic condition from inflation, unemployment, and trade deficits. The liberal democratic governments then in power faced acute economic crises. Withers notes the following factors contributing to the failure to sustain growth:

1. Insufficient capital.
2. Inability to curb inflation.
3. Inadequate markets.
4. Failure to carry out land reform.
5. Political instability.
6. Inflationary spending for the sake of political power.

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*"Gross national product" is the market value of all the finished goods and directly rendered services produced in a given period.

**The phrase "terms of trade" refers to the relationship between export prices and import prices.

7. Inability to get enough American capital because of anti-Yankeeism.
8. Communism, Peronism, and other political disruptions.
9. Failure to remove illiteracy and to provide enough technical education for farmers, workers, engineers, and businessmen.

After 1958 the United States, having been jarred by revolutions in Cuba and Guatemala, directed considerably more attention to Latin American difficulties. Efforts culminated in the conference at Punta del Este in 1961, setting up the Alliance for Progress. In addition, the United States Export-Import Bank began making more loans to Latin Americans and we supported the establishment and operation of the Inter-American Development Bank. The story of Latin American efforts toward growth in the 1960's is to an appreciable extent the story of successes and failures under the Alliance for Progress program and we will return to it.

Pertinent Data and Comments

The land area of Latin America is about equal to that of Europe and the United States combined, but proportionately less of it lends itself to human habitation. One-fourth is mountainous, an equal area is covered by tropical rain forests, and another 10 percent is desert or semi-arid. In spite of containing four of the world's major river systems (the Amazon, La Plata, Orinoco, and Magdalena), the topography is generally a barrier to transportation and commerce both within and between countries. Most of the countries essentially face away from each other (27).

Of the now twenty-four independent nations south of the US, twenty are republics belonging to the Organization of American States (Cuba has been suspended), and four are members of the British Commonwealth*. OAS members include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Barbados, Guyana (both new states), Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago are members of the British Commonwealth.

The per capita annual income for the area has been estimated at roughly $325—about one-ninth that enjoyed by the United States. This figure is several times higher than those for Africa and Asia. However, per capita income varies greatly within the region and within countries. The highest per capita gross national product in 1965, $850 per annum, was enjoyed by Venezuela. At the other extreme was Haiti with a per capita income of $100, Bolivia $120, and Paraguay $140. (33) Furthermore, in a number of countries a disproportionate share of income goes to an upper class and, since often there is no appreciable middle class, the per capita income of the masses of rural groups and city slum dwellers is considerably below the average.

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*Note that Guyana is a member of both the OAS and the Commonwealth.

In general, the larger countries of Latin America have progressed more rapidly than the smaller states. Brazil has become the leading manufacturing country. Mexico has shown considerable sustained and balanced economic development. Argentina, although somewhat stagnant in recent years, has one of the region's highest living standards and one in which most of the population participates. Venezuela has made substantial economic strides, spreading the benefits of its high oil revenues. Chile and, to a lesser extent, Colombia are also above the region's average in economic terms. Peru is the only major Latin American country which has lagged behind in economic development (27).

One of the most troublesome economic-political-social problems plaguing Latin America is the fact that there is a dual nature to so many of the economies; that is, there are industrialized and commercialized centers of activity in the big cities where, despite slums, change is occurring, standards of living are beginning to rise, and a larger middle class is developing. On the other hand, "on the periphery," in the rural areas and hinterlands, there are large numbers of people who are living very close to subsistence, who have not begun to be integrated into national economies and who are natural subjects for extremists who would like to see revolutions of violence.

Agricultural activity has lagged. A great part of agricultural effort goes into feeding the growing populations. The table on the following page illustrates the problem of food production in Latin America.

Agricultural enterprise is of special concern at the present time in view of the current efforts to establish a Latin American Common Market; agricultural problems give rise to considerable difficulties in integration schemes (as evidenced by arguments within the European Common Market). It is highly desirable that major effort be made to assure that this sector contributes significantly to the integration processes, and receives a due share of the benefits therefrom.

To do this, the agricultural sector must overcome institutional rigidities and gradually permit a greater degree of specialization, allowing each country to enjoy the benefits of potential comparative advantages in the production of both foodstuffs and industrial raw materials. It is necessary to devise new techniques and to formulate procedures, institutions and policies which will help to assure the integration of agricultural development in Latin America so essential to the growth of other sectors in the economies.

INDICES OF PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION,

AVERAGE 1955-59 AND 1960-62 AND ANNUAL 1963-65
(1957-59 = 100)

			Per Capita		
Country	Average 1955-59	Average 1960-62	1963	1964	1965
Mexico	98	103	108	113	111
Cuba	98	88	63	68	74
Haiti	103	92	79	76	78
Dominican Republic	100	98	92	90	87
Jamaica	100	110	108	111	110
Trinidad and Tobago	103	100	96	94	95
Caribbean	99	92	74	77	80
Guatemala	98	112	124	120	125
Honduras	99	100	103	112	127
El Salvador	100	108	121	117	115
Nicaragua	103	106	117	128	117
Costa Rica	95	104	98	88	92
Panama	97	91	91	99	101
Central America	99	106	113	114	114
Colombia	97	103	99	101	100
Venezuela	100	106	112	114	117
Brazil	97	101	101	88	103
Ecuador	100	113	111	102	105
Peru	99	108	102	103	99
Bolivia	96	98	106	103	103
Chile	99	96	97	99	90
Paraguay	98	95	96	95	97
Argentina	100	92	106	100	93
Uruguay	105	105	107	113	105
South America	99	100	102	94	101
Latin America	99	100	101	97	101

Source: Part of Table 1, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. *The western hemisphere agricultural situation.* Washington, D.C. March 1966.

The region's leading agricultural exports today are coffee, sugar, and cotton, accounting respectively for 20, 10, and 4 percent of sales abroad. Meat, hides, cocoa, wheat, wool, tobacco, and corn make up an additional 10 percent.

Oil accounts for about 25 percent of Latin American exports but almost all of it comes from Venezuela. Copper, iron, and nitrates come from Chile; tin, from Bolivia; lead, copper, silver, zinc, and iron from

Peru; and iron ore, on the largest scale, from Venezuela. Mexico also yields lead, silver, copper, and iron in major quantities. Brazil's mineral wealth is largely in iron and manganese.

There is relatively little trade among Latin American countries. This situation is due partly to the fact that most of them are raw material exporters with basically competitive economies, and to the lack of adequate intra-Latin American transportation. Aggravated by the geography of the region, one of the present great issues is how to integrate the economies in order to take advantage of modern production methods. (we have already noted agriculture's responsibility toward this end). The issue is discussed further in the section on international trade.

The United States purchases about half of Latin American exports. Western Europe (especially Great Britain) accounts for about 30 percent, and Japan, nearly 15 percent (27). For basic data relative to the five countries associated with *Programa,* see the Appendix.

Accounting for Underdevelopment

Read twenty books on economic development and one is likely to find twenty varying lists of why countries have been slow to progress. Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between factors that now exist which hamper development (such as the duality earlier mentioned, the lack of attention to marketing, lack of capital formation, lack of education, lack of stable government, lack of infrastructure, too much inflation, lack of a middle class, lack of proper motivation), and some of the roots that may have led to such shortcomings.

Geographic factors have been basic handicaps to progress in Latin America, isolating peoples, hampering transportation, and giving rise to enclaves which have perpetuated the absence of balanced growth.

Spanish colonization policies have left a deep and handicapping imprint on the region. It is probably fair to say that the Spanish came to Latin America primarily to exploit for minerals and not to develop the new locations. Furthermore, even when the Spanish introduced new industries, such as the manufacturing of wool, cotton, leather goods, iron products, tile manufacturing, blanket making, gold and silver filigree work, they brought institutional arrangements that subsequently inhibited the growth of these early industries, and technical progress lagged in Latin America for the next 400 years. Wherever the interests of local industry clashed with the interests of industry in Spain and Portugal, home governments enacted legislation favoring the mother country. For example, the raising of grapes in the New World might lead to a winemaking industry that would compete with that in Spain, so the raising of grapes in the New World was prohibited. Olive groves were destroyed. Textile and leather industries were restricted. An embryo steel industry was ordered out of existence and smithies closed. (9) In general, Spain and Portugal discouraged economic development in the colonies.

Some of the agrarian problems associated with *latifundia* can be traced back to the coming of the Spanish when the *conquistadores* received large tracts of land to exploit much as they chose, and received the Indians who lived on the land "in trust" (*encomiedas*). In the early part of the eighteenth century, the *encomienda* system as such was abolished, with emphasis being put on the ownership of the land, but the leverage over the Indians was maintained by a system of debt peonage. Although the Indians were not content with these arrangements, Gordon thinks that the incomprehensibility of the system was probably an important part of the explanation of the inefficacy of the Indians in either resisting the system or adjusting to it.

In the eighteenth century the Creole (a person of pure Spanish blood born in the New World) took power from the Spaniards born in Spain, but the Indian remained an outsider. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Creoles and the rising mestizos (mixed Spanish and Indian) wrested land from the Church, but the Indians continued to be dispossessed.

To this day, then, the Indian populations generally have not been assimilated into the struggle for a modern economy. It would appear that the institutional environment was not responsive to technological change—that great cumulative, dynamic force which has led to so much of the economic development of civilization. It is this clash between the fixed habit patterns of institutional arrangements and the cumulative process of technological development that is the basis of the modern version of institutionalists' economic theory, as developed, for example, by Clarence Ayres of the University of Texas, and is the basic theory relied upon in Wendell Gordon's *The Political Economy of Latin America.*

As to the availability of productive factors, one might point out that not infrequently there are raw materials which are in existence but which are not located in areas where they might be brought into a composite complex of industrialization such as we have in the New England area, where coal, iron ore, population, markets, transportation facilities, and technological knowledge all blend.

Another fundamental difficulty, dating all the way back to Simón Bolívar's failure to integrate Latin America politically, is the effect of such fragmentation upon marketing, and thus cost conditions. That is, modern mass methods of production, bringing about low per unit cost, depend upon large markets.

With this briefing as background, it may be of interest to examine more specifically some of the most urgent problems that Latin America is faced with today.

Government

The political aspects of economic development are fundamental. Classical economic theorists put much stress upon the need to accumulate capital goods in order to develop a highly productive economy; it is still considered a critical factor. One of the vital conditions involved in the accumulation of capital (either in the funds sense or in the producers' goods sense) is an appropriate governmental environment. The word *appropriate* was deliberately used to emphasize that a government most conducive to progress in one country will not necessarily be a replica of any other particular government, be the comparison with that of the United States, or with Russia, or with Costa Rica, or with Brazil. And to say that *stable* government is required is not enough. Perhaps the most apt attribute for a satisfactory government would be that of responsibility in some ultimate form, constitutionalized, making it answerable to the will of the people, and thus inviting widespread support in the promotion of progress. A government of this sort would inherently acquire stability and thus remove one of the great barriers to investment, both from within the country and from abroad. A responsible government might be required to protect domestic interests from exploitative types of investment from external sources, but reasonable compromises could be made (such as joint enterprises).

Such a government would do well to devise plans and programs for developing forms of participation for its constituents. A realization of the interests of heretofore neglected groups and how they might take action to redress old inequities and undertake new responsibilities would lend viability. In Pakistan, the "basic democracies" system has been devised, whereby at the base of the political structure local councils meet to identify problems, set priorities on them, and learn what can and cannot be done toward getting assistance in their solution. Community development programs, such as the one now being attempted in the Dominican Republic, have similar objectives. In the efforts to identify issues, the process of problem-solving occurs and there is less dependence on paternalism.

Charles Anderson (1, p. 70) emphasizes that the state is a product of its environment. "It is not an independent variable in the equation of change, but a part of the total fabric of the life of a people." Its potential as an instrument of human betterment is bound up with all the assets and liabilities of the community and cannot be understood in isolation. One must examine the processes of economic and political life relating the state to its environment to assess its potential. Deeply entrenched beliefs concerning the legitimate economic role of government, together with highly patternized forms, limit the capacity of the Latin American state to act as an instrument of economic change. Innovations in public policy adopted from the West (for example, progressive taxation) are often ineffective because of institutional reluctance to take the steps necessary to render them effective. Resistances involve the commitments of individuals and groups to social institutions other than government. People find the logic of life in the family, the hacienda, or the traditional market situation more compelling than the claims of public authorities. "Unless the predominant economic community becomes equivalent to the nation, to the jurisdictional area of the state, many economic resources will remain beyond public control (1, p.74)."

The economic capabilities of the state are also limited by the availability of physical resources, the "vicious circle" nature of self-reinforcing poverty, the limited position of a country in world trade, and a persistence of cultural attitudes and values inconsistent with desirable economic policy changes.

Anderson (1) has made an astute observation pertaining to characteristics of Latin American government that may not be any too well understood in this country. It is typical for a Latin American government to recognize new groups who have found a means of forcing political recognition in the acquisition of some form of "power capability." If the new groups (involving, for example, new-found political power of trade unions, or organized students, or bureaucratic elites) win sufficient power they may dominate (or strongly influence) political direction of the state. However, much of the success of a new government leadership will depend upon arrangements that tolerate previously formed power contenders.* A new power group that violates the pattern is apt to find tenure difficult (this may partly explain some of the difficulties that Juan Bosch had during his brief period of service as president of the Dominican Republic in 1963). The issue is cited because Americans should realize that Latin American ways may prevent our efforts to install what we think are more democratic forms of government. Awareness of the pattern makes it easier to understand how elections can be constitutionally held and consistently annulled. The results of an election, then, may be tentative, pending responses by the various power contenders. Negotiation becomes important.

Much as many of us dislike the idea of governmental militarism, Latin American instances of it are, perhaps, better understood with some knowledge of the typical power complex. Political intervention by the military does not always have the effect of destroying the whole power system, but rather, in some cases at least, holders of important power capabilities are assured that their position in the society will be recognized.

This is not to say that militarism is justified, or that it may not do more harm than good as a defender of the status quo. It is to say, however, that there are facets of government in Latin America which, if better understood, might be less alarming and cause less hackle-raising.**

The route to change, embraced by such leaders as Betancourt of Venezuela, Figueres of Costa Rica, Belaúnde of Peru, and others, may be described as the quest to legitimize democratic power capabilities through the conversion of non-democratic ones. Those whose power does not rest on consent will have their actions redirected through structural change of the system, and their capability will be converted rather than destroyed. Hence, the military will become primarily professional; the hacienda owners will be required to adopt modern methods of production. The appeal is in the name of "national interest." This is a difficult path; passage over it requires time and education.

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*Such toleration should not be confused with democratic dissent and compromise.

**The author must confess that, in his very limited personal observations, he is prone to conclude that more and more of the people in Latin America are resentful of the power that so often resides in the military and which is not infrequently exploited by oligarchic groups who wish to maintain the status quo.

The essence of a democratic government lies in its ability to suffer dissent—what we speak of sometimes as the tolerance of a "loyal opposition." Support for this form of government would permit the flexibility so desirable for development. Some of the countries of Latin America seem to be making great strides toward it (for example, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile); others lag far behind.

If a sense of *nationhood* rather than mere nationalism can be developed, there is hope for more consideration of and respect for national interest.

In the Western democracies compromise is an accepted part of the governmental process. In some Latin American countries it is apt to have little effectiveness and, if compromise is in disrepute, dissent is not allowed. Democracy as we know it may not readily inspire Latin American hearts. "Its effects are slow in showing themselves, for a democracy is meaningless away from the halls of tradition and without the tones of compromise (34, p. 39)."

The United States might be wise to maintain continuing contact with every non-communist element of power. "However difficult, the United States must avoid drifting into 'allegiance patterns' which identify its interests with this or that class or interest group, or limit its support to parties and personalities simply because they happen to be in power (25, p. 35)."

We can better cope with Latin American complexities if we retain flexibility of action and a willingness to work with various groups as long as they blend reasonably with United States objectives. This will be particularly true if we link policy to the popular will and welfare of the Latin American people, whatever the ruling group and its form of government.

So much more could be said about the role of government, both as a catalyst, and as a limiting factor in development, that it is frustrating to stop here. We have not touched upon problems associated with corruption, graft, poor administration, and other such conditions—problems that are aggravated by poverty and will be ameliorated only with development. Nor have we explored the possibilities of a viable government encouraging the growth of responsible private enterprise.

Marketing

In this section some of the internal marketing problems in Latin America are examined. In the section that follows, aspects of international trade and integration are considered.

Improvements in marketing are especially vital for two reasons: first, because it will help distribute cheap food to growing populations and to urban centers where industrialization is contributing to growth; and second, because marketing knowledgeability and facilities so greatly affect production costs.

Improved marketing involves better roads, new access roads, overhauling of railways, more trucks, more storage facilities, dissemination of marketing information, advertising, more readily available credit, control of monopolistic practices, and establishment of cooperatives. In the desire to increase production, development plans have tended to neglect the subject. One reads of peasants in India who applied modern production techniques only to be discouraged because of a price drop with increased supply that might have been avoided if storage facilities had been available. It has been said that Argentina could "strike a blow for itself" toward development if it would renovate its railroad system. Perhaps Dominicans might save foreign exchange expended on such things as pear nectar if promotion work were done to increase the market for juices that could be produced readily within the country. Central wholesale markets, strategically located, functionally divided into operating areas, and properly regulated, are contributing to marketing efficiency in an increasing number of areas in Latin America. A homely thing like fitting axles and pneumatic tires from trucks to bullock carts greatly increases transport efficiency. "Twice the load can then be carried with the same tractive force, and it is much less wear on soft country roads (31, p. 21)."

Farmers need information on the prospective values of crops or they may not even try to grow some crops in active demand for which their land may be suitable. They need to be aware, too, of prices likely to be offered in alternative markets and at different seasons of the year. Furthermore, in a number of the underdeveloped countries, short term credit facilities are available only to the larger merchants, leaving the smaller farmers under pressure to sell their produce during a post-harvest depression in prices. And the rate of interest charged to small producers often seems prohibitive. "Instances are often reported of 10 percent per month (120% per annum) or more for small farmers—though the proportion of agricultural output affected by such charges is difficult to determine (31, p. 55)."

Land distribution, though it may be urgent from a political-sociological viewpoint, may lead to both inefficient production and marketing. The dangers, however, may be partially overcome by the establishment of cooperatives.

Again one is impressed with the need for initiative, capital, and time.

Rostow's ideas on how to develop markets on a broad scale are worth attention.* Having noted that in one developing nation the 61% of the population living in rural areas bought only 10% of the goods sold to consumers, he suggests that there are four major jobs to be done, simultaneously, as part of conscious national strategy shared by both public and private authorities. The first job would be to increase agricultural productivity. This would involve new roads and schools, more technical and marketing advice, more credit resources, and increased incentive to shift to new production methods. However, such a revolution in agriculture can only be effective if there is a parallel revolution in marketing. So here is the second job. With the application of modern marketing methods, food prices could be lowered by at least 10%. Development requires much greater attention to cheap and efficient marketing of the products of agriculture in urban areas. Distributors, as well as producers, must think more in terms of a mass market with small unit profits, compensated for by a larger turnover.

The third job would be for manufacturers to expand their production to cater not only to goods which the small wealthy groups can buy, but to things which have potential for mass marketing. Rostow mentions such things as simple agricultural equipment, cheap textiles, canvas shoes, flashlights, household equipment, transistor radios, bicycles, and sewing machines. What is required is a strong effort to bring industrial capacity into the service of a wider range of the population. In the process, the number of underemployed plants would be reduced.

The fourth job would be to devise new and efficient ways of getting mass-produced goods out to the rural markets. The mail order catalog might be used in some areas; where the rate of literacy is low, there might be truck huckstering. Some interesting experiments of this sort already have been made. "What is required is a purposeful organization of this kind of production and marketing with financing which would permit a protracted period in which the rural population begins to react (26, p. 140)." In the United States the availability of cheap, attractive consumer goods has been a major factor leading the farmer to change his methods to increase productivity and income. One is reminded of the role of the mail order houses in the rural areas. Incidentally, it may be noted that Sears, Roebuck has been active in several of the Latin American countries in ways that have contributed to economic growth. Their policy in general has been to develop local suppliers, and to utilize local help extensively.

Rostow's ideas on making a national market are reminiscent of Ragnar Nurkse's (22) stress upon balanced growth wherein he points out the advantage of mutually developing markets which, in a sense, feed each other.

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*ROSTOW, W. W. *View from the seventh floor.* New York, Harper & Row, 1964. See especially Chapter 11, How to Make a National Market.

International Trade

Just as developing internal markets would permit more efficient production by enabling lower per unit costs, so the extension of markets internationally, would contribute to modern economies of scale. Many years ago, the so-called father of economics, Adam Smith, said that nations as well as individuals increase productivity through division of labor. He added that specialization is limited only by the extent of the market. Teachers of international trade have been saying it ever since.

The United States is a classic example of the efficacy of a large, "common" market. In the 1950's we encouraged Western Europe to develop a common market in order to induce large-scale, overhead-spreading, production methods. In the sixties we have been active in encouraging such efforts in Latin America—most recently, at the meeting of the Latin American republics (Cuba excluded) at Punta del Este in April (1967). Michael Sieniawski, reporting from São Paulo, Brazil, wrote that "nothing in recent years has caught so much Latin American imagination as the recent decision at the Presidents' Conference in Punta del Este to create a Latin American common market." (4) The announcement was greeted with enthusiasm. However, some of the national monopolistic groups, apparently concerned that their privileges will be challenged, reportedly are siding with the communists in denouncing the plan as "Yankee imperialism."

The idea of a Latin American common market comprising nations with a total present population of close to 250 million (which will more than double by the end of this century) has been discussed at a number of conferences. However, the new factor introduced at Punta del Este is that the project has received the full formal endorsement of the United States.

President Johnson also said at Punta del Este that the United States is ready to explore the possibilities of temporary preferential tariff advantages for all developing countries in the markets of all the industrialized countries. Raúl Prebisch, a leading Latin American economist from Argentina and Secretary-General of the United Nations' Trade and Development Conference, has commented that most of the developing countries need a world-wide system of preferences giving them greater access to the markets of the more affluent industrialized countries, and not limited discriminatory preferences on regional lines. Prebisch (21) said that the political decisions taken at Punta del Este to create a Latin American common market have given the technical secretaries of regional organizations a mandate to develop the instruments for this market.

Among the principal regional organizations that can participate in furthering integration are the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, the Latin American Free Trade Association, and the Central American Economic Community, each with its own secretariat.

Although both common markets and free trade associations have as their aim the reduction of tariffs and increase in trade among and between the nations involved, a common market includes common tariff schedules to those outside of the arrangement; in the case of a free trade association each nation continues its separate tariff arrangements. One can see that a common market might invite broad integration but could become uneconomic in the world community if it were to use the arrangement to regionally monopolize trade with resulting net higher tariffs to the rest of the world after the market has formed, and herein lies a principal danger.

One somewhat unsatisfactory arrangement as the situation now stands with respect to the proposed Latin American common market, is indefiniteness in the proposed tariff reduction schedule.

A corollary to the economic integration theme, replacing to some extent the earlier emphasis upon social reform, is the new emphasis upon agriculture as a key sector in economic growth. Under the original Alliance for Progress concept (1961), industrial growth and its effect upon urban life was emphasized, as well as agrarian reform. In the new policy agriculture is stressed, and there is more discussion of increasing productivity, diversifying exports, and improving credit and marketing, with less emphasis upon agrarian reform.

The barriers to economic cooperation are much higher in Latin America than they were in Europe when the European Common Market was formed. It has already been noted that Latin American nations are not accustomed to trading among themselves and lack common channels of communication. Furthermore, their economies are not as complimentary as those in Europe. Technicians and administrators are more scarce and in a number of the countries the technology of plant and equipment is relatively backward. It is probably true to say, too, that there are more extremes of economic inequalities and inequities both within nations and among the nations of Latin America, and there is danger that the several more advanced nations would enjoy a lead that might handicap the poorest nations.

At present there appears to be a belief in the State Department that we should direct most of our assistance effort toward creating integrated markets and sound economic conditions, with the thought that stability will follow. However, it might be dangerous to slight the political-sociological aspects of development if we are to avoid the radical type revolutions alien to our own mode of life. It is too bad that we do not do more to understand this aspect of the problem of development, involving the support of hitherto underprivileged peoples. On the other hand, it is too bad that many Latin Americans fail to appreciate how relatively non-materialistic many of us really are.

A word about the Central American Economic Community and the Latin American Free Trade Association is appropriate. The Central American Economic Community is a result of studies and negotiations begun in 1951 and culminating in the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, signed in December 1960 by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. There appeared to be a realization of the obstacles to development arising from the smallness of national markets and from the absence of basic resources such as coal and oil (it might be noted that even the economic integration of all five countries means a market smaller than that of Colombia, for example). Perhaps the most interesting principle involved in the Central American trading bloc is the recognition that industrialized expansion for the region will be acquired not by a proliferation of existing plants, but through the establishment of new industries essential to the development of other branches of activity. (19) The common market in Central America has already achieved noteworthy advances. Intra-Central American common market trade has tripled during a period of five years and Panama has been added as an associate member (28).

The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was set up by a treaty signed at Montevideo (Uruguay) in 1960. The members are Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Mexico. The treaty provided for annually lowering duties and charges among the member countries with not less than 8% of the weighted average applicable to third countries. The procedures for implementing the reductions are fairly complicated and considerable maneuvering is involved each year between each pair of countries in determining what commodities will be subject to negotiation during the round. There is quite a range of escape clauses spread throughout the treaty. One such clause pertains to agriculture and since agricultural trade represents almost half of intra-Latin American trade, exceptions are not to be taken lightly (9).

Gordon (9) points out that all of the Latin American countries are too small, but the poorer countries especially are too small. If they join LAFTA and continue to use their tariffs to maintain their economic smallness, they would be failing to take advantage of the characteristic of the common market (its economic size) that makes the operation worthwhile. Latin America has much to do before the area will realize from LAFTA the gains that seem to be accruing to the members of the European Economic Community.

Tentative present planning would consolidate the Central American common market with the Latin American Free Trade Association to form a common market for all of Latin America. The market actually would be inaugurated by 1970, and put into "substantial operation" by 1985. It would include free movement of capital and labor among the member countries, and would establish a common currency.

No discussion of trade problems should omit mentioning that great argument among economists of Latin America (the champion in this respect is probably Raúl Prebisch) and the United States (perhaps exemplified by Gottfried Haberler) pertaining to the terms of trade. Prebisch has long argued that one of the handicaps of Latin America is the fact that prices for the primary products typically exported from Latin America generally have moved downward in recent decades, whereas prices for manufactured goods that make up much of the imports of Latin America have tended to move upward. But the argument is affected by the particular time span one might choose and by the difficulty of allowing for quality changes in the products involved. Also, there has been a big increase in the variety of available manufactured goods.

The data seem to this writer to indicate that the prices of Latin American exports have fluctuated more than the prices of Latin American imports. Also, it is possible that technology will decrease dependency upon certain imports into the industrialized countries now deemed essential. Latin Americans would have us give more consideration to commodity agreements, as well as preferential tariff treatment.

People

I would like to close this exploration of some of the major Latin American political-sociological-economic issues by making some observations concerning population problems, by commenting upon Theodore Schultz's emphasis upon "investment in human capital", and by emphasizing the importance of motivation.

The Population Problem

Reverend Thomas Malthus, publishing his essay on population in 1798, observed that population increased much more rapidly than food supply and implied that man was doomed to a subsistence level of living. This theory led to the branding of economics as the "dismal science" and was incorporated into economic doctrine (especially during the first half of the nineteenth century). As we approached the twentieth century there was much less concern, in the Western World at least, with the problem of population pressure, probably due to the fact that the Western economies were developing rapidly as great strides were being made in technological and market development. Only in recent years has there been appreciable alarm that man might not be able to continue to "beat the rap" in avoiding widespread starvation.

It was popular for a long time to point out that modern science could keep us a jump or two ahead of food shortage. There have been many articles written about new methods of production, new fertilizers, new irrigation projects, new seed varieties, new fisheries. Hydroponics has captured the imagination and alleviated worry to some extent. These innovations have helped to stave off a day of reckoning but despite all this we have been forced to re-examine the question as we have observed the very rapid increase in rates of population growth, especially in the areas that may be least able to afford it. Georg Borgstrom, an authority on food utilization, has said that in order to feed even the present world population adequately we would have to double our food production overnight. With great ingenuity we might achieve and sustain this goal within forty or fifty years, but by that time, at its current rate of growth, our population will be doubled. Man threatens to deprive himself of a future by refusing to recognize his predicament.

> Mankind has by and large failed in its supreme effort to feed adequately those billions of people *now* living on earth. Of these, at least one billion are undernourished, and the diets of an additional eight hundred million are deficient in one or several key nutrients. (3, p. xi)

In the first sixty years of this century the world's population doubled, and it is likely to double again before the year 2000. Borgstrom thinks we are figuring in a totally misleading time dimension. We speak of developing areas such as Alaska, New Guinea, or Siberia, but do not realize that during the years it would take to convert these regions to feeding millions, the number of people will by then have grown vastly beyond the capacity of these areas.

> The technical reshaping of the whole of Siberia will take at least twenty to thirty years and the area may by then offer a livelihood and opportunities to, at the most, five hundred million. At the present time this constitutes less than eight years' net population growth in the world. (3, p. 451)

The most rapid rates of population increases are found in Latin America. The rate of increase in the United States recently has been running less than 1.3% per annum; the rate of increase for the world is around 2%; for Asia, about 2.3%; for Latin America, close to 2.9%. The highest rate of increase in Latin America is 4.3% (Costa Rica). Many other Latin American countries have rates above 3%.*

Some well known economists believe that the population problem is a challenge that spurs development. Albert Hirschman (11), acknowledging that he is having a thought dangerous to his reputation, nevertheless has said that population pressure on living standards will lead to counterpressure that will maintain or restore communities' traditional standard of living, and that the community, thanks to the learning process, will have increased its ability to organize itself for development. It would seem that this thinking slights recognition of the effects of deep poverty upon the resilience, attitude, and capability of people that are living so close to subsistence that they fear the risk that might accompany the necessary changes for increasing productivity. Furthermore, even with desire, the lack of funds, fertilizers, seed programs, technical

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*Most of the demographic data for this study have been obtained from the *DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK*, 1965. New York, United Nations, 1966.

skills, transportation facilities, storage facilities, irrigation, and political stability, with all the related shortcomings of countries struggling to find themselves, requires quantities of time and education, as well as money. It is difficult and expensive to change institutionalized habit patterns and organize new ones.

Colin Clark (5), British economist, also has written that population growth generally has been beneficial and often may be the only stimulus powerful enough to shake men out of their established ways and customs. Clark cites the history of Americans, and states that had population been only slowly growing over the period of most rapid development, the American economy, political institutions, and culture would all be quite unrecognizably different from what they are now. But this seems to be a poor example to compare with the population pressures that exist in much of Asia and in some parts of Latin America, where the ratio of people to available resources does not appear to be nearly as advantageous as that which existed on the continent of the United States during our rapid development period.

One might suppose that the man most prone to agree with Clark would be the historian Arnold Toynbee, who theorized that great civilizations arise from challenge and response. Yet we find Toynbee, at the World Food Congress in Washington in 1963, saying that the "thundering tramp" of overpopulation, unless checked by birth control, will throttle scientific progress and plunge mankind back into an abyss of war, disease, and famine. He predicted that even if the human race succeeded in colonizing other planets, "it would reach a limit to their food supply somewhere, at some date". Toynbee's stress on the need for birth control clashed with the views of Agriculture Secretary Freeman, who said "science and technology have now, in this generation, opened the door for a potential abundance for all".

B. R. Sen (31), Director-General of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, in his preface to the Organization's Annual Report for the year ending June 30, 1966, said that stagnant agricultural production, shrivelling food stock piles, and a 70 million spurt in world population have combined to make the world food situation more precarious than at any time since the period of acute shortage immediately after the Second World War.

The fact that the increase in the rate of population growth has been caused especially by the dramatic drop in death rates as we have helped to purify water, kill mosquitoes, and attack disease germs with penicillin and other modern drugs, does not relieve us of the resulting pressure. Birth rates remain high, especially in Latin America, and it may take decades for education, emancipation of women, higher standards of living, new possibilities for diversification of efforts, attention, and activities to reduce birth rates. With the political-economic pressures generated by the have-nots in the world today, time may not be on our side.

Stycos (29) has written an interesting article on opinions of Latin Americans concerning population problems and birth control. He thinks that Latin American intellectuals' aversion to population control include the rural frontier mystique (the more people the more wealth and power), and the "population-as-goad" theory—deprivation and suffering beget creative solutions. He adds, however, that the most characteristic attitude toward population control is indifference.

Latin Americans have long lived in a psychological atmosphere of underpopulation, dating back to Iberian settlers conscious of their small numbers compared to the Indians. Furthermore, a cheap labor force was desired to work the mines, the plantations, and the haciendas. Today, while the problem of scarce laborers has been replaced by that of unemployment and underemployment, the mystique of the rural frontier lives on (29).

Rodríguez Fabregat, Uruguayan delegate to the United Nations Population Commission, has said:

> The newborn child should be regarded not as an extra mouth to feed, but as an additional mind and an additional pair of hands which could make a contribution to the progress of mankind. (29, p. 13)

However, Stycos insists that the most characteristic attitude toward population growth in Latin America is indifference. The lack of concern is partly because it has been only in recent years that the population size and rate of growth have been remarkable. There is also support among the Latin Americans for the theme that population problems are in fact economic or political problems associated with deficiencies in production and distribution—the population problem is not only fictitious, but a myth created by imperialist nations (typical of the Marxist position). There is probably some fear, too, of state control over intimate aspects of life, and rationalization that the processes of industrialization and education will bring about fertility declines as they did in the case of the Western nations (the time element is not given sufficient consideration, however).

Official governmental policies on population control have not yet emerged in much of Latin America. However, there are signs of increasing interest and the beginning of new action. At the 1964 Western Hemisphere meetings of the International Planned Parenthood Association, twelve Latin American governments sent delegates who participated in passing a resolution calling on the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, and the Organization of American States to conduct studies on induced abortion and the sociological economic effects of population growth, and to recommend means for problem-solving.

The climate *is* changing. Expanded social and economic planning forces government to face population growth problems as countries become frustrated with slow per capita rates of progress. Furthermore, it would appear that the Catholic Church is reconsidering its position. In addition, urbanization has created a new sense of pressure. Demographers and government planning experts conducted a meeting in February, 1967, at the headquarters of the Organization of American States in Washington, as a preliminary to a major conference on population. The United Nations has given sanction to an organized effort to deal with the problem of too rapid population growth; twenty-five nations, some formerly reluctant to endorse population control measures, supported a resolution calling for assistance to nations desiring help in training, research, information and advisory services in population control. (20) There is a long development period ahead, however.

Dudley Kirk and Dorothy Nortman (15) report that a number of Latin American countries are taking steps to institute family planning as a regular public health service (Chile, Jamaica, and Honduras). Colombia and Haiti are also evidencing interest in such plans. In December, 1964, a decree was promulgated in Peru setting up a "center of population".

United States policy toward participating in efforts to solve population pressures has been changing in the 1960's. Directives from the Department of State to its AID (Agency for International Development) field offices emphasize the importance AID attributes to population problems and the need for responsive action to deal with them, pointing out that control of the rapid growth of population throughout Latin America is a critical factor in achieving social and economic development goals of the Alliance for Progress. Such directives have stated that AID is prepared to assist host governments as fully and effectively as possible in the areas of (a) information, (b) training, (c) research, and (d) institution building.

There is, then, a growing feeling of emergency concerning the adequacy of food supplies in view of the population spurt. Many observers consider this to be the most urgent problem confronting us in the immediate years ahead.

Not all analysts of Latin America are alarmed at the population pressures which seem to be developing south of us. Wendell Gordon (9), for example, comments that, in spite of the population growth, Latin America remains one of the relatively underpopulated areas and thinks that, since the increase in population is more the result of falling death rates than rising birth rates, once the average population age has risen somewhat, the rate of population increase will fall.

Ameliorating population problems also will take time; meanwhile, perhaps it is correct to emphasize the immediate need to increase agricultural productivity, especially in view of the unrest in many parts of Latin America.

John Kenneth Galbraith (41), however, closes his book on economic development by bluntly stating that the nations menaced by the population explosion must settle on the most practical contraceptive method, make it available in mass, get it into use, and judge its success by results—by what happens to the birthrate.

Investment in Human Capital

Theodore Schultz (28) has been writing for years about the importance of the "missing factor" in accounting for rapid expansion of economic activity in the United States.* Increased inputs of the traditional factors of raw materials, physical capital, and labor do not account for the resulting proportionately higher increase in output. The missing factor is improvement in the *quality* of both physical capital and labor, but Schultz directs our attention especially to improved human effort and the education essential to its accomplishment.

Earlier development efforts were aimed at industrialization. The pendulum then swung toward promoting better agricultural techniques. Only in the last few years has education itself been increasingly stressed, and recognized as an investment in *human* capital. That is, expenditures upon education are not mere current expenses, but lead to a stream of income returns over a considerable period of time. The World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) has begun only recently to make appreciable loans specifically directed toward education. Slowly, national budgets have allowed for larger segments allotted to education. The United States, in its own assistance effort, has become more and more conscious of the importance of education and the wastefulness of making tractors and machine tools available unless there is knowledgeability of how to run them, service them, repair them, improve other techniques, administer enterprise, and market the product.

There is urgent need for exploration concerning the appropriate *types* of education and the proper setting of priorities. Latin American universities have been prone in the past to produce doctors and lawyers, whereas present requirements call for accountants, marketing men, agronomists, and business administrators. At lower levels, the most strategic form of education might be the training of mechanics and other technicians, as well as agricultural programs perhaps something like our vocational agricultural education. Literacy is, of course, desirable, but must contest with the urgency of other priorities. The ordering of priorities may differ in the various economies of Latin America, but the importance of directing attention to people and their appropriate education cannot be overstressed.

Motivation

The subject of motivation brings us again to the importance of people and the need for better understanding of the psychological aspects of achievement. In a number of Latin American countries there is much evidence of paternalism. People who have been directed by dictators for many years cannot be expected suddenly to shoulder the respon-

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***See, for example, his classic article in the *AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW* LI, Investment in Human Capital. March 1961.**

sibility desirable in a national effort toward development. One Latin American psychologist told the author that some degree of *"paternalismo"* may be necessary during a period of trying to lessen the effects of paternalism!

People who are close to a subsistence level of living may resist change because of what to them is a very real risk involved in doing things differently; that is, with so small a margin for error, a failure could be disastrous. Peasants have expressed opinions implying that it is interesting to observe the demonstration of the American extension worker, riding up in a Jeep station wagon, assured of the availability of seed and fertilizer and equipment and technical knowledge and sources of backing; it is a different matter for the peasant to imitate the procedure without the certainties enjoyed by the American, especially when old habit patterns may be considerably disrupted. People need to believe that the possible outcome of change is worth the risk, and part of any demonstration effect must consider the culture pattern and the psychology of those one would help.

If people could be assisted to identify themselves with the community's social effort, to take more responsibility for recognizing and solving problems, assigning priorities, and participating in solutions, progress would be accelerated. Beyond this, if more and more people begin to identify with national effort, this, too, could be a strong development force. Nationalism in the sense of consciousness of "nationhood", with direction of attention to the common good, is a potentially powerful factor. Nationalism in the sense only of jealousies and rivalries with other nations could be detrimental to growth (especially if it ignored the feasibility of economic and political integration suggested for Latin America).

David McClelland (18) wrote an interesting book exploring the motives of an achieving society in which he traced one human motive in particular, the *need for achievement,* that appears with regularity in the imaginative thinking of men and nations before periods of rapid economic growth. The role of achievement motivation, in contrast with Social Darwinism and Marxism, emphasizes man more as a creator of his environment rather than merely as a creature of it. Thus, history should be rewritten more in terms of national character and what the people are trying to do or are most concerned with.

A people must break with traditional ways if they are to achieve. Once the need for change in orientation is accepted, the means are not hard to discover. Increased communication is basic (more roads, radios, telephones, newspapers, speeches). If people are to learn about new techniques or new norms, they must come in contact with them. Contact is not enough, however. Developing the capacity of the community to absorbe change is important. (18)

Resistance to modernization is often massive. McClelland suggests it can be overcome by an ideological campaign using the various means of contact to prepare them for it, with the fervor necessary for effective results. Projecting ideology that induces change might well involve appeal to national pride, organizing reform movements, and new roles for the Church, substituting some degree of emotional security with new norms as traditional forms are destroyed.*

I once asked a Pakistani graduate, who was about to return home with his new degree, what he considered to be the most important factor in his country's efforts to develop. His answer was "the attitude of the people".

Reflections

The explorations that we have indulged in appear to the author to be of special concern, but they are by no means inclusive. We have not discussed the troublesome problem of inflation, which involves an argument between those who think the prime reason for inflation is overease of monetary and fiscal policy ("the monetarists") and those who think that the troublesome aspect of inflation is inadequate and inefficient production ("the structuralists"). There is also the interesting question of the role of private enterprise and the possibilities of mixed economies where, with a pragmatic approach, more correlation between public and private activities might be feasible.

The problem of rapid urbanization, which has been touched upon only indirectly, demands more attention directed to community development and agricultural improvements to slow down the movement from the countryside to the cities. There is a need for basic services in the *barrios* of the cities, even though for a while this might serve to perpetuate what Americans would consider as slum areas. The ultimate solution, of course, depends to a great extent upon the ability of the economy to grow and, in the process, create jobs.

The problem of agrarian reform has not been probed here, either. One feels compelled to note that agrarian reform is so very much more than distribution or redistribution of land. It involves rehabilitation, credit facilities, storage facilities, selective choice of families, marketing knowledge, extension service.

It is so much simpler to call attention to these problems than to solve them. Offering solutions is "easier said than done." Nevertheless, a willingness to seek new direction and to innovate are vital to efforts toward progress.**

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*HAGEN, EVERETT. *On the theory of social change*. Homewood, Illinois, Dorsey Press, 1962. Hagen also stresses the need to change traditional attitudes and permit the evolution of what he calls "the creative personality" as opposed to the authoritarian type which permits so little scope for curiosity and investigation. Societies composed of authoritarian individuals are not susceptible to economic growth. Both McClelland and Hagen decry "traditional" child-rearing practices whereby paternal authority stunts enterprise.

**It is likely true that a sense of direction encourages efforts toward progress, even though the level on which the process starts may be quite low.

United States Policy and the Alliance for Progress

Since 1961, United States assistance to Latin America has been channeled through the Alliance for Progress program.* United States funds for the Alliance have been put into use not only through the Inter-American Development Bank but also through Export-Import Bank loans, assistance through the Agency for International Development, and the several programs under Public Law 480 (which has rendered support under the Food for Peace program).

Latin American progress in the 1960's has been somewhat erratic. Goals have not been met, and one hears of complaints, misunderstandings, and disgruntlements. Despite the poverty, revolutions, dictatorships, militarism, and other various and sundry political-social-economic problems existing for hundreds of years, there seems to be dismay that Latin America hasn't been renovated in six years.

There *have* been disappointments and misunderstandings. Perhaps we have expected too much in requiring well-constructed development plans as a basis for aid consideration, or in expecting that new tax laws enacted could then quickly and easily be enforced, or that agrarian reform could be carried out in the span of a few years without strong resistance from those who would prefer the status quo. Perhaps, especially in the earlier years of the Alliance, we may have been too anxious to put the United States stamp on this organization in our desire to let Latin Americans know that we are helping them. Further, one sometimes wonders if there could have been more effort on the part of the receivers of aid to try to understand the problems and intentions of the country rendering assistance, as well as vice versa.

Our belated efforts to give consideration to the problems of our southern neighbors have not all been received as we might have wished. Is the Alliance a failure? Is Latin America doomed to go through the revolutions of the extremists before its reforms can be extended to the underprivileged?

In the Fifth Annual Report of the Social Progress Trust Fund a regional evaluation was made from which the following facts were taken.**

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*Perhaps it would be proper to note that ideas leading to the Alliance for Progress came from Latin Americans. For example, in 1958 President Kubitschek of Brazil proposed that "Operation Pan America" be undertaken through the Organization of American States to find solutions to common problems and formulate new measures for economic cooperation. As a result, nineteen of the Americas States adopted the Act of Bogota in 1960, which specified measures for social improvements and recommended that measures for economic development and multi-national cooperation for social and economic progress be undertaken. These actions also resulted in the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1959 and its special Inter-American Fund for Social Progress in 1961.

**INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. *Fifth Annual Report of the Social Progress Trust Fund, 1965.* Washington, D.C., Inter-American Development Bank, 1966.

1. From 1961 until 1965 approximately $384 million was allocated by the Inter-American Development Bank, the Agency for International development, and the Export-Import Bank for water supply and sewerage facilities benefiting an estimated 44.7 million people.

2. Between 1960 and 1964 enrollment in primary schools increased by an estimated 28%; in secondary education the increase was 50%.

3. Total agricultural production in Latin America increased annually 1.6% over the past five years (however, this must be compared with the average annual increase of 3.6% during the first half of the past decade).

4. In 1965 the Ecuadorian Land Reform and Colonization Institute started its operations vigorously converting tenant-workers to farm owners.

5. Since 1964 the Peruvian Institute of Agrarian Reform and Development has been active in getting its program underway in establishing land reform zones, granting tenure rights to long-term occupiers of hacienda lands, and colonizing new areas through migration and land development.

6. In four years of Colombian agrarian reform, more than 1.2 million hectares of land (mostly public land) have been distributed to roughly 30,000 farm families.

7. Venezuela, during 1965, greatly accelerated its land redistribution program with 25,000 new beneficiaries. The total number of families who have received land during the last five years of the reform is almost 100,000.

8. An important consequence of new land reform laws has been the establishment and strengthening of government agencies to implement the reforms; while these agencies are not yet very strong, they represent a significant development in terms of public concern and growing responsibility for the welfare of the *campesino.*

9. Activity has been directed to land surveys and registration (land records are poor in the region, resulting in tenure uncertainty, inadequate tax base, and problems connected with land reform implementation).

10. An overdue change in attitude is occurring with respect to the political role of *campesino* groups. In recent years such activity has been noticeable especially in Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil.

11. Total tax collections, expressed in constant dollars, increased from $7.3 billion in 1960 to $9.2 billion in 1964, representing an increase of 26%, with a significant acceleration of the expansion in 1964.

12. In constant dollars, fixed capital formation went up from $13.0 billion in 1963 to $14.3 billion in 1964, an increase of over 10% (one of the essential factors of the acceleration of the rate of economic development in the region during 1964-1965).

13. During 1965, the number of Latin American countries with government approved national development plans increased.

In back of the evidence of modest progress is a staggering amount of unfinished business. It would seem, nevertheless, that there is direction, and motion; it may or may not be enough to assure allegiance to democratic programs. Things *have* been done with positive results. Let us end the review on this note.

APPENDIX

ARGENTINA*

1. Exchange rate. The peso was devalued in March 1967 from 251 per US dollar to 350 per US dollar (one peso is now the equivalent of approximately .285 cent).

2. Cost of living index (1958 = 100):

1960	272
1961	309
1962	395
1963	491
1964	600
1965	771
1966	1,020

3. Industrial production index (1958 = 100):

1960	92
1961	102
1962	95
1963	87

4. Leading exports (millions of US dollars):

	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*
Wheat	142.7	65.6	173.4	116.4	242.3	372.7
Corn	124.2	82.8	121.6	126.5	168.0	153.6
Meat	219.3	217.4	228.5	334.1	328.7	328.8
Wool	145.3	142.4	144.8	160.6	128.6	112.0
Hides	70.2	79.0	91.6	78.0	57.7	50.3
Linseed	40.6	50.2	58.8	41.7	40.9	46.8
Quebracho Extract	15.1	13.0	12.1	12.9	15.6	16.1

5. Gross national product (billions of pesos):

1960	956
1961	1,140
1962	1,403
1963	1,725
1964	2,349
1965	3,243

6. Population (millions):

1960	20.67
1961	21.01
1962	21.35
1963	21.69
1964	22.02
1965	22.35
1966	22.70

		% of total
7.	(1957) Arable land and land under tree crops	11
	Permanent meadows and pastures	41
	Forested land	36
	Unused potentially productive land	—
	Not accounted for	13

8. Life expectancy at birth (1947): Male, 56.9 years; Female, 61.4 years

9. (1961)	Crude birth rate	22.4 per 1,000
	Crude death rate	8.0 per 1,000
	Infant death rate	61.2 per 1,000

10. Annual % increase in population 1958-61: 1.7%

11. Illiteracy (1947): 13.3%

12. Student-teacher ratio (1961):

primary school	21.7
secondary school	6.4

13. Education (1960):

per capita (US dollars)	9
% central government budget	17

14. Calories per day (per capita, 1957-59): 3,090
(97.7 grams of protein per day)

*Items 1 through 6 were taken from the International Monetary Fund's *International Financial Statistics, July, 1967*. Items 7 through 14 were obtained from the *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1964,* Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles. The years shown were the most recent ones appearing in each of the sources.

BRAZIL*

1. Exchange rate (end of April 1967): 2.715 cruzeiros per US dollar (on February 13, 1967, the new cruzeiro was introduced, equivalent to 1,000 old cruzeiros).

2. Cost of living index (1958 = 100):

1960	185
1961	256
1962	390
1963	684
1964	1,270
1965	2,050
1966	3,000

3. Industrial production index—none reported.

4. Leading exports (millions of US dollars):

	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
Coffee	713	710	643	748	760	707	764
Cotton	46	110	112	114	108	97	111
Cacao	69	46	24	35	35	28	51

5. Gross national product (billions of cruzeiros):

1960	2,397
1961	3,475
1962	5,436
1963	9,520
1964	18,726

6. Population (millions):

1960	70.9
1961	73.0
1962	75.3
1963	77.5
1964	79.8
1965	82.8
1966	84.7

	% of total
7. Arable land and land under tree crops (no additional breakdown reported)	2

8. Life expectancy at birth (1947): Male, 39.30 years; Female, 45.50 years

9.

Crude birth rate	43.0 per 1,000
Crude death rate	20.6 per 1,000
Infant death rate	17.0 per 1,000

10. Annual % increase in population 1958-61: 3.6

11. Illiteracy (1950): 51.4%

12. Student-teacher ratio (1961):

primary school	32.6
secondary school	15.0

13. Education (1960):

per capita (US dollars)	3
% central government budget	—

14. Calories per day (per capita, 1957-59): 2,540
    (60.9 grams of protein per day)

*Items 1 through 6 were taken from the International Monetary Fund's *International Financial Statistics, June, 1967.* Items 7 through 14 were obtained from the *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1964,* Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles. The years shown were the most recent ones appearing in each of the sources.

GUATEMALA*

1. Exchange rate: End of March 1967, 1.00 quetzals per US dollar. (This has been the ratio since 1924).

2. Cost of living index (1958 = 100):

1960	98
1961	98
1962	100
1963	100
1964	100
1965	99
1966	100

3. Industrial production index (1958 = 100):

1960	106
1961	112
1962	111
1963	126
1964	133
1965	147

4. Leading exports (millions of quetzals and US dollars):

	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*
Coffee	78.6	69.2	68.2	78.1	72.3	91.7
Bananas	17.3	13.9	9.5	11.5	9.6	3.5
Cotton	5.8	10.2	15.4	24.7	23.2	34.4

5. Gross national product (millions of quetzals and US dollars):

1960	1,010
1961	1,031
1962	1,080
1963	1,200
1964	1,311
1965	1,410

6. Population (millions):

1960	3.81
1961	3.93
1962	4.05
1963	4.18
1964	4.30
1965	4.44
1966	4.57

			% of total
7.	(1950)	Arable land and land under tree crops	14
		Permanent meadows and pastures	5
		Forested land	44
		Unused potentially productive land	—
		Not accounted for	37

8. Life expectancy at birth (1949-51): Male, 43.82; Female, 43.52 years

9.	(1961)	Crude birth rate	49.9
		Crude death rate	16.3
		Infant death rate	84.8

10. Annual % increase in population 1958-61: 3.1%

11. Amerindian (1950): 53.6%

12. Illiteracy (1950): 70.3%

13. Student-teacher ratio (1962)

primary school	32.0
secondary school	8.0

14. Education (1960):

per capita (US dollars) 4

per capita (US dollars) 4

% central government budget —

15. Calories per day (per capita, 1957): 2,175

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*Items 1 through 6 were taken from the International Monetary Fund's *Inter ational* *Financial Statistics, June, 1967*. Items 7 through 15 were obtained from the *St tistical* *Abstract of Latin America, 1964*, Latin American Center, University of Califor a, Los Angeles. The years shown were the most recent ones appearing in each of the s urces.

MEXICO*

1. Exchange rate: 12.49 buying and 12.51 selling pesos per US dollar (one peso = 8¢ approximately).

2. Cost of living index (1958 = 100):

1960	108
1961	109
1962	110
1963	111
1964	114
1965	118
1966	123
and Feb. 1967	125

3. Industrial production index (1958 = 100)

1960	117
1961	122
1962	129
1963	141
1964	159
1965	168
1966	185

4. Leading exports (millions of pesos):

	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
Cotton	1,974	1,999	2,729	2,445	2,127	2,652	2,774
Coffee	896	896	876	614	1,190	913	1,048
Lead	421	465	328	343	291	351	345
Copper	322	238	306	282	182	102	106
Zinc	369	342	353	373	532	535	552

5. Gross national product (billions of pesos):

1960	154.1
1961	163.8
1962	177.5
1963	192.2
1964	224.6
1965	242.7

6. Population (millions)

1960	36.05
1961	37.27
1962	38.54
1963	39.87
1964	41.25
1965	42.69
1966	44.14

		% of total
7. (1950)	Arabable land and land under tree crops	10
	Permanent meadows and pastures	38
	Forested land	20
	Unused potentially productive land	6
	Not accounted for	—

8. Life expectancy at birth (1940): Male, 37.92 years; Female, 39.79 years.

9. (1961)	Crude birth rate	44.9 per 1,000
	Crude death rate	10.6 per 1,000
	Infant death rate	70.3 per 1,000

10. Annual % increase in population 1958-61: 3.1%

11. Amerindian: 30%

12. Illiteracy (1960): **37.7%**

13. Student-teacher ratio (1960)

primary school	45.7
secondary school	11.0

14. Education (1962):

per capita (US dollars)	6
% central government budget	20.4

15. Calories per day (per capita, 1957-59): 2,440
(67.8 grams of protein per day)

***Items 1 through 6 were taken from the International Monetary Fund's *International Financial Statistics, June, 1967*. Items 7 through 15 were obtained from the *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1964*, Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles. The years shown were the most recent ones appearing in each of the sources.**

PERU*

1. Exchange rate: 26.82 sols per US dollar.
   No restrictions on foreign payments.

2. Cost of living index (1958 = 100):

1960	122
1961	131
1962	139
1963	148
1964	164
1965	191
1966	208
and Feb. 1967	216

3. Industrial production index—none reported.

4. Leading exports (millions of sols):

	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
Fishmeal	1,056	1,329	2,678	2,802	3,845	3,844	,870
Cotton	1,997	2,140	2,605	2,452	2,450	2,345	,290
Sugar	1,299	1,721	1,460	1,740	1,716	1,002	,243
Lead	590	598	440	440	884	1,016	928
Copper	2,580	2,808	2,476	2,340	2,762	3,252	995
Silver	656	739	881	960	1,213	1,047	,110

5. Gross national product (billions of sols):

1960	55.52
1961	62.29
1962	71.70
1963	78.71
1964	95.48
1965	114.72

6. Population (millions):

1960	10.02
1961	10.32
1962	10.63
1963	10.96
1964	11.30
1965	11.65
1966	12.01

7. (1961)

		% of total
7. (1961)	Arable land and land under tree crops	2
	Permanent meadows and pastures	9
	Forested land	56
	Unused potentially productive land	—
	Not accounted for	34

8. Life expectancy at birth (1940-43): Male, 46.10; no figure for Female.

9. (1961)	Crude birth rate	28.1 per 1,000
	Crude death rate	8.5 per 1,000
	Infant death rate	97.2 per 1,000

10. Annual % increase in population 1958-61: 2.0%

11. Amerindian (1940): 45.9%

12. Illiteracy (1940): 57.6%

13. Student-teacher ratio

primary school	36.3
secondary school	18.3

14. Education (1960):

per capita (US dollars)	5
% central government budget	10

15. Calories per day (per capita, 1957-59): 1,970
(49.0 grams of protein per day)

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*Items 1 through 6 were taken from the International Monetary Fund's *International Financial Statistics, June, 1967.* Items 7 through 15 were obtained from the *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1964,* Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles. The years shown were the most recent ones appearing in each of the sources.

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THE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA



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Dr. Louis De Armond, director of the Latin American Studies Center at California State College at Los Angeles and professor of history, received his A.B., M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California at Berkeley.

In the early 1940's, Professor De Armond was stationed with the United States Embassy at Santiago, Chile. During 1948-1949, he taught at the University of California at Davis. From 1950 to the present, he has been professor and director, Latin American Studies Center, at California State College at Los Angeles, and has directed the numerous summer institutes conducted by that organization. In addition, he has conducted an educational television program on current events in Latin America for several seasons.

Dr. De Armond received fellowships from the Institute of International Education for study in Chile, 1942, and from the Ford Foundation (Fund for the Advancement of Education) for travel and study in Latin America in 1954-1955. He resided in Chile for two and one-half years and in 1954-55 he traveled in Central and South America extensively. From August, 1966, to February, 1967, Dr. De Armond studied and traveled in Mexico.

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The History of Latin America

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The Latin American nations are today given unprecedented coverage on United States television and radio and in our magazines and newspapers. Publishers are issuing books on Latin America in ever larger numbers. Such attention has become a delight to those Latin Americanists who have waited so long and so impatiently in the wings, hoping that the spotlight of attention might some day be focused on their area of interest. They are enjoying the novelty of having myriad paperback books thrust upon them for classroom use and they are flattered by the almost obsequious approach of publishers' agents seeking additional manuscripts for publication.

Paralleling this rush to print is a corresponding growth of interest on the part of policy-making and action agencies of the Federal government and even of a number of state governments. Ever larger numbers of universities and colleges are being called on to mount a wide variety of technical and other developmental programs in the Latin American states.

Encouraging too is the trend toward expanded university and college course offerings on Latin America. Elementary and secondary school systems are adding Latin America to the curriculum or are revising their offerings to improve existing units of classroom work centering on Latin America.

In light of all these encouraging circumstances it might seem churlish of anyone to feel anything other than delight. Yet there is a large segment of the Latin Americanist group who shares a feeling of dismay. Their dismay stems from a widespread tendency, especially on the part of government agencies and even on the part of some university development groups, to concentrate their attention on the problems of underdevelopment with entirely too narrow a focus.

Too often a given reform program is launched without paying sufficient attention to sometimes crucial collateral problems. Initiation of a plan to effect a desired economic change may cause undesirable social or political side effects. Analogy can be made to the ecological balance of nature; ill-considered efforts to eliminate a pest have too often simply served to introduce a worse pest.

Errors of this sort seem to be diminishing (or at least they are less grievous). Sometimes lessons have been learned through analyzing the failure of earlier programs. Improved training and more sophisticated approaches are responsible in other instances. In either case, the lesson is being learned that in Latin America one simply cannot effectively work toward reducing an economic, or a social, or a political shortcoming without taking into account the other elements of the triad.

A second source of the dismay among Latin Americanists is the tendency of those approaching a development problem (even those whose approach is the broader one advocated above) to consider the problem without taking into account the historical origins of the problem under attack.

The value system underlying contemporary Latin American economic, political, and social behavior goes deep into the past. Though there are scholars who are notable exceptions, a probably large majority of Latin Americanists believe that a knowledge of the earlier national period and of the long colonial era is essential to a sophisticated understanding of contemporary Latin America.

To put the nub of the argument used by these students of the Latin American past: quite aside from the fact that to study the colonial period is to follow the development of a fascinating civilization, effective approaches to the developmental problems of contemporary Latin America must be based on an understanding of the colonial period. The argument is equally valid in application to the preparation of a school curriculum, whether it be for a sixth grade class or for a university course curriculum.

Personal and individual value judgments inevitably color determination of what are the shortcomings of modern Latin American civilization. Taking the Latin American political and intellectual leaders at their own word, however, we can continue on the assumption that political, economic, and social democracy are the goals toward which Latin America is striving. Using these ideals as a vantage point, deficiencies in the Latin American scene are readily visible on the horizon.

The Colonial Period

Among the political shortcomings, without seeking to be exhaustive, are an inadequate nationalism, a government of men rather than of law, and an inadequate machinery of government.

Nationalism

Political nationalism has its expression in the national symbols and the national heroes, while economic nationalism is a strong force in

Latin America. Yet nationalism in the fullest sense of nationhood is rare in Latin America. Mexico may be the only one of these nations in which the large majority of the people feel they belong to a nation. Even those Mexicans who have not shared in the benefits of economic advancement are a part of a consensus with respect to goals. University students and party functionaries are at odds with each other, not because they have different professed goals, but rather because they champion different means toward reaching the national goals.

At the other end of the scale and much closer to the colonial norms are such states as Peru and Bolivia. In these states elements of the population have a horizon which does not extend beyond the hacienda or village in which they live. They may not even be aware that they are Peruvian or Bolivian. And in a very real sense they are not.

Nor is the authority of the national government always recognized by regional or local levels of authority. The roots of this particularism clearly lie within the colonial period, which in its turn reflects a political heritage carried to America from Spain. The appearance of Spanish political unity in the person of the monarch is inaccurately portrayed by a few historians who have tended to cast the king in the mold of the eighteenth-century divine-right monarch. In fact, at the time of the discovery of America the nobility and the towns still enjoyed considerable power. And conquerors from the ranks of the lesser nobility tended to carry to America their reluctance to yield to the demands of a higher level of authority. Other conquerors, though not of the nobility, tended to act the same way. They had come to America to gain a title of nobility and, having gained it, tended to ape those already in the noble ranks. These men, whose political natures anticipate the *caudillo* of the nineteenth century, yielded to a higher level of political authority only when compelled.

The trend toward real authority in the hands of local or regional bosses was strengthened in many American areas by the geography, which made both transportation and communication difficult. Thus the viceroy in Mexico City had not the most general sort of real power over the governor of Guatemala and the president of the *audiencia* of Charcas (modern Bolivia) came to hold large discretionary authority simply because the viceroy in Lima was so remote. By the same token, a landowner distant from Chucisaca (today Sucre), where the Charcas *audiencia* sat, often became the local government either by default or by arrogation because of his remoteness from the regional authority.

These colonial tendencies, which carried into the national period, frustrated Simón Bolívar's dream of one America. The particularistic political loyalties—those that broke up the large colonial viceroyalties into the smaller, more numerous independent states and emerged with independence from Spain—were simply too strong. On a lower level these regional urgings remain extant within today's nations, serving to weaken or even prevent a national consensus on economic or social goals. Argentina's political history in the nineteenth century offers a good case study to prove the point. Close examination of the real power relationships in most of the Latin American countries demonstrates that in some degree this colonial inheritance is still operative and still troublesome.

Authoritarianism

Another political tradition carried over from the colonial era was that of authoritarian, even arbitrary, government. Though at first glance this political habit might seem in conflict with the particularism described above, in fact they went hand in hand. The picture is one of various levels of government in successively smaller areas, each jealously guarding its prerogatives and each operating in an authoritarian manner.

Again the tendency toward authoritarianism has its origin with the very beginnings of Spain's empire in America. The Spanish monarch was determined that in America there should be no competing power centers such as those of the towns or of the nobility in Spain, however vestigial that power might have become by the time the conquest of America began. Authority in America was therefore vested in the king's viceroys and in other agencies of government under his immediate control through the Council of the Indies. Government in America was not to be controlled in the least by those governed, and those serving in government were to serve at the king's discretion. In general, a viceroy or a lesser official removed from office was plucked from the structure of royal government in America for incompetence or too generous dishonesty but seldom for being too arbitrary.

Personalism

Similarly inherited from the colonial period (and here too one can find roots going back to Spain) is the proclivity toward governance by men rather than by laws. The frequently ineffective legislatures, the sometimes too powerful executives, and the typically inadequate political parties are among the Latin American political shortcomings traceable to what is usually called personalism. Support of or opposition toward a political party for the person heading it rather than on the basis of party ideology is the hallmark of personalism.

The tendency can be traced back to the still medieval caste system of Spain, which divided men into nobles (whether they be secular or clerical) and commoners. The trend toward thinking and acting in terms of this dichotomy was strengthened when the Spaniards arrived in America. Any Spaniard, whether nobleman or commoner, came to insist on his superiority to the Indian and, when they were shortly added to the ethnic mix, his superiority to the Negro. The racial mixture of Indian and Negro (*pardo*) or white and Negro (mulatto) generally remained beyond the pale during the entire colonial period, while the position of the mixture of white and Indian (mestizo) tended to blur until the ranks of the commanding and of the commanded came to depend as much on level of culture as on ethnic origins.

A sub-division within this social rank order split the white population into peninsulars—those born in Spain, and the creoles, those born of Spanish parentage in America. Both groups remained tightly united in relations with the Negro and Indian and their admixtures. But the disdain and haughtiness of the peninsulars toward the creoles, even when the latter might be culturally or economically superior, were a great source of creole resentment. It is no accident that, when the movement for independence from Spain began, the revolutionary leadership was almost invariably creole.

When the Spaniard arrived, the Indian was already accustomed to a caste system (though it may have been less rigid than that of Spain and Portugal). The mestizo [illegible] adopted the Indian culture of his mother also accepted the infe[illegible]sition as did, of course, the enslaved Negro. (The occasional rebel[illegible]s of the colonial period were generally based on economic grievances and not infrequently included creoles in the rebel ranks.)

Though slavery no longer exists in Latin America, the caste system, now better described as a class system, exists everywhere. In some nations it remains strong; in others it is much attenuated by modernizing pressures. But even in the least class-conscious of the Latin American nations there are regions or groups wherein the class order manifests itself.*

Personalism to some degree, therefore, characterizes the politics of every Latin American nation. Eduardo Frei in Chile owes a measure of his presidential power to personalism even though the personalist tendency is less strong in Chile than in most of the other Latin American states.

Constitutional Inadequacy

The other side of the personalist coin is marked by an inadequate institutionalization of the laws of the land. The constitutions of the Latin American nations are today often better reflections of the real law of the land than they were in the early nineteenth century, but in every instance there is a sizeable gap between the operative laws and the prescription set down in the constitution. A re-reading of the preamble and some of the amendments to the constitution of the United States suggests that this gap is not a uniquely Latin American phenomenon.

***I remember the instance in which my wife took Aleja, our lively little maid, to her Chilean dentist, who refused to do any dental work on a servant. The dentist's class consciousness bowed before my wife's stubbornness and Aleja emerged with an unembarrassed full smile. The pressures toward modernity are sometimes small but cumulatively important!**

But neither personalism nor the "constitutional gap" is so notable here as both are in Latin America.

To an important degree the inadequacy of the constitution and statuatory law are reflections of the colonial era. This is so even though Spain sought to regulate her colonies in minute degree through an enormous variety of edicts and modifications of edicts. Much of the colonial law represents efforts to resolve dilemmas incapable of solution. A case in point is the voluminous laws regulating treatment of the Indians. Repeatedly the laws reflect conflict between two urgings on the part of the king and his advisors. Under continuing and strong pressure from liberal Spanish intellectuals the monarch and his Council of the Indies sought to accomplish the Hispanization of the Indians. On the other hand, there was need to constitute the Indians as the American labor force so that the colonies might fill the mercantilist role assigned to them.

In America the creoles, who were the immediate beneficiaries of Indian labor, were obdurate in their determination to exploit the Indian whatever might be the enlightened laws emanating from Spain. Peninsular administrators sent from Spain found themselves obliged by the American realities to wink at widespread violations of portions of contradictory laws out of Spain. Many, in fact, joined in violation of some laws in order to gain economic benefit for themselves. Such habits extending over almost three centuries inevitably carried over into the national period.

Mercantilism

Another colonial development reinforced the disregard for inconvenient law. The mercantilist relationship in vogue at the time when Spain acquired her colonies put the colonies in the role of suppliers of raw materials and bullion to the "mother country," which in turn was to further enrich itself by supplying the manufactures needed by the colonies. In the Spanish instance the colonies filled their role perhaps too well but Spain was unable to meet her end of the bargain. In the very early sixteenth century, as a part of the urge toward political and religious unity, both Jews and Moslems were forced into Christianity or exile. The Moslems were the finest agriculturalists of Spain while, more important to the mercantile relationship with the American colonies, the Jews were Spain's most effective merchants and manufacturers. The expulsion, to generalize rather grossly, left Spain with noblemen or aspirant noblemen who disdained work, and peasants who had neither the means nor the ability to initiate manufacturing enterprises. Spain was therefore compelled to go to northern Europe for manufactures to be sent to America. Much of the silver from the mines of New Spain and Peru came to English, Flemish, and German banks in payment for these goods, which moved from northern Europe to Spain, where they were transshipped to America.

During the later sixteenth century the European suppliers of goods for America tended increasingly to bypass Spain and sell directly to the colonials. Though more profitable, this trade was also illegal. Some of the contraband goods were smuggled in at beaches remote from population centers. But as the decades passed, more and more of this illegal trade was handled in major ports such as Veracruz and Buenos Aires. By the early eighteenth century most of the European foods entering Spain's American colonies came in by way of these illegal channels.

Officials from the viceroy down to the lowest port bureaucrat necessarily knew of and accepted this illegal trade and profited from the attendant bribes. Laws governing trade were so cheerfully and extensively violated that a casual attitude toward law enforcement was general, extending even to law governing activities unrelated to trade. A tendency so firmly entrenched was of course carried over into the national period.

An example of the impact of such traditions can be seen in the Latin American attitude toward income taxes. Some of the more modern nations have had income tax systems in the statute books for some years, while others have more recently added an income tax under United States pressure through the Alliance for Progress and other aid programs. Even so the collection of income taxes has been as minimal as the evasion of these taxes has been widespread. Several years ago Chile was rocked by the unprecedented jailing of two men for flagrant tax violation!

Society and Government

The Latin tendency to consider laws less important than charismatic leaders as the means to establishing the rules of society was further strengthened by the ideological underpinnings of the revolutionary movements which brought independence from Spain. The origins of the movement, as is true of all such movements, are complex, but the ideology which entranced the creole leadership was largely that of the Enlightenment. Rousseau and his development of the idea that government was a contract based on the consent of the governed were particularly attractive to restive creoles anxious to be free from the peninsular yoke.

Once independence was won new governments had to be formed. Monarchy was unacceptable except in the special case of Brazil. Elsewhere the revolutionary leaders followed the example of the new United States, whose government was itself a product of Enlightenment political thought. The creole leaders, now become national leaders, set up constitutional republics.

As the revolutionary euphoria dissipated and control passed to a more conservative second generation of leadership, the personalist tradition which had developed during the several centuries of colonial authoritarianism, reasserted itself. The democratic flower was too tender to survive the realities of the Latin political climate and the *caudillos* emerged. Though these political bosses never discarded the constitution, it became only a facade behind which they erected their arbitrary rule and fought their battles with other *caudillos* anxious to become president. The constitution became just another political tool throughout the nineteenth century and into this century. The Mexican constitution of 1917 was the first to reflect in some measure the political realities and goals of the nation. While constitutions in several other Latin American states are tending in the direction pioneered by Mexico, the more typical situation is that in Paraguay where the constitution is nothing more than high-sounding fiction.

Bureaucracy

The establishment of stable government, based on constitutional and legislative norms as against the shifting and unstable rules of successive *caudillos,* is made even more difficult by bureaucratic ineffectiveness throughout Latin America. Here, too, the colonial antecedents are discernable. Involved are the *patrón* (boss) relationship and *compadrazgo* (co-parenthood), which have at least a psychological origin and, in the case of the *patrón,* a certain origin in Iberian and colonial times.

The *patrón* relationship is one of men who are not social equals, though the term connotes a reciprocal obligation. Most unequal was, and is, the *patrón*-peon relationship. The landowner *patrón* had virtual life and death authority over his workers, the peons, who were literally his chattel through the debt peonage system that characterized rural Latin America as the colonial era ended. The obligations were largely those of the peon to his *patrón,* though the *patrón* was expected to help his peon in any trouble with the law or other threats.

In nineteenth century politics the local *patrón* gave his loyalties to a more important regional *patrón,* to whom he looked for both favors and protection. Moving up through several levels of *patrones* one finally reached the president, who was expected to act as *patrón* to his political lieutenants. The system still operates. The president of Mexico is to a degree approached by both the ordinary citizen and his political colleagues as a *patrón.*

Often interconnected with the *patrón* system is the *compadrazgo* relationship. *Compadrazgo* refers to the practice among Catholic parents of acquiring co-parents for their children. Though godfathers and godmothers stand with the child being baptized into the Catholic Church in the United States as well as in Latin America, the relationship has implications in Latin America that are not characteristic in the United States. In the United States the ritual marks acceptance by the godparents of the spiritual well-being of their godchild should something happen to the natural parents. Often, but not always, the godparents also accept responsibility for the material well-being of the godchild.

In Latin America the force of social custom has forged a godparent-godchild relationship (*compadrazgo*) of such strength that it has important political and economic implications that transcend the original religious and social purposes. The Latin godfather (*compadre*) is in fact a co-parent whose links with the godchild are normally as close or closer than those of blood relatives such as uncles, aunts, and cousins. If the natural parents die, the godparents become virtual adoptive parents. But even if the natural parents live, the godparents are under societal compulsion to remain actively interested in the material as well as the spiritual success of their charges.

Though strengthened by other social factors, the *compadrazgo* relationship is a major determinant in such mundane decisions as job placement and political advancement. The *compadre* is expected to place his godchild in a business or a bureaucratic post that may be his to fill, whether or not the godchild is the best qualified to fill the given position. Universally assailed as a major contemporary problem in Latin America is the grossly inadequate nature of the bureaucracy, be it governmental or business management. The *patrón* system and *compadrazgo* reinforce each other strongly and account in primary degree for the manifold inadequacies of public and private administration. Equally obvious is the strength of these factors in preventing the emergence of a professionally trained and continuing body of capable civil servants in any Latin American country save, perhaps, Mexico.

Uncertainty hides the origins of this peculiarly Latin American intensification of the godparent-godchild relationship, for this is another of the many areas of Latin American civilization begging for scholarly study. But the available evidence does suggest that the practice developed in the colonial period as an intensification of earlier habits carried from Spain.

Economic Structure

Comparison of the economic structure in the English colonies and of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies brings out some striking differences which go far to explain the dramatic economic contrasts in the twentieth century hemisphere.

Entrepreneurship

Divergence began with the very foundation of the colonies. While the Spanish colonies were exploited directly by the monarch through his growing legion of administrators, the English colonies were often established by private corporations under charter from the king. The English colonies were established by businessmen who often fostered entrepreneurial behavior on the part of the colonials in anticipation that profits would be enhanced.

The Spanish heritage, on the other hand, was such as to inhibit entrepreneurial tendencies. That the Spanish colonies were established more than a century before the English colonies and were therefore denied the benefit of that century of evolution of European economic institutions is probably irrelevant. Spanish economic attitudes developed prior to the occupation of America were so firmly entrenched that they underwent no significant change until the eighteenth century.

Entrepreneurship in Spain that invested in Middle and South America had been largely lodged in the hands of the Jews. Not only was the religion of the people considered heretic, eschewed, so also were their economic attitudes. Hence the Spaniard of means or of social position avoided business and reinforced his anti-entrepreneurial behavior out of a determination to enhance his social acceptability. Landholding and husbandry were the most respectable economic activities brought from Spain to America.

Beginning with the aspiring conquerors and continuing through their creole descendants, the colonial Latin Americans were driven by their own aspirations and by the socio-geographic circumstances in the New World to ape the pattern of economic norms established by their Spanish mentors. The conquerors, as well as later creoles seeking a reward for some service rendered the monarch, invariably sought their reward in an *encomienda* grant of Indians. Less often the Indians paid a small monetary tribute to the *encomendero;* more often they were compelled to work for the Spaniard to whom they were granted. They worked their own lands under the direction of the *encomendero,* who ignored the legal niceties of whether the land were also granted to him by the monarch and simply turned it to his own purposes.

Estateholding

While many landed estates came into being through dispossession of the Indians, others were created by the sale of royal lands to the highest bidder. In any case, the manorial *latifundia* came to prevail. And, if the crown did not actively encourage large landholdings, at least it served to perpetuate the practice by instituting in America the laws of primogeniture and entail (*mayorazgo*), which forbade the breaking up of estates as they were transferred from father to eldest son.

In contrast with most of the Anglo-American colonies, where the small free farmer came to be typical, a pattern of large landed estates thus came to prevail early in the colonial period. The system was not conducive to economic growth. Exploiting his outright slave Negro labor or his quasi-slave Indian labor, the landowner was usually able to realize an ample income from the inefficient cultivation of only a part of his extensive land holding.

Industry

Mining, especially of silver, was early added to the major economic activities in Spanish America as the mines of Zacatecas were opened in New Spain and the Potosí lode came under exploitation in the mid-sixteenth century. Diversity of economic activity was not, however, enhanced by mining. Typically, the individual who became wealthy through owning a mine bought land, thus acquiring the social acceptability which was accorded only to the landowner.

Manufacturing developed in only very limited degree in the colonial period. Money was typically invested in agriculture and husbandry for the reasons already adduced. Royal policy, though sometimes inconsistent, was normally one of discouraging the development of manufacturing so that the colonies might more completely conform to the mercantilist ideals. The only major exception to this generalization was the textile industry, which early in the colonial period became important enough that even the viceroys were loath to interfere with it seriously even under regulatory orders from the king. Nor did this textile industry really develop any entrepreneurial tendencies. The textile *obrajes,* or mills, were monstrously exploitative of their Indian labor with the result that the owners tended toward the same attitudes as the landowners and the mine owners. The really successful owner of a textile *obraje* also sought to buy his way to respectability through the purchase of land.

In the final analysis economic activity in the colonies was notably lacking in diversity. Agriculture and husbandry based on very large holdings constituted the norm. The honored, the successful, and the powerful were landowners.

The impact of practices so long honored is still widely to be seen in most of the Latin American nations. Though business and industry may no longer bear the stigma of yesteryear, the large landholding, still operated under the economically inefficient and socially exploitative norms of the colonial period, is common to this day. Entrepreneurs who make a fortune in business or industry typically look for land to buy, thus in a sense buying their way into the highest social circles. (It must be admitted, too, that land constitutes an excellent hedge against the inflation endemic to so many of the Latin American republics!)

Capital Investment

Another developmental problem in Latin America today is a sometimes near-desperate lack of domestic capital for investment. In part this derives from more recent tendencies, in part from the colonial inheritance. The flight of capital to United States and European banks is a tendency developed during the politically unstable nineteenth century. On the other hand, the still prevalent tendency to invest in under-exploited land not only tends to drive land prices higher but also reduces the amount of money available for investment in business or industry.

Social customs inherited from the colonial period also inhibit capital accumulation. Great numbers of *cofradías,* or confraternities, emerged during the colonial period. Some were charitable organizations formed to support a hospital or an orphanage, while others were self-help and philanthropic groups associated with the craft guilds (*gremios*) which emerged in large numbers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Each had its patron saint, who was honored in splendid fashion on his feast day. For obvious reasons it fairly early became the practice to name one of the more prosperous members president of the *cofradía* in the anticipation that he would spend much or all of his financial substance to assure a splendid celebration of the patron saint's feast day. The same practice developed around the relatively unimportant post of *mayordomo.* One of the wealthier members of the village was normally chosen *mayordomo* with the expectation he would use his own money to stage the festival honoring the community's patron saint. Since great prestige was attached to these postitions, they were eagerly sought after.

While these practices made for more splendid festivals, they also inhibited the acquisition of capital at the local level. Taken in the aggregate these practices represented a major inhibition against effective capital accumulation and economic growth during the colonial period.

The practice, rather reminiscent of the potlatch practiced among the northwest Indians (or of the big wedding and reception common in the United States today!), is still a commonplace throughout Latin America. The result is that the many occupational or municipal festivals that make Latin America attractive to the tourist camera bug also prevent much economic development. Not a few Mexican *braceros* on their return from the United States were compelled by community social pressure to spend their hard-won savings on celebrating the saint's day rather than on more productive ends.

Effective capital accumulation is also made difficult by an attitude carried over from the colonial period and whose political impact has already been pointed out. This is the tendency to distrust people not of one's own extended family and immediate circle of intimate friends or associates (*gente de confianza*). The economic impact is twofold. One outgrowth is the tendency to keep business organizations as family enterprises even though to do so may limit growth opportunities. The other is to discourage investment in those enterprises which have gone public as corporations offering their stock in the local stock market. There is a general reluctance to invest in a corporation whose management is not personally known by the potential investor. That this is no small deterrent to industrial expansion can be seen in the fact that only Mexico of all the Latin American nations has (quite recently) developed a viable and functioning stock market.

Another deterrent to economic growth is the social class structure of some of the Latin American states. Sometimes so rigid that it might more aptly be called a caste system, this class structure has already been identified as one of the sources of political instability. Though this factor is more easily recognized in those nations with a large Indian population (be they racial or cultural Indians), it is present to some degree in virtually all the Latin American republics.

Though other factors are clearly operative, one reason underlying the fact that a major part of the population in Peru, Ecuador, and Guatemala is outside the money economy lies in the fact that they are Indians. Only with a rarity that confirms the validity of the generalization does an Indian escape from the confines of the web of prejudice and deprecation that confines him. The resultant economic disability is twofold: Not only are Indian men and women, however large their innate ability, denied the opportunity to contribute to national growth, additionally the market for the product of national industry is limited by the socially-imposed restriction of potential consumer power. Other problems of rather recent origin may very well be more serious blocks on the road to economic growth, but certainly this class structure inherited from the colonial period must be added to the list of ills.

Economic Expansion

Ironically, the liberalism which suffused Spanish and Portuguese America in the late colonial period and which added constitutionalism to the political lexicon also contributed to the economic problems of independent Latin America. Both Spanish and Portuguese economic policy with respect to the American colonies changed markedly in the last half of the eighteenth century. Economists acting under the innovative urgings of the Enlightenment were both numerous and influential. The result was significant economic expansion in the colonies as the retrograde mercantilist restrictions were lifted.

With independence, however, the irony came into play. As trade protectionism was a feature of mercantilist economics, the liberal economists of the now independent nations embraced the free trade urgings enunciated so persuasively by Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations*. The result was that most of the new Latin American governments embraced the principle of free trade. The Latin American businesses that had emerged or expanded in the fresh economic breezes of the late eighteenth century were often destroyed by British and United States competition in the early nineteenth century. The textile plants in Puebla could not compete in the Mexican market with the more efficiently produced and cheaper British product. If there were a Mexican counterpart to Alexander Hamilton, with his successful drive for protective tariffs in the new United States, he was not heeded. The result was that Mexico and the other new Latin American states were deprived of both the entrepreneurial skills and the industries which had only so recently emerged.

Religion and Education

Political and economic factors which serve to slow development in Latin America are relatively easy to identify and analyze. They can even be quantified in tentative degree. The same is not true of societal factors, which are much more intangible in their nature. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to avoid value judgments during an examination of these societal factors. The problem is complicated by an ambivalence on the part of most North American students of Latin America: While they see many Latin American social customs as inhibitions against economic development, they also find themselves wishing that their own society might in some respects move toward some of the Latin American norms!

The Church

The church in Latin America has historically played, and today plays, a very different role from that of the churches in the United States. The reasons very clearly derive from the colonial period when the church exercised not only its spiritual and cultural roles, but additionally held important political and economic authority.

In the early Anglo-American colonies the church sometimes played an extremely important political role. As the colonies developed, a multiplicity of churches emerged, while a variety of pressures reduced the role of the churches to that of spiritual tutors dependent for their economic well-being on tithes and other contributions from their membership. It was a relatively easy thing, then, for the churches to move from the colonial era into the republican period. They carried on their religious education and social welfare functions without any radical change. The Latin American church was not able to make the same relatively easy accomodation to new political and economic circumstances.

From the outset of the colonial period in Latin America, the church was an important political and economic entity as well as spiritual and social arbiter. The church's position, so different from that of the churches in Anglo-America, is in part the result of deliberate design, in part the result of historical development. By agreement of pope and king, Spain's monarch was made patron of the Catholic Church in America under the *patronato real*. This, together with other circumstances, brought a fusion of church and state functions unknown to the churches in colonial Anglo-America. Church special privileges and deathbed cessions by the pious (together with careful management of her resources!) made of the church a major economic influence. As an example, by the end of the colonial period the church in New Spain owned fully half the arable land and much urban real estate. The church had also become the most powerful lending agency in the colony.

The inevitable upshot of these developments was an intimate identification of the church with a status quo under increasing attack as the revolutionary period began. With independence in the early nineteenth century, the pope and the new governments moved to regularize the status of the church. Most of the new states recognized the Catholic Church as the state religion, while there tended to be a close cooperation between the church and the emergent oligarchs. Nonetheless the church suffered heavily as the nineteenth century wore on. Particularly serious was the progressive decline in church income, thus curtailing the eleemosynary activities traditionally carried on by the church in the colonial period.

The church moreover carried its tradtional conservatism into the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century until very recently in some of the Latin American states. The church tradition of social involvement was cut off in Latin America at the very time it was developing significantly in the United States. The church has taken on social concerns only in very recent years under the spur of recent papal encyclicals such at *Mater et Magistra* and with an infusion of clerical activism through priests from Europe and the United States.

In sum, the role of the church in the colonial period was such as to deny it an effective part in efforts to modify some of the more retrograde social attitudes carried over from the colonial period by society at large. In addition, denial to the church (or the church's refusal to accept?) an effective role in much needed social welfare activities increasingly placed these responsibilities on the doorstep of the civil government, thus diluting the latter's already limited resources for development.

Education

In another respect, however, the influences and tendencies established by the church in the colonial period persist even now with troubling consequences. Much of the educational tradition laid down by the church remains today. The church did seek in the early years of the colonial period to extend educational opportunities rather broadly and even to the Indians in some instances. It was soon discouraged from these efforts and education became the privilege of the colonial aristocracy. In the national period, though education came under increasing civil control, the elitist habit remained. Tradition was reinforced by usually inadequate state revenues and the result was extremely limited educational opportunity for all but a few.

Today the pattern varies widely with respect to elementary and secondary education. Some countries have broken the bonds of tradition to the point that they rival the United States in terms of basic literacy.

Others are educating, in relative terms, scarcely more of their children than was characteristic in the colonial period. Yet even those countries with educational systems most heavily modified from the colonial norms carry a heavy weight of tradition in the curriculum. Teaching methods are still widely tradition-bound. Technical education in the secondary schools is inadequate in even the more industrialized countries. A combination of tradition and fiscal inadequacies traceable in part, at least, to the colonial period, still acts to delay the development of effective elementary and secondary education.

University education, in some respects, is little better off. The colonial curricula trained students for medicine, theology, and law. Of these only theology has been eliminated as a major curriculum in today's universities. It is true that engineering and science programs have been added by the state and other universities of the more industrialized countries. Even so, all the Latin American universities produce more lawyers than are needed, while too few engineers, scientists, and social scientists are being prepared.

University autonomy is a generally accepted Latin American tradition which frequently serves to prevent the improvement and modernization of university education. The tradition has its roots in the practices of the medieval university as brought to colonial Latin America. Under these traditions the university grounds were inviolate and the faculty determined curriculum. University autonomy was so widely violated by the heavy-handed *caudillos* of the nineteenth century that it virtually ceased to exist in some areas. It was re-established in the years immediately after World War I, in large measure through the initiative of student activitists who were determined to make of the universities an instrument for social change.

Though the degree to which university autonomy is honored in Latin America varies rather widely from country to country, it is rather generally accepted. (The behavior of Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina and the more recent treatment of university students and faculty by military governments in Argentina and Brazil are striking exceptions to the generalization.) Faculty, students, and alumni normally enjoy representation on the government body of the university. This sharing of responsibility does not necessarily make for curriculum updating. The professors are too often interested in maintaining a status quo in which they have a vested interest. The students frequently find proposals to update the curriculum and grading practices a threat to their goals. Nor do the alumni and part-time faculty (who constitute a majority in most universities) represent an effective force for modernization. Thus university autonomy, with its roots in the colonial past, has become a force less for the improvement of the university and more for its politicization.

Culture

Little can be claimed for the colonial period in the cultural development of Latin America. Both the colonial church and the universities which it dominated provided little by way of cultural advance. The art and literature of the time tended to stultify under traditionalist church leadership. While it is true that Mexico City had a printing press fully a century before there was one in any of the Anglo-American cities, the books printed were very ordinary catechisms and other religious tracts. Much work was done by individual dedicated priests to translate the catechism into a number of Indian dialects but, while these works are of great value to modern anthropologists, they did little to stimulate the emergence of an indigenous culture.

Still, to the colonial clerical and civil authorities must go credit for at least not destroying the wide range of native arts and crafts extant at the time of the conquest. The visitor to any of the Latin American nations with a large pre-conquest population will be quick to notice the extent and vitality of ancient crafts as they are kept alive by Indian and mestizo craftsmen. Brazil, thanks to the large infusion of Negro labor brought in as slaves during the colonial period, would fall into this category of Latin American states. Though commercialization may have corrupted some of these crafts, they remain a joyous and useful heritage from the colonial period.

The impact of certain individual characteristics and attitudes carried over from the Iberian and colonial past has already been pointed out in the discussion of Latin American problems of political and economic development. Some of these attitudes have an impact pervading far more of Latin American life than politics and the economy. The strongly held sense of individual dignity and worth (*dignidad*) is one of these. The attitude carried from Spain and Portugal and expressed in colonial America as *"Abajo del rey, ninguno"* (roughly translated: "Next to the king, me") is still prevalent in Latin America today. The attitude is in some respects an admirable one. No matter how mean an individual's economic or social position may be, he possesses a serenity and confidence in his own person that must be admired. The Calvinist self-doubt which is a part of our colonial heritage may well be a prod toward hard work and achievement, but it does deprive many of the personal confidence so widely evident in Latin America.

At the same time this sense of *dignidad* and its exaggerated offspring, *machismo* (manliness), tend to make difficult or even impossible social relations common in this country. Voluntary group actions are such a commonplace in the United States (and they have their origins in such colonial events as barn raisings) that we tend to take them for granted. They range from planning neighborhood picnics and all-night parties for high school graduating classes to non-paid service with government advisory groups. Taken in the aggregate these voluntary cooperative enterprises constitute an enormous contribution to national development.

Dignidad and the individual's fear that his *dignidad* may be compromised or bruised by working with others in a joint activity tend to deny to Latin American societies the great benefits flowing from such voluntarism. Organizations like Rotary and the Lions Club exist rather widely in Latin America but, with rather rare exceptions, they tend to be social organizations with the service aspects characteristic in the United States absent. The same difference in role can be seen by contrasting the behavior of Masons in the United States and in Latin America.

Conclusion

The catalog of Latin American deficiencies inherited from the colonial period is long and these habits do constitute a serious drag inhibiting Latin American development in the pattern that has enabled the United States to emerge to an unprecedented level of world power. But recent developments in the United States demonstrate that we have by no means solved some major social problems. Some students of the Latin American scene have been bold enough to suggest that Latin America may be able to offer us a way out of some of our dilemmas through the adaptation of elements in their civilization. Anyone who has spent any time in one or more of the Latin American nations will tend to agree that Latin America, withal her many problems, does indeed have something to offer us. To see the United States as possessor of all that is good and Latin America as beknightedly stubborn in failing to take all our advice and blindly follow our example is to be arrogant and provincial.

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CONTRASTS OF PERU AND BRAZIL

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Mr. Arecco has long had a deep interest in folk music and has taught himself songs of many Latin American countries, accompanying the vocals with his guitar.

The Contrasts of Peru and Brazil

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PERU

Latin America is generally divided into four geographic regions for descriptive purposes:

I. Circum Caribbean area
II. Western Latin American area
III. Southern Latin American area
IV. Brazil

Peru is a part of area II. The main characteristics of this region are: Mostly highland with a high percentage of indigenous population. Since this area was colonized by Spain, the official language is Spanish. Nevertheless, a few indigenous languages, such as Quechua and Aymara are spoken by many people. Most of the indigenous population is bilingual, though quite a few big communities are found in which only native languages are spoken.

Lima was founded by the Spaniards in 1535 and from that time, the colonization was characterized by the transferral of the Hispanic culture into the New World. This transferral was made easier by the existing social system in the Inca Empire. As examples, one can mention the system of stratification with the existence of castes, the present division of labor compared to the *ayllu,* the rites of the Catholic Church and the ritualistic Incaic ceremonies.

Peru presents three geographical divisions: coastal, forest, and Andean. Each has its distinctive characteristics, but in aggregate form the physiognomy of Peru.

Historical Background

Coastal Region. The coast has been, since Peru's founding, the seat of the national government. Lima has been Peru for many years if we consider the economic progress, literacy, and other phases of modern development. In this region most of the modern mestizos of Peru arose.

Here, also, was the chosen site of the bulk of the European migrants, which brought as a consequence the formation of an urban life which has many similarities to European cultures.

Andean Region. This was the area in which most of the Inca population lived just prior to the conquest and more than 50% of the indigenous population of Peru still lives here. During Inca times the population lived primarily from agriculture through a system called *ayllu.* This consisted, in a few words, of a large extension of land with its peasants and their respective foremen. Each family had certain obligations to fulfill on the piece of land allotted to them. After the harvest, he had to report his yields to the representatives of the Inca. The excess cereals or other harvested crops were given to the granaries of the Inca for their maintenance and to be used for the general population in case of a famine or other crises.

With the Spanish conquest, this organization almost disappeared because the Indians were enslaved. This was done in mining but not in agriculture. As a result of this slavery, about 37% of the Indian people died. Naturally, hatred and fear of the white man developed among the Indians. This period of slavery in mining lasted for more than two centuries. After independence (1821), a new agricultural era started which lasted until today and is characterized by large haciendas, owned by whites and worked by Indians. Some few areas still have a modified *ayllu* system.

Forest Region. This region includes the forest area to the east of the Andean Range. It was totally ignored during the colonial period and although some exploration took place following independence, it has only been in very recent years that concentrated efforts were employed in conquering this tropical and semi-tropical land. Roads and railroads are being extended to Iquitos, the principal city, but the whole area suffers badly from poor communication with Lima and other parts of the nation.

Geographic Description

The coast includes a flat strip of land the length of Peru (875 miles long and 12 to 30 miles wide). This strip borders a mountainous area of rocks and sparse vegetation. The land is sterile (desert with the exception of forty valleys formed by the few rivers which descend from the Andean mountains). In these valleys it is possible to maintain intensive agriculture by taking advantage of the water of the rivers or by sinking wells into the subsoil. On the coast the rainfall is minimal, often being absolutely zero.

The mountainous region is characterized by little vegetation and steep rocky slopes. Here and there are valleys between the mountains and low productivity agriculture is the rule. Means of communication are few and the existing roads, with few exceptions, are in bad condition due mostly to the excessive rain and melting snow.

Eastern Peru is a region of deep forests, isolated from civilization by the Brazilian Amazon on one side and the forbidding slopes of the Andes on the other. The main means of communication are the Amazon River, which is navigable the whole year through, and other adjacent rivers which are periodically navigable by small crafts.

The Ecology of Urban Centers

Lima, Peru's capital, has existed for 446 years, and like the cities of the other Latin American nations, shows much more development than the rest of the country. This metropolis has a pattern of settlement that differs little from other old cities, in which four distinct zones can be distinguished. The first of these is *El Centro,* with a high proportion of the nation's commerce, business, and government offices concentrated there. In addition, there is a large resident population in this area which is usually composed of lower middle class families.

Zone two circles *El Centro* and is a mixture of both old and new buildings. The concentration of population here is very high, often being several thousand persons per square block. The families are most frequently of the middle and lower middle class groups, representing small shop owners, middle range professionals, and a large number of young business and office workers. Great variation will be seen in construction —new and old—individual homes and multiple dwellings. Small factories and service businesses will appear all through the zone and typically the corners will be occupied by small shops, particularly groceries, soft drink stands, bars, and restaurants.

Zone three is a residential area similar to those found in US cities. Here there are small to large commercial centers of the supermarket, shopping center type, mostly very new and modern.

The fourth zone is termed marginal and is made up of the *barrios,* very low cost rental housing or owner-occupier homes constructed of most anything available in the same areas. Here's where the new rural-urban migrants begin their progress through the urbanization process. Here, too, the manual workers of the lower class reside. Housing varies a great deal, depending upon income and other family resources, but is frequently inadequate. Often the houses are constructed on "invaded" properties and physical improvement is not only difficult financially, but also unwise since the quasi-builders do not possess a title to the land. Urban services of lights, sewage, water, streets, education, and police protection are poor. Shops are small and tend toward general merchandizing rather than specialization. Naturally, they sell mostly low-quality goods but since they frequently extend credit and do a low-volume business, prices are high.

Most other Peruvian cities also conform to this pattern, with the exception that the zones are less distinct and both zones one and two will show a mixture of upper, middle, and lower class residences. The principal square is still the predominant center of the city, with the most important civic and commercial buildings, along with the cathedral, located on or near it. In some, the homes of the richest families may also be on the square, which otherwise functions much as "main street" does in the US.

Cities are few in the Andes and none of them could be called modern. Colonial architecture predominates, particularly in *El Centro,* and buildings with old-fashioned balconies and inner patios border narrow, cobbled streets. Life is slower and more traditional in general aspect but with modern touches of transistor radios, cars, and ivy-league dress styles. The Sunday open markets, religious ceremonies, and *paseos* in the square and parks are still the custom. Formal terms of address, strict relationships, and familial-friendship ties are all much stronger than in Lima.

The aspect that most attracts the attention of the visitor to these cities is the predominence of Indians in the population. Not only are they Indian by blood but also in their dress, language, and customs. It is not uncommon to encounter that they have a very strong social organization within their own group that reigns much more over their everyday lives than does that of the superimposed white and mestizo populations.

The one city, Iquitos, and the few large towns in the forest region are primarily white-mestizo in character. They are primarily new population centers, relatively poor, and with little modern development. Some characteristics of both the coast and the Andes are seen but a new kind of "tropical" atmosphere is growing that makes these centers appear much more like northern Brazil than like Peru. This is natural since, for centuries, communication has been primarily with the Brazilian Amazon rather than with Peru.

Rural Life

While most people who have visited Peru think of Lima, Cuzco, and Machu Picchu, this nation is actually characterized more by the thousands of farms scattered through the many valleys. Seventy percent of Peru's population is rural and lives from agricultural pursuits, just as in the days when Machu Picchu was the capital of the Inca Empire.

The coastal plain is but 10% of the country's land area and only 10% of this is farmed. The forty river valleys are almost entirely divided into very large estates and the cultivation of these is pretty much modern and intensive. The year-round laborers are mostly mestizos but many Indians come down from the Andes to work seasonally in the sugar cane and other crops.

The sierra or Andes Range holds many small isolated worlds; Indian worlds in which children are born, grow to adulthood, and are buried without ever travelling more than a few miles.

Life is hard on the small mountainside terraces where individual farms or assigned use of communal land permits only a scanty living. It's equally hard on the haciendas where a man is born into a life-job of working so many days per year for the owner in return for the use of a small patch of ground on which to raise cereals, potatoes, and other sturdy crops developed in this cold country. But it is also a peaceful land: one in which your relationships with relatives, friends, and white or mestizo overseers are fixed for you. There's no violence, little debate, and plenty of coca to be chewed to ease the pain of illness, hunger and dissatisfaction. Nuñez del Prado, a Peruvian researcher, notes that "the native population is more involved in production than in consumption and has no part in the political life of the country in which it occupies the lowest social level and usually lives under the most unfavorable conditions" (7, p. 103).

The Indian is very dedicated to his work, principally when it is for his own sake or done as exchange work with relatives and friends. His entire social and most of his economic life is organized around kinship, whether consanguineal, affinal, or ceremonial. The rights and obligations of helping each other mutually exist far stronger through such ties as *compadrazgo*. Paternal authority is strong. The division of labor by sex begins in early childhood. Laboring in the fields, herding domestic animals, and housework are also taught at an early age. Everyone must help and time for play is short indeed. The few fiestas celebrated in these outlying areas are the only events that bring the entire family away from its work. Other than at these times, only church and marketing provide opportunities for distraction from the daily routine.

Isolation, physical and psychological, is the lot of the Andean population. The Indian isolates himself even more by segregating himself even when he lives in cities, or by being segregated by others. Escape is difficult and the only sure path is through work on the coast where his children can grow up as mestizos and join the modern world.

Descending the eastern slope of the Andes into the larger valleys of 2,500 to 3,200 feet, one encounters the great cattle ranching area of Peru where large estates again dominate social and economic conditions. The cowboys and other laborers are Indian but live a more open, mobile life than their brothers higher in the Andes.

The mestizos of the forest region, along with the civilization-incorporated Amazon tribes exist primarily on a "gathering" basis. Wax, nuts, resins, and rubber are the products yielded up by the jungle and these require living deep in the hot, wet forests or long forays by canoe and on foot into this steamy land. The social organization of the mestizos, as would be expected in this kind of existence, is loose and shifting, depending upon where a living can be made and the mixture of cultures poured into the individual. National borders mean little (and in fact much of this territory is disputed by Peru and Ecuador) and they forage back and forth among Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador, and Colombia. As with most newly settled areas, life patterns are not yet set and only future development will tell what may arise.

Religion and Church

In this case no distinct geographical divisions can be made because of dissimilarities in all the regions. The Inca Empire accepted the many gods of the conquered tribes. They superimposed one god, the Sun God. In the same way, the Spaniards supposedly imposed a Christian Catholic God but He, too, is for many superimposed rather than substituted for the previous ones. Today almost the entire population is Catholic to some degree. It can be termed a kind of pagan Catholicism in the Andean population because the native's supernatural world is populated by spirits of the earth, of the mountains, animals, plants. They practice ceremonies and rites which are confused or mixed with Catholic ideas and rites. Thus native people seek to establish relationships to God and the saints through the Catholic Church but maintain their beliefs in this Indian spirit world. This phenomenon also appears in some native populations on the coast.

Every city, big or small, has a particular saint protector which is venerated once a year with a big fiesta. In small towns the fiesta is organized in the name of a saint by a person who accepts the responsibility of making the arrangements and paying the expenses. This responsibility is called *cargo, alferazgo* or *Mayordomía.*

Young people, and especially those who have studied, tend to believe less in any of the religions and are more likely to show up at a popular Mass (e.g., the 11:00 A.M. Mass on Sundays). Here they are apparently more interested in the social activity than in the theology involved. Nevertheless, Peruvians continue to be recognized as among the most Catholic of the Latin Americans.

Education

From the beginning, formal education was in the hands of the Catholic Church: classical orientation and traditional studies. For many years it was only for the upper class. Today the schools are provided by the state or by religious bodies, but they are for whites and mestizos, not for the natives.

On the coast where the majority of the population is mestizo, schooling is barely adequate but in rural areas, especially in the Sierra, there are many barriers to formal education, such as: 1. lack of understanding of rural conditions on the part of the teachers, 2. resistance on the part of the natives to send their children to school, 3. teaching methods poorly adapted to the conditions, and 4. the language differences. Informal education is given in the process of socialization by the parents and community and is strongly traditional and especially oriented to teach the children how to work.

Stratification

Dr. Ralph Beals, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, University of California at Los Angeles, stated that: "In Peru the establishment of a feudal society was facilitated by the existence of a highly stratified native society." In that case there should be two classes today, upper and lower, but it is found, and Dr. Ralph Beals affirms, that there is another class which came to be called "middle class," formed especially by the mestizo population. Talking about the mestizo population, which has a set of patterns and characteristics, the term *criollo* is popularly used. In Lima (coast), the term *criollo* is usually associated with all groups except the indigenous peoples. The symbols of being a *criollo* are most prominently found in the mestizo patterns of diet, drinking, dancing, music, humor, fiesta celebration, and leisure time activities in general.

In other small coastal communities it is regarded as being upper class. In rural mestizo communities, the provincial upper-class turns to becoming *criollo* in aspiring to the "urban" way of life. Another popular term is *cholo,* equivalent to mestizo and used mainly to distinguish the two main variants in Peruvian culture, the mestizo and the Indian.

BRAZIL

According to the classification cited for Peru, Brazil is located in Group III. For purposes of clarification, it is best to use Wagley's (11) classification of regions and also the types of cultures found in each region.

REGIONS

1. Northeast Coast
2. Arid Northeast
3. Eastern Highlands
4. Amazon Valley
5. South
6. Brazilian West

SUBCULTURE TYPOLOGY

1. Tribal Indian
2. Modern Indian
3. Peasant
4. Primitive Sugar Culture (*Engenho*)
5. Modern Sugar Culture (*Usina*)
6. Town
7. Metropolitan

Northeast Coast

The first region is located in the northern part of the country and is made up of the following states: Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe and Bahia. At the very beginning and for a long time, the Portuguese dominated this very rich sugar region. Initially, this region was characterized by the primitive sugar culture, and some still is, but most has now turned modern. The former was characterized by very large farmlands in which the main product was sugar cane, farmed by exploiting the slaves. The landowner's house was located in the center of the plantation and surrounded by servants' houses, a chapel, slave quarters, and an equipment storage hut.

This type of exploitation of land and men left deep roots in the inhabitants of the region. Even today, we find some features in the attitudes of the people similar to those of ancient times. For example, during slavery, the slave was highly dependent on the landowner and very loyal to his master. Today, the slaves' descendents have the same attitudes toward the employers, who in many cases are also descendents of the masters. We can see clearly in this type of subculture a division of two levels—worker and landowner. The workers can be considered as rural people. However, the landowners, besides the fact that they belong to this stratum (plantation), have a way of life that can be considered as urban. In many cases these landowners live in both rural and urban areas. They have their agricultural enterprise in the rural area but may have their residence in either rural or urban areas, in a nearby city or, in some cases, the state capital. The landowners generally occupy the upper stratum in the social scale.

The *Engenho* Plantation subculture in many sections has passed or developed toward the new and superior step of *Usina* Plantation subculture. As industry progressed, the sugar mill developed into a modern economic enterprise. The most notable changes are related to the peon-*patrão* (worker-landowner). In the *Engenho* Plantation subculture there are patterns of intimacy of mutual dependency, and loyalty between workers and landlords. On the other hand, in the present *Usina* Plantation subculture, those traditional patterns have been changed for more strict economic relationships between the workers and the administrators of the corporation.

We can still say that there are certain regions that maintain certain similarities to the *Engenho* type in the sense that they cultivate sugar cane but industrial processing is done by a large and modern corporation. This type of cane culture has been internalized into national institutions and cultural patterns and the workers in modern plants enjoy a better life today. Mintz (8) recently characterized these workers as the "rural proletariats."

Arid Northeast

This region comprises the states of Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, and the dry interior sections of Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, Sergipe, Alagoas, and Bahia. It is one of the most densely populated regions of Brazil, but is one of the poorest in natural resources. With the exception of a few rivers, the region is arid and only occasionally has vegetation (*sertão*). In general, the resident of the Arid Northeast is involved somehow in cattle production. The cattle are poor in quality, mainly because of poor grazing land, but the area accounts for 10% of Brazil's cattle production. The industry is poorly developed so far but lately there has been some progress due to government help and international aid. Techniques and machinery are outdated. Due to these facts and several others, the Northeasterners are continuously migrating in search of a better way of life. This migration is generally south: Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and lately, Brasilia. In some cases, these migrations are permanent and in others, temporary. The people are reluctant to leave their Northeastern homes and this persists in a popular song in which the words are as follows: *"so deixo meu cariri no último pau-de-arara"* (I leave my land only if the whole world leaves).

There are many characteristics by which we can classify the major part of the Peasant subculture region. These peasants consider themselves as nationals (Brazilians); the economy is tied to the region and also to the nation; extensive transactions through the medium of markets to which peasant farmers regularly go to sell their surplus for cash. Peasants maintain accounts at stores and trading posts from which they receive goods of nation-wide circulation such as kerosene, steel tools, cloth, thread. The crucial point is that these peasants are generally poor, illiterate, and with few means for alleviating their misery.

Eastern Highlands

In this region we find almost the entire state of Minas Gerais, part of Espírito Santo and part of South Bahia. As the name depicts, Minas Gerais is mountainous. After the sugar cane rush, adventurous men went to this region (the famous *bandeirantes*) and discovered gold which subsequently caused the gold rush of the eighteenth century. With this discovery arrived approximately 400,000 Portuguese, according to Celso Furtado (2), a Brazilian economist, of whom the majority settled in this area. As a consequence of the gold rush and the decline of sugar cane culture in the coastal region, many slaves were sold to mine owners. The region experienced success but the minerals were soon depleted. However, the population remained in the region and now is agriculturally oriented. The population has distributed itself into a great number of small towns with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants (e.g., in 1950, Minas Gerais had only two cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants among 1,093 urban centers).

These urban centers can be classified as a Town subculture type which have as their main function serving the immediate rural area. Many rural traditional patterns are still preserved. Everything is divided —rich-poor, white-negro, worker-landowner. Politically there is always rivalry between the two groups. The upper families are those which maintain the more intense social life such as parties and meetings; in most cases the workers are excluded. These families, the high social class, fight for the poor class vote. Another characteristic of this region, referring to agriculture, is the diversified farming (production of beans, corn, butter, milk, coffee, oranges, potatoes, and manioc). This type of production is carried out on the small farms known as *fazenda mineira*. The population of the state of Minas Gerais is considered as being the most traditional and conservative of Brazil. The old patterns of behavior such as the *compadresco* (god-parent) relationships and *parentelas* (kinfolk) are very important.

Amazon Valley

This region includes the states of Acre, Pará, Amazonas, part of the state of Maranhão and the federal territories of Amapá, Rondônia, and Rio Branco. It comprises 45% of the total area of Brazil but has less than 5% of Brazil's population. The main problem in the development of this region is the lack of means of transportation. Roads are in bad condition and are useable only part of the year, or do not exist. The main transportation is the Amazon River and its tributaries which carry the main product of the area, natural rubber. In peasant life there is little progress, primarily because of inconsistent world market prices for rubber.

This region is characterized by the Peasant subculture. The Indian population (from 10,000 to 20,000) is mostly concentrated in this zone. In some cases (rarely) we find the Primitive Indian subculture but more frequently the Modern Indian subculture. These latter are entering sedentary agriculture and live as other people of the area. Many years will pass before this region can develop because less capital investment in other regions close to markets can produce more profit than if invested here.

The South

This region may be divided into two subregions—the industrial center and the extreme south.

The Industrial Center

This subregion comprises the states of Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara, and São Paulo, which are the most highly industrialized centers and have high population density. Rio de Janeiro and Guanabara have every possible race mixture and their problems are similar to those characteristic of any other large city in the world. Even though Brasilia has replaced Rio de Janeiro as Brazil's capital, Rio is still the bureaucratic capital. Few industries are located in this state, but all industries have their main offices here. It is important to note that the port of Rio de Janeiro (state of Guanabara) has as much commercial movement as Santos, the port for the state of São Paulo, the industrial capital of Brazil.

In Rio de Janeiro we find the widely known *favelas* (slums). Recent census figures show more than 500,000 inhabitants in these unfortunate conditions. The majority of the *favela* population is Negro and other people from the north. São Paulo is also populated by a racial mixture of whom the majority is of European ancestry, particularly Italian and German. Recently there have been important migrations of Orientals to the area. The interesting thing about this subregion, especially São Paulo, is that its economy grew from coffee production. Coffee prices dropped severely and São Paulo successfully established a diversified farming economy and today is one of the leading agriculture producing states. Unlike sugar cane plantations, the coffee plantations allowed the slaves, and later the paid workers (*colonos*), some freedom of action in the sense that the peasant could work the land between the coffee trees or when the trees were growing. With the advent of the industrial era, economic freedom of the workers came faster and easier. Very rarely are traits of the colonial times found among this group, yet they are still prominent in areas such as Bolivia.

Today in São Paulo, we find a middle-class subculture and urban-proletariat subculture. The former was and is traditionally conservative; the new rich are more liberal. The middle class was a product of industrialization and professionalization; the urban-proletariate was the result of rural area and small interior town migrations.

The Extreme South

This subregion is made up of the states of Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. This is a completely different Brazil if viewed from an ethnic composition aspect and from their agricultural systems. Here we find the *estancias* (ranches) that specialize in cattle raising and as a consequence the *gauchos* (cowboys) who gave the area its typography. In some parts of this region the house styles and ways of living are very similar to those of the first migrants.

The peon-*patrão* system is different due to historical colonization and European immigration. There were no systems of agricultural plantations but there was an organized colonization system. They were culturally and organizationally isolated and for many years they maintained their European languages. This language barrier was particularly notable before World War II. Today they are almost completely integrated in language and social life.

The Brazilian West

This region includes the states of Goias, Mato Grosso and part of Pará. The *bandeirantes* (pioneers) arrived here early but this region is still sparsely populated. Its population in 1950 was 3.3% of that of Brazil, but its land area included 22% of the total territory. The location of Brasilia in this area (Goias) has brought many improvements to the area, notably road communication with the rest of the nation, telegraph services, and better markets. Schools and other facilities are also going up rapidly and spell even greater progress for the next generation.

Immigration is heavy now, and more intensive farming methods are being introduced to provide food and other materials for Brasilia and the expanding cities and towns of this region. Brasilia and the surrounding states stand as symbols of Brazil's hope for continued development—taking practically nothing and turning it into beauty and prosperity for the future.

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SOCIAL FORCES IN LATIN AMERICA

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A sociologist, just as an historian, economist, anthropologist or linguist, necessarily must implant at the beginning of any discussion on Latin America, the well-known disclaimer that he is not inferring that all of that conglomerate conforms to any set of theories or generalizations. While it is true that each nation varies considerably from any other, and indeed exhibits radical differences within itself, it can also be shown that there *is* a Latin America and that some characteristics hold fairly well throughout the area. Just as earlier writers were inclined to err through over-generalization, contemporaries bend too far the other direction and cause confusion and fragmented conceptualization by treating every life facet in piecemeal fashion.

While this paper will make no attempt at elucidating all the facts concerning social forces in Latin America, it will point out some of the more important institutions and describe their general nature. It will also, notwithstanding the risk of censure, discuss the commonality of some Latin American social forces. The readers are cautioned, then, that this article is by way of introduction, not definite description.

A Simplified Social Forces Theory

Social organization, in its simplest terms, is merely the way a people have arranged themselves to provide for their real or imagined needs. It includes not only such measurable entities as division into classes, the family, the grouping for religion, institutions for education, and friendship circles, but also the socio-psychological patterns of thinking (consciously or not) about all of these separately and as a whole, and about the individual's part in them. The organization does not provide an equal amount or quality of responses to needs of individuals but to survive, it must provide that which is deemed most important by each of the various segments of the population.

Most social institutions last for a very long time and are modified but slightly to meet the challenge of new circumstances. In fact, they usually persist far beyond the conditions which brought them about and continue to exist even when they become dysfunctional. Instead of changing the institutions when they do not fit, individuals frequently find ways around them or rationalize them, while contributing to their continuance by partial and/or outward conformance to them (outright ownership in slavery to control through credit). Eventually most members of the group may accept and even formalize the alternative actions without changing the original institution and thus create a parallel one (marriage and legalized prostitution). In other cases a society may give its blessing to the process of freely finding alternatives rather than institutionalize one of them (the *jeito* of Brazil or the "new twist" in the USA) or develop an accepted direction of the process (the *mordida,* tip or bribe, in Mexico; influence through friends in Chile).

The most frequent way of circumventing an institution that does not satisfy immediate needs, however, is to simply ignore the rules or norms and proceed in a manner thought to be an improvement (concubinage in many countries, successive divorces in the USA, polygamy in a few areas). Because of the pressure of some segment of the population or because either social and/or legal machinery grinds out change so slowly, a society may simply permit some or all of its members to forget that certain rules exist (the previous segregation practice in the USA).

All of these alternatives do, nonetheless, have their effect upon the original institution and tend to change it so as to meet the exigencies of the present environment, albeit slowly and sometimes too late. Only rarely, even during or after violent revolution, is change radical and swift (the elimination of a class which ruled by birth in the USSR). Much more often, mere substitution occurs (the military officers and financiers of the independence wars replaced the Spanish governing forces in most of Latin America without substantially changing the power structure within the society).

Few if any changes have lasting effects upon a population unless a high proportion of those affected demands the modifications and/or are psychologically ready for them. It can be argued that reform can come from the top down when a need truly exists, even when a vast majority of the populace is unaware of the nature of the problem and has begun no action toward remedying the situation (theorists frequently cite the US conservationist laws as an example). In fact, it can be shown that most revolutions, of whatever type, began above and filtered down. It is difficult, however to find one that was successful either when only a few felt the need for the new arrangement or when a subsequent "educational" campaign was not carried out to "awaken" the people (although few workers even knew what a monopoly, trust, or cartel was, Roosevelt's "fireside chats" plus the desperate financial situation existing at the time, drew widespread support for radical legislation; the Mexican revolution shares some of these same characteristics).

The secret to success in change lies in obtaining some degree of participation of the majority. This participation may come in the form of fighting (the Algerian revolution), voting (the people of Martinique chose to become an integral part of France rather than an independent nation), passive resistence (through which India gained her independence from Britain), or by convincing authorities of the need for change (bombarding legislators with letters supporting a reform).

The explanation for the theory of popular demand and readiness comes from the nature of society: it is a collectivity of individuals. The individual thinks, feels, and acts as he does primarily because he has learned from others around him and thus is, to a large degree, an imitation of his fellows. He invents or discovers very little; he rearranges that which has been passed on to him.

This rearranging, however, gives him what he has of freedom of action. The human mind apparently has almost unlimited capabilities for performing this function. The mind brings up many, many possibilities but rejects most all of these, thereby restricting "new" approaches to problems to those which will give him the greatest reward or help him avoid as much pain as possible. But neither the reward nor the pain has to be physical. In fact, those which are social may often be more important and lead to the loss of goods or suffering physical pain (a person unwillingly gives to charity; a soldier dies for his country). This does not negate the possibility of purely altruistic or spiritual motives, but it can usually be proved that socially-conditioned responses are involved along with the altruism.

It is no surprise, then, to find in every society, the following conditions co-existing:

1. that most social institutions are somewhat out-of-date.
2. that some individuals are acting counter to the established norms.
3. that there are myriad ways to avoid the punishment prescribed for flouting the norms; some of these carry strong sanctions and some do not.
4. that every institution is being modified to some degree.

No study, then, of formal, particularly written laws, will provide an accurate picture of any country and will, in fact, lead to gross misconceptions. On the other hand, a study of any special group may give ideas just as erroneous, especially if that group consists of individuals with vested interests in or related to a particular societal arrangement or trend. The Latin American countries are no exception—every known social idea finds adherents in every country so that it is fruitless to attempt to examine them all. Persons interested in working with a certain group in a specific country must necessarily discover the trends among those people. Those interested in the overall national picture can profit from the generalizations noted in the following discussions.

The Family

Latin America has in the past been characterized by rural-type social structures, further formalized by large landowner-"captive" worker economic relationships. Thus the family was held to be an extremely strong unit, one that extended to several generations of formalized (legal) relatives. At the same time, concubinage was not only permitted, but also gave extra prestige to those males who could in some way afford the arrangement.

A second "society" also existed in many countries, one usually made up of poor people who were physically very mobile: small farmers, small entrepreneurs, and seasonal workers (but almost never among pure Indian groups), which internally permitted progressive polygamy and even periodic polyandry. These rarely place very high value on either civil or religious marriages but almost invariably recognize and accept, as a society, several conjugal arrangements. Legitimate or illegitimate childbirth is relatively unimportant in these cases and instead they place more value on recognition or non-recognition.

Two distinct trends are present in every country. First, the rapid urbanization, particularly as concerns unskilled and semi-skilled workers, is weakening the extended and even the immediate families. This fractionalization, plus the weak economic status of the individuals, has caused some increase of common law unions. At the same time, the rapid growth of the middle class, which imitates its already established peers and those in the upper class, is causing an increase in the value assigned to civil and religious marriage and more stable immediate families. They also enter less into concubinage arrangements since their aspirations for homes, furniture, cars, clothing, and education have risen tremendously, making multiple families an economic liability.

One of the several secondary factors, but of growing importance, adding to this latter trend, is the economic, political, and social liberation of women. Their newly-gained independence allows them to demand and receive greater attention from their spouses and makes clandestine financing of amorous affairs more difficult. In addition, the liberalizing views and actions of the Catholic Church are attracting greater participation of men in religious functions. They, then, through conviction or to keep up appearances, restrain themselves in the matter of setting up illicit families.

Just as in the US, one of the most disturbing changes for governments, education, and parents in today's Latin America is the self-emancipation of children. Galling under centuries of the feudal dominion of parents, grandparents, servants, and sundry family members, along with the introduction of independence of thought in the school systems; the raising of the level of importance of youth in the teachings of democracy and communism; swelled by ideas gleaned from movies, television, and countless books and magazines; fanned by the success of student strikes everywhere—all these coupled to the traditional freedom of the young-to-old males, have brought about rebellion against authority of any kind, and particularly that of the smoldering mother-dominance pattern common in most of the southern continent. Often unable to cope with the lashing-out against tradition, parents complain bitterly, and mostly fruitlessly, about the uncontrolled conduct of many youngsters. Diversional activities are few and too costly for most people, leaving youngsters to expend their energies on demonstrations, political parties, and fads. While clubs, sports, better schools, and other preventive measures are being organized in most urban centers, more youths are recruited to "freedom" than can be attended in the facilities.

Again, newspaper articles and parental laments should not divert the attention of one studying Latin America from the general reality of the place of youth in that region. The vast majority still lead quiet lives in the circle of parental and village domination in which they arrive quietly and sanely to adulthood without the teenage upset characteristic of our culture. Their self-assurance, grace, responsibility, and thirst for education impress travelers and remain very much a part of the Latin American scene.

Proximity Relationships

One of the strongest factors in the social forces of all the countries of Iberian America, and the most difficult for US citizens to comprehend, is the level of personal relationships. These are primordial in every phase of life. They vary from face-to-face, give-and-take situations in small communities and neighborhoods to direct and intimate identification between godparent and godchild, management and labor, professor and students, governors and governed. They far outweigh institutions in their power. Individuals pay much more allegiance to *amigos* (friends), *jefes* (bosses), *padrinos* (godparents), and *compadrazgo* (the relationship between a child's parents and his godparents) than to ideas, ideals, or institutions. These relationships supercede communities, universities, industries, political parties, and even countries.

This social fact is not, of course, exclusive to Latin America; it is the general societal pattern for rural and small populaces nearly everywhere. What is surprising is that despite the extraordinary rate of urbanization, which usually brings a substitution of group allegiance, the direct contact continues strong. True, there is less "face-to-face" and more "identification," but the mode of conduct remains essentially the same—a person works harder, facilitates a legal process, votes for a candidate, and does any of a thousand other actions because it is expected or requested of him (or he thinks so) by a person with whom he has a real or imagined mutual aid "arangement." Ex-dictator Gómez of Venezuela may have been uneducated, arrogant, autocratic, and even cruel but he was past master at building personal relationships with persons from all walks of life. Few Latin Americans even saw John F. Kennedy, much less talked with him, but the identification he inspired there is outlasting that in this country.

Studies of leadership, patterns of new idea adoption, and the general communication process consistently show similar qualities "recognized" among those involved in these psycho-social phenomena:

1. a desired occupational or professional ability
2. a willingness to help others
3. some trace of direct identification
4. some ability to transmit their possession of these qualities to others.

Thus the reasons for leadership in the rural areas are often vocalized as "he's a good coffee grower"; "she knows more about dressmaking than anyone else"; "he can get us together when no one else can".

In larger communities the reasons become less specific but continue to emphasize concrete abilities: "He organized the last fiesta well."; "She has been the school principal for five years." In city residential areas, the people may recognize "leaders" with whom they have had little contact but they will still ascribe direct ability qualities to them.

At first glance this may appear to be a near copy of the old patronage and ward political organizations in the US but closer examination proves this to be untrue. Personages may come and go in our systems but institutions continue; in Latin America the disappearance of the leader usually spells the renaming, reorganization, and/or the demise of the organization. Unfinished public works, the multiplicity of political parties, and constant educational "reforms" are but a few examples of the application of this principle.

One of the clearest cases of the effects of a leadership pattern on the thought and actions of people was documented by Antonio Arce (4) in his study of the introduction of rational change on a coffee plantation in Costa Rica. The application of modern techniques denied ability expression to a high prestige group, the pruners, and despite better housing, more medical care, higher wages, and kinder treatment, nearly all the workers denied the higher production even though it was physically evident, invented problems that did not exist, and left the hacienda within a short time. Why? Because they owed allegience to a group of high ability workers who could no longer demonstrate this leadership quality, thereby the relationships which governed many facets of the "society's" behavior pattern were disrupted, creating first confusion and then dissatisfaction, and finally causing the withdrawal of almost everyone from an intolerable situation.

Professors from the United States, who are accustomed to having certain rights invested almost exclusively in themselves, who view department chairmen and college deans as partners in bringing an idea into fruition, who pay greater allegience to the idea and their university than to personages, often have disappointing and even disastrous experiences in the universities to the south. They find themselves outside the teaching and research structure and hopelessly prevented from doing what the whole country needs because what they must say or do for their cause reflects directly or indirectly on persons high in the organizational scheme. Were they to be allowed to carry out their activities, they would lessen or supplant the prestige of someone who has been accepted as the maximum technical authority and therefore find an audience only among the rebellious. And the more they consort with these, the less likely they are to get "in". The idea that a "smart" dean is one who can gather technical genius around him, thus raising his prestige by showing that he is a good organization man, is an untenable one in most Latin American universities.

US citizens are not the only ones to experience this frustration: dedicated Russian communists, reform-minded clergy, national agricultural extension workers, Japanese industrialists, and even French-culture-forever de Gaulle have felt its sting. Success is allowed those who learn how to implant ideas in the minds of others and wait for their hatching out. Just as with incubation, applying extra "heat" does not get you a new chick quicker, it results in a cooked egg.

The tenor of this discussion appears negative because of the need for focusing attention on a serious problem. It must be recognized, however, that there are high and low officials and citizens who are creative, well-trained, and working devotedly toward the improvement of every organization in their countries. Furthermore those people who might be called conservative are not intentionally acting against their institutions; they simply are acting in the only way and within the only social context they know. Progress in instutionalization, industrialization, and socialization is steady: the new wrestles with the old and the old defends itself against the new—an inevitable part of the social struggle.

Religion as a Reckonable Force

Religiosity is not easy to measure in an individual, very difficult in a group, and next to impossible in a nation. Nevertheless, no description of social forces in Latin America would be complete without noting at least some general ideas about religion in the present-day southern hemisphere.

The Catholic Church has traditionally played an important role in nearly every phase of Latin American life, and particularly in education, government, and general life philosophy. It still does and will for a long time to come. Except for Mexico, the Church accounts for more than 20 percent of the education of these republics and in some up to 40 percent. Furthermore, since teacher training and security are higher, and pupil attendance is steadier, all private education enjoys a much higher reputation than that dispensed by public schools. In addition, those who can afford to send their children there, do, thus the managerial staffs of government, industry, and most other institutions are in large measure graduates from these schools. Church influence, then, is proportionately much greater than their school enrollment indicates.

While only a short time ago the Church was regarded as one of the most conservative elements in these countries, recent developments show a widespread swing to the side of liberal ideas and, indeed, in many areas large numbers of the clergy are frankly revolutionary in outlook. Archbishop Zanabria led the fight for much of the social legislation in Costa Rica. The Church in Chile effected the first important land reform in that nation. Everywhere priests are being trained in economics, social welfare, community development, and cooperative buying and selling. Priests have led revolutionary movements in Brazil, Paraguay, and Colombia. Church-identified liberal parties have won in Chile and Costa Rica and another is strong in Venezuela.

Conservative elements are still strong, however, and exert a great deal of influence. Much of their power is more subtly applied than formerly, due to the social responsibility statements of the last two popes and the increasing numerical strength of young native priests.

Except for Panama and the ex-British territories (properly speaking these latter should not be included in the term Latin America), no other church commands much of an audience. All Protestant churches combined rarely reach five percent of the population and while their numbers are increasing, their proportions remain relatively the same. The only group with a sizeable increase in recent years is the Church of the Latter Day Saints in Mexico and part of Central America. In general the Protestant churches are made up of foreigners, children of immigrants, and lower class nationals. Only in Chile do they command a recognizable power by predominating among the groups of northern European descent, the members of which are of the upper and upper middle classes.

Although important immigrations of Israelis, Arabs, and Turks have arrived in Latin America, few of these remain orthodox Jews or Moslems for more than a generation. Buddhists are numerically strong only in Brazil but some adherents are found in nearly every country.

The so-called "native" religions, generally lack organization outside of tribal or village units and even these, except in primitive areas, are usually mixed with Catholicism. The Indians of Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru often evidence this combination. The Voodoo cult in Haiti and the Macumba in Brazil are not truly native but rather of African origin. Their domination over the lives of many people in both countries lies more in the black magic portion of their beliefs rather than in their principles of conduct. As with the Indian cults, these are ordinarily combined or held jointly with Catholicism.

Agnosticism and atheism both exist and are most frequently proclaimed by young intellectuals. Communism has brought about some increase in their numbers since World War II. Anti-clericalism is much more common than either of these and is particularly expressed in Mexico and Argentina. All three of these tend to be only partial rejections, however, since these same people tend to return to the Church during their middle age years and, in fact, frequent the sacraments at important rite periods throughout their lives.

The foregoing description does not tell the whole tale and two factors need to be mentioned to complete even this superficial account. First, Southern European-type Catholicism has permeated every phase of the cultures and philosophy. Far from being the irreligious peoples as seen by many Protestants and even Northern European-type Catholics, they tend to hold surprisingly unshakable beliefs in their religion. Their values, customs, and even their vocabularies are replete with Catholic orientation. Their subscription to the tenet of almost unlimited forgiveness by God and the low level of knowledge about their creeds, due to the woeful lack of Church personnel, give an appearance of desultory adherence which belies the truth of the situation.

Education — for Change?

Dr. Robert Havighurst has discussed the relationships between education and the societies of Brazil and the general trends in the educational process extremely well. There remains a need, however, for some general comments about education as a social institution within the framework of current events of strikes and dissension everywhere on the American scene.

ALL social institutions are, by nature, CONSERVATIVE. That is to say, within the current of thought that created them or is managing them, the mean opinion—the most common or an acceptable synthesis of the middle range—calls the plays. Further, in any sort of free leadership selection, the power in an institution is usually conferred on members "toward the conservative" side. All of this results, then, in an institution primarily dedicated to the status quo (in cases of absolute democratic selection) or to the ideas of the right of center of the managing group. Rarely, even for a short time, is an institution intentionally concentrating its efforts on changing society as such.

Naturally, there are always individuals in any group that desire change and through their individual efforts or of like-thinking members brought together in a subgroup, cause certain modifications to occur. These occur, however, in spite of the institution and not because of it. And just when these individuals gain control and consolidate their new thought into the philosophy and methodology of the institution, just then they are converted from "liberal" actionists to conservative and resist certain new modifications suggested by upcoming progressives.

A few individuals remain primarily in the progressive camp most of their lives. Their lot is a difficult and precarious one; they must have exceptional ability to stay on as leaders after their generation passes to the conservative side. Some of these stay in the thick of the battle (James Conant in US education, Martin Luther King in race relations). But more of them retire to a symbolic status so high that they serve throughout their professional lives as guiding lights for those among the front line battlers (Norman Thomas and Haya de la Torre in democratic socialism). Those who continue as active leaders find that much of the time they are fighting both sides, pulling up the conservatives so that change can occur and toning down the progressives so that change will be orderly and efficient.

Education as an institution, finds itself somewhat in the position of these latter leaders—passing on the general culture, mores, values, and norms to the new generations, thus serving as a conservative agent—and by shortening the time required to acquire the old culture, leaves time for the incubation and development of new ideas, thus serving as a liberal agent. Seldom is it the actual champion of these ideas but it is a causal factor in their development and intentionally or otherwise allows and even facilitates their dissemination.

And what of education in Latin America? First, let us examine our own system briefly so as to better understand that of our neighbors. From very early days, US education has been a middle class-oriented institution. Its staff is middle class; it serves as an important vehicle for acquiring middle class status by preparing lower class citizens to enter the professions. It dispenses middle class ideals and reaffirms these within its own structure and action. Only recently, in the case of "ultra liberal" thought in the University of California in Berkeley and in several cases of racial disturbances has US education found itself challenged as a too conservative structure for substantial portions of its staff and students. These grew weary of waiting for evolution and brought revolution to play. And this happened in an atmosphere of relatively rapid change compared to most of the rest of the world.

Again the question, what then of Latin America? Education did not begin as a middle class institution—it began, and remained for a long time, an organization by and for the upper class. Only in very recent years has it opened its doors to the lower class, and the middle class has had limited access to its services for only a short period longer. Furthermore, control of education has remained essentially in the hands of the upper class, thus its philosophy and methodology are primarily for the children of its own members. Worse yet for the other classes, the orientation has been chiefly for the upper class, causing a general dissipation of economic resources, talent, and time in imitation of the superficial facets of upper class living—clothing, cars, homes, entertainment—that could have been invested in further education, business, professional facilities, savings, and other items designed to consolidate the new position of them and their children.

Result? Continual and increased frustration. And the extension of education to larger and larger proportions of the population increases the difficulties. Temporarily more people are "educated" than can be absorbed into the economy at the level of their aspirations.

This is more potentially explosive than that produced by exploitation of the masses, general dictatorship, unjust legal systems. Its US corollary is the condition of the educated Negro. Both groups have tended to attempt to remedy the situation through three principal avenues:

1. Work hard individually to better their own lot, feeling that the eventual cumulative effect will produce the required changes,
2. Seek regulatory modifications through the ballot box that will reduce discriminatory practices and increase opportunities,
3. Rebel violently against persons, individual institutions, and collectivity.

The latter is the most disturbing to the general public and unfortunately for the goals of the oppressed group, usually results in the dissipation of energy and other resources, as well as creating even greater resistence in the rest of society. Indeed, reprisals against students in Latin America have been so stringent as to practically eliminate some sections of education for periods of time. Universities are closed; high schools suspended; students ejected, jailed, and exiled. This counter force has been strengthened, in many cases, to such a degree that the normal cycle of cultural change has been deterred or interrupted, resulting in less progress than would have taken place ordinarily.

Despite all these problems, education is progressing as a social force all through Latin America. Increased vocational, technical, and commercial training are providing the personnel for a more efficient economy. The addition of new fields of university education is filling voids in the intellectual structure of the nations. The extension of primary education to more and more of the people provides at least the base upon which further training can be laid. The liberalization of teaching methods results in more students staying longer in the system. The educational picture is, in fact, one of the brighter phases of national life. Whether it can improve itself and general conditions fast enough to avoid violent revolution and the imposition of radical ideas remains to be seen.

Politics, Political Parties, and Government

Bewildering, exasperating, and frightening are the adjectives commonly used in connection with civil government and its attendant institutions in Latin America. The frequent changes so confuse most observers that they are hard put to even recall the composition of the in's, much less understand which social forces they represent. Experts, both national and foreign, disagree on what is happening. To further confound the situation, few persons can objectively analyze events and they tinge their reports with partisan support for one group or ardent dislike for another.

Social scientists have a general distaste for current situations that involve politics and, except for certain economists, have avoided research that might have better explained what often have appeared to be purely contrived revolutions, social legislation, and power changes. Fundamentally, however, most will agree that the colonial period can be described as supplanting the indigenous hierarchies with imposed rule by a small French, Portuguese, or Spanish group over varying numbers of Amerindians. Three conditions grew from this situation during this period:

1. The formation, through conjugal unions, of an in-between group, the mestizos.
2. The reduction, through disease, war, and inter-marriage, of the Amerindian peoples to an insignificant force in most countries.
3. The introduction of Africans to replace the lost working class of Amerindians.

Independence and the abolition of slavery did not really change the socioeconomic structure—local authority replaced that of France, Spain, and Portugal but the relative positions remained the same. Local hierarchies grew up and maintained their power through the preservation of the status quo in-so-far as was possible.

The mid-part of this century, though, has seen some basic changes and the necessity of the superficial appearance of others. The presidential surnames changed—there was a period when Italian, German, Yugoslav, and other non-Spanish, non-Portuguese descendents dominated the executive scene. Generals, too, lessened in popularity and were replaced by colonels. Old political parties changed their names; new ones sprouted up annually.

Despite the superficiality of these indicated modifications, social change was occurring. The stirrings of discontent and the threat of greater manifestations in the future caused the hurried reorganization of politics and government at times. In other cases truly liberalizing legislation and structural replacements took place. Some of these, often to the chagrin of their authors, enabled even greater change.

But backsets have occurred, also. Reverting to military rule, establishment of dictatorships, and suspension of certain rights have been used to halt or slow down the breakup of the power rings.

The net result of all this garbled action and reaction, or in spite of it, has been a general increase of mass participation in all national institutions. Society is also regrouping itself to take advantage or decrease the disadvantages of social, economic, and political upheavel. Mexico's "voluntary" one-party system, Uruguay's ex-consortium presidency along with the abandonment of that system, Chile's election of a party advocating peaceful revolution, and hundreds of smaller acts and movements are at least momentary answers to pressing socio-political problems.

The future is as cloudy as the present. Social change will continue but its nature and direction will depend upon economic growth and distribution, upon the allocation of power within the societies, upon the ability of governments to channel the energies of opposing forces. Historical analyses will be far more accurate than present predictions but it appears that social reorganization and economic progress will have salutory effects on government throughout the Americas.

Economic Influences on Society

The colonization of the Americas was based primarily on the desire to improve the financial condition of the home country. It could not have been otherwise since the dispersion of military and other natural resources to these areas necessarily placed an economic drain on the treasuries that had to be compensated. Naturally, the new organization was built to achieve this end: a group of producers and supervisors to see that they produced.

The early independence years were characterized by subsistence economies, producing enough to pay for the local superstructure of replaced colonials. This period changed rather gradually to one of producing materials demanded by the world's commercial powers. Since these had already begun developing their industrial complexes, they demanded raw materials for their industrial production and food to replace that formerly provided by workers now involved in other pursuits. Finding areas able and willing to furnish these items led to further growth of industries and commercialization organizations. From there, vested interests pressured to keep this situation intact since disrupting any part of it would cause widespread unemployment and political dissatisfaction at home.

The very success of this operation, however, sowed the seeds of its own destruction. As more and more people in raw materials production earned a better living, they acquired more education, more capital, and a desire to manage their own affairs rather than be dependent upon outside forces. Both older residents and immigrants from the industrializing nations saw and took advantage of local markets by manufacturing national products and very soon active competition began. The local manufacturers usually could not compete with volume production and to overcome this disadvantage, they demanded protective legislation. Governments responded and the present nationalistic economies were born and nurtured.

What happened to society is obvious; it had to be reorganized. First a few workers were diverted from agriculture and similar occupations, then complementary services were increased, next government had to increase its own labor force, and the whole trend toward urbanization and specialization was well underway. The leaders attempted, however, to maintain their situation by keeping the reorganization within the existing framework of absolute control of employees by employers. Soon, however, the sheer number of trained employees gave rise to the possibility of emancipation from a part of this control and the introduction of labor unions and other forms of worker participation in decisions found ready adherents. These forces have continued to acquire power, either through strikes or ballots, and are reckonable voices in every country. Their growth would have been even greater had not a large part of their class remained behind in uneducated semi-tribal units or plantation isolated groups.

The new labor groups commonly sided with capital in keeping the large mass of the population "down on the plantation". They felt that the disbanding of the hacienda system would release large numbers from their agricultural pursuits and these would flock to the cities, competing for jobs. And only recently, when their demands for a still greater voice in management were not met, have they sought support from their rural brethern by offering socio-economic benefits. These benefits led to the desire for others and rural Latin America is now beginning to organize itself to participate more fully in every phase of national life.

This description is deceptively simple and positive. Social benefits cost money. Real money results from true economic growth. And true economic growth is very limited, if not impossible, when contained within limited expansion resources. To compensate for lack of capital, production inefficiency, and poor markets, the governments have resorted to contracting debts, printing money, restricting imports, and other artificial controls of their own economic destiny. These have neither been very palatable to the people nor very successful in business.

They have, nonetheless, resulted in some social characteristics which, if properly managed, can result in overall improvement. One of these is the incorporation of more and more people into national social, political, and economic life. Concomitant to this incorporation is a greater identification of individuals with the goals of the nation. Nationalistic tendencies have also increased and while the immediate result is mostly beneficial, the world situation is such that the exclusion of outside investment, technical assistance, and general economic cooperation is detrimental to any nation's future. Regional groupings such as the Central American Community are already appearing, and the social structures will have to be modified so as to allow for the inclusion of neighboring peoples in nearly border-free cooperative arrangements.

Class Barriers

Numerous references have been made to social classes all through this discussion. The description of these classes has intentionally been left toward the end, however, since comprehension of the present scene of other phases of Latin American life is required first. The term "required" is used because the recounting of the class structure necessarily must sound harsh and in being so, dulls the appreciation of the rapid changes taking place or in the offing.

The upper class structure is extremely rigid in most of the southern countries. Surname is an important word in describing anyone from this group. This surname will usually be coupled with the colonial period, independence times, important revolutions, or the presidency. Seven people with the same surname (all relatives) have been presidents of one republic. Members of these families are found in important positions in government, education, industry, banking, commerce, agriculture. The interweaving of power is so complex that at times it is impossible to explain certain kinds of decisions in any one facet of national life without tracing the interrelationships of personnel in different institutions affected by that decision. Appointments often appear ridiculous until one understands how they consolidate power.

Contrary to what happens in most parts of the world, in Latin America these families persist for centuries. In the US there are only a hundred or so direct descendents of all our presidents. In Latin America each one has literally thousands. There's no room at the top, then, for newcomers. True, a few do manage to rise but these usually have to "marry in" or in some way become so wealthy that the others must play ball with them. Even then, the newly rich may stay on the outer fringe of the upper social class for a long time. Amerindians, Orientals, and Negroes rarely have occupied high positions. (Notable exceptions are Haiti, one case in imperial Brazil, one short-reigning Peruvian, and perhaps Cárdenas of Mexico. They have not in the US either, of course.) Some few lower class people have risen to considerable political power (Gómez of Venezuela) but these have ordinarily been through military coups.

There are four principal sources of membership in the middle class.

1. Some members of the upper class, who after suffering low incomes for an extended period, do "fall out" of their previous position and find themselves in middle class. Some families have become so numerous that resources are divided many times and will no longer support an upper class life. Marriages not favored by the families, recognized illegitimate sons, and rebels from upper class values also find themselves in this category.

2. New immigrants and their descendents, even when they have a great deal of money, usually stay in the middle class for a long time; some forever.

3. A genuine middle class group, although very small, has existed since late colonial days. Small businessmen, some military personnel, lower echelon professionals, and operators of medium-sized farms make up this important segment of socio-economic life.

4. There is a growing group of people who has managed to rise from lower class status through education, commerce, government or other institutional service.

The middle class in Latin America is a broad catchall category that includes so many variations of power, prestige, values, and economic resources that many social scientists conclude that there is no middle class, that there are several classes instead of one, or that for lack of self-identification, is of no value as a social class. All are partly true. Most of those in this grouping subscribe to upper class values and trappings. They live, however, in a manner far inferior to the superior class. They rarely join together to act as a block. There are serious divisions among them, not only in physical resources, but also in thought patterns. It is, at best, a loosely knit assortment and will remain that way until such definitely middle class leaders as Frei in Chile can pull them together or some idea stimulates unification.

The lower class, too, presents a diverse composition. Most servants, small farmers, and manual laborers fit here. Some small store owners, itinerant salesmen, teachers, and fishermen can be so classified. Nearly all Amerindians and Negroes have found difficulty in rising from this socio-economic condition. The lower class makes up not less than 50% of the population of any country and rises to over 80% in some. It's the great mass of the public, entering little into the economic and political life of these nations. They are economically on the subsistence level, buying and selling little. They are illiterate or can barely read and write. They live at the mercy of others, exploited or ignored.

Change is stirring here, too. They have flocked to the cities during the last 30 years, in ever increasing numbers. Urbanization did not improve their economic lot significantly in the early days but many youngsters growing up there have been able to obtain and hold worthwhile jobs. Children are attending more years of school than in the rural areas; vocational, commercial, and industrial training are helping.

Rural lower class conditions have improved some with new schools, agricultural extension, health clinics, and agrarian reform but for millions, life is endless drudgery, illness without hope, little to eat and less to wear. The land they toil is too poor to produce much regardless of farming practices and there is no work in the cities. And even if there were work, their low knowledge level makes them practically untrainable for most jobs. Latin America has a serious problem with this group. They consume almost no manufactured goods and without greater markets, industrialization cannot be increased; without more industries, there is no work for the illiterate lower class. The only hope of ameliorating the situation is through extension and credit so the farms may provide at least a tolerable existence, and greatly increased primary, secondary, and vocational education for youth so they can be absorbed into other parts of the economy in the future.

Exceptions and Unusual Trends

Generalizations are useful as a basis for comprehending area problems and progress but when applied to specific cases, sometimes cause erroneous conclusions. Those propounded in this discussion of Latin

America are applicable in some degree to every one of our Iberian neighbor states. In a few cases, however, the degree, at this moment in time, needs clarification.

Costa Rica, due to its settlement by families, abhorrence of the military, and accent on education, is an exception to most Latin American rules. It does not have an all-powerful upper class, exhibits a strong middle class, and its lower class is literate and upward striving. The Church has long been a liberal force, most presidents were educators, and civic responsibility is high. While Costa Rica's resources are very limited and her problems many, this tiny Central American republic is far better off in many ways than her wealthy neighbors.

Mexico, too, must be noted as differing from the general pattern. With a fast-growing industrial complex and a very healthy tourist business, she is fast outgrowing many of the stagnating characteristics common elsewhere. There are lots of trouble spots yet but the mighty surge upward will continue to bring improvement to them.

Sprawling, brawling Brazil conforms to the generalizations while presenting many exceptions to them. Wealthy Southern Brazil is far different from the poverty stricken North. The opening of new land can mean economic improvement for at least a million deprived farmers. She doesn't even know yet what her resources are. People both rise and fall in social and economic levels, frequently within a short span of time. Her divided state-federal powers cause and solve problems. A man can make a fortune with his wits and bare hands in a year, yet become stymied in incomparable red tape the next and not be able to lift a finger. She's just Brazil—industrial and rural, happy and heartbreaking, religious and blasphemous, free and hidebound—but above all, Brazil.

And there are sad exceptions as well. Haiti: poor, illiterate, stricken with black magic and worse politics, stands out as the nation with the least hope. Her artistic, French and Creole speaking population stands continually on the brink of disaster and seems unable to pull itself more than a hair's breadth away from misery.

Bolivia, too, must be cited. Here for centuries a restrictive clique marched an oppressed Amerindian population endlessly through tin mines, extracting mercilessly from both. But in recent years the oppressed exploded and have struck out ferociously against everything. Sadder still is the precious little progress being evoked in the nation—tokens of what's needed in this foreign aid supported Andean land.

Exceptions abound: Venezuela's fast growing industrial complex; Paraguay's nearly classless society; Guatemala's Amerindian problem; Chile's liberal top government layer and several thick underlayers of conservatism; Argentina's significant migrant influence. These are, nevertheless, mostly special manifestations at this time and may well disappear or take over as determinants in this vast and captivating area called Latin America.

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